LAX00FA322

The airplane took off from the airport on a left downwind departure and after reaching an altitude of approximately 300 feet, banked steeply and dove into the ground. Witness statements indicated that the takeoff ground roll extended to midfield of the runway, a distance of 4,850 feet before the airplane lifted off. According to the Airplane Flight Manual performance charts, the normal ground roll should have been about 2,100 feet. While turning crosswind, the airplane steepened its bank and continued toward the downwind. As the angle of bank approached 90 degrees, the nose dropped and the airplane descended to impact with trees and the ground. Several trees were struck before the airplane came to rest on the underlying terrain in the backyard of a residence. The airplane was thermally destroyed in the impact sequence and post crash fire. Calculations of the airplane weight and balance data put it at least 251 pounds over maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. Remaining wreckage not consumed in the ground fire was examined and the engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No discrepancies were found. Cockpit instrumentation and all autopilot components were thermally destroyed. Flaps and landing gear were found in the retracted position and the elevator trim surface was slightly nose up from the takeoff setting. The autopilot had a reported history of malfunction and the electric elevator trim system was scheduled for repair a week before the accident, but the owner took the airplane prior to the work being performed. The airplane had been modified with the addition of several Supplemental Type Certificates, one of which was a wing spoiler system. The controls and many of the actuating linkages for the spoiler system were destroyed in the fire.

History of flight

On September 1, 2000, at 1550 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-46-310P, N88AM, crashed into trees and terrain while turning downwind after takeoff from the Lake Tahoe Airport, South Lake Tahoe, California. The pilot had requested and been approved for a left downwind departure from runway 18 by the airport control tower operator. The airplane was destroyed by the collision sequence and post impact fire. The certificated private pilot and three passengers received fatal injuries. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91. The flight originated from South Lake Tahoe airport at 1549. Marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an IFR flight plan had been filed but not activated. The accident site was about 0.5 miles from the airport. The airport elevation was 6,264 feet msl.

According to the Lake Tahoe control tower operator, at 1542, a clearance to taxi to runway 18 was issued after a transmitted request from the pilot. Additional wind and altimeter information was given. At 1548, the pilot requested takeoff clearance and a left downwind departure. The controller gave the clearance to takeoff, approved a left downwind departure, and issued winds at 140 degrees and 12 knots. The controller then reported hearing an ELT (emergency locator transmitter) transmission at 1550. A verbal transmission from an unknown source was also received at 1550, and it communicated that there was an aircraft down. Smoke was observed 0.5 miles southeast of the airport. No emergency transmissions from the pilot were reported.

Witnesses on the ground reported the airplane lifted off on the 8,544-foot-long runway 18 abeam the terminal building at midfield, then almost immediately begin a crosswind turn. The turn had continued nearly 180 degrees when the airplane descended suddenly striking several pine trees before crashing between two houses. Several witnesses described the airplane's bank angle at nearly 90 degrees.

Additional witnesses reported seeing the airplane in flight moments before it crashed. An employee of Allegiant Air who was on the observation deck at the terminal saw the airplane bank hard to the left and stated that she thought it was in trouble and going to stall. "The turn was too steep [for having just lifted off] and the airplane had banked better than 45 degrees as it flew over the windsock," she continued. A mechanic who worked on the airplane earlier that day watched the airplane takeoff. He reported the engine sounding like it was under full power. Two other witnesses also gave an account of the engine sound. One lived just outside the airport and reported hearing the loud roar of the engine as it approached and crashed through the trees. The other reported hearing the engine revved up very loud and hearing an inconsistency in the sound just before the crash. According to the witness, the engine sputtered and then the power returned. The statement also indicated that the wing attitude was vertical instead of horizontal before the crash.

Personnel information

A review of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airmen records revealed the pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument ratings. His most recent certificate issuance was the addition of a multiengine land rating on November 16, 1999. The pilot also held a second-class medical certificate that was issued on December 21, 1999. It did not have any limitations or waivers. An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated a total flight time of 2,343.8, and the last entry recorded was November 16, 1999. The pilot reported having 2,428 hours on the certificate application for the multiengine rating. According to a personal associate of the pilot, he had over 2,500 hours of total flight time accumulated and had flown 200 hours in the last 6 months. The pilot was reported to have been logging the more recent flight time on a computer, which was not available for review by the Safety Board.

The FAA airmen and medical certification databases did not locate any U.S. airmen or aviation medical records on the passenger seated in the right front position.

The pilot was also the registered owner and operator of the airplane. A witness and associate of the pilot indicated that the airplane had been purchased about 6 months prior to the accident. FAA aircraft registry and ownership records identify the pilot as having obtained the airplane in March 2000.

Aircraft information

The 1985 Piper Malibu PA-46-310P airplane, serial number 46-8508056, last received an annual inspection on October 25, 1999. Review of the airplane logbooks revealed 2,845 hours on the airframe at that time. By March 15, 2000, the airplane had accumulated 2,900.3 hours. This airplane was equipped with a Teledyne Continental TSIO-550C1B engine, serial number 802521. It was installed on June 08, 1995, under Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA00380AT. Total time on the engine at date of the annual inspection was 815.9 hours.

A remanufactured Hartzell propeller, model number BHC-C2YF-1BF, hub serial number 4991SJ, was also installed on the airplane on June 08, 1995. The date of remanufacture recorded was March 22, 1995. The propeller maintenance logbook submitted for the investigation indicated that Palm Beach Propeller, Inc., had overhauled both the propeller and the governor.

Modifications made to the airplane included extended fuel caps, a wing spoiler system, and a nose gear door that provided engine cooling. According to New Piper Aircraft, Inc., the fueling ports were not a factory installation and allowed the operator to add an additional 10 gallons of fuel per tank, bringing the total capacity to 140 gallons. Maintenance logs established August 29, 1995, as the date of installation in accordance with an STC. The airplane weight and balance form had been amended to reflect the additional filler caps. Total time on the airframe at that point was 2,068.9 hours.

A personal associate of the pilot who had previously flown in the airplane reported a problem with the autopilot. The statement indicated that the associate observed the pilot having difficulty disengaging the autopilot while on board. By the same account, the pilot reported to the associate that on earlier occasions it would activate without being switched on. The mechanic who worked on the airplane the day of the accident also reported the pilot having past problems with the electric trim system on the autopilot. No recent maintenance was performed on the autopilot according to logbook records kept by the previous owner. The operating manual states that the KFC-150 autopilot/flight director deactivates after a roll rate of 14 degrees per second and a pitch rate of 8 degrees is reached. When the heading mode is set, the autopilot will turn at a maximum bank angle of 20 degrees. Axis servos, bridle cables, and autopilot instrumentation was not located in the wreckage and presumed thermally destroyed.

The KFC-150 system incorporates an electric trim to relieve control pressures when the autopilot has engaged the pitch servo. The elevator trim surface was found with a downward deflection and a total of 9 threads on the jackscrew actuator were observed. New Piper Aircraft, Inc., reports that this position corresponds to a nose up setting of just above neutral. A jackscrew actuator position of 7 to 8 threads is the takeoff setting (neutral), and 14 to 15 threads equals a full nose up deflection of the trim. Both the electric trim and autopilot rocker switches are capable of adjusting the pitch attitude at a rate of approximately 0.9 degrees per second. Manual stick forces required to counteract the pitch trim adjustments were obtained through a Piper Aircraft flight test report; number VB-1352. The maximum setting for the fl