LAX02FA266

After an asymmetrical deployment of the thrust reversers during landing rollout deceleration, the captain failed to maintain directional control of the airplane and it veered off the runway, collapsing the nose gear and damaging the forward fuselage. Several days before the flight the #1 thrust reverser had been rendered inoperative and mechanically locked in the stowed position by maintenance personnel. In accordance with approved minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures, the airplane was allowed to continue in service with a conspicuous placard noting the inoperative status of the #1 reverser placed next to the engine's thrust lever. When this crew picked up the airplane at the departure airport, the inbound crew briefed the captain on the status of the #1 thrust reverser. The captain was the flying pilot for this leg of the flight and the airplane touched down on the centerline of the runway about 1,200 feet beyond its threshold. The captain moved both thrust levers into the reverse position and the airplane began yawing right. In an effort at maintaining directional control, the captain then moved the #1 thrust lever out of reverse and inadvertently moved it to the Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust lever in the full reverse position. The thrust asymmetry created by the left engine at TOGA power with the right engine in full reverse greatly increased the right yaw forces, and they were not adequately compensated for by the crew's application of rudder and brake inputs. Upon veering off the side of the runway onto the dirt infield, the nose gear strut collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose down pitch attitude, about 7,650 feet from the threshold. There was no fire. Company procedures required the flying pilot (the captain) to give an approach and landing briefing to the nonflying pilot (first officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the thrust reverser's MEL'd status, nor was he specifically required to do so by the company operations manual. Also, the first officer did not remind the captain of its status, nor was there a specific requirement to do so. The operations manual did state that the approach briefing should include, among other things, "the landing flap setting...target airspeed...autobrake level (if desired) consistent with runway length, desired stopping distance, and any special problems." The airline's crew resource management procedures tasked the nonflying pilot to be supportive of the flying pilot and backup his performance if pertinent items were omitted from the approach briefing. The maintenance, repair history, and functionality of various components associated with the airplane's directional control systems were evaluated, including the brake system, the nose landing gear strut and wheels, the brakes, the antiskid system, the thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these components.

1.1 History of flight

On August 28, 2002, at 1844 mountain standard time, an Airbus Industrie A320-231, N635AW, operating as America West Airlines flight number 794, landed on runway 08 at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, Phoenix, Arizona. While decelerating about midfield, the airplane veered right and exited off the side of the runway. Thereafter, the airplane crossed the apron area east of intersection B8 and experienced the separation of its nose gear strut assembly upon traversing the dirt infield area south of the runway, where it slid to a stop on its nose. The airplane was substantially damaged. On board the airplane there were 2 flight crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and 154 passengers (including 4 lap children), for a total of 159 occupants. Of the 10 persons injured, 1 of the crewmembers (the captain) sustained a minor injury, 7 passengers and 1 lap child sustained minor injuries, and 1 passenger was seriously injured. The daytime flight was performed under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The 2 hour 41 minute flight departed from Houston, Texas, at 1803 central daylight time.

Days earlier, the airplane's #1 thrust reverser had been rendered inoperative (MEL'd). The #1 thrust reverser system had been mechanically locked out by maintenance personnel thereby precluding its usage.

The captain of the accident airplane reported to National Transportation Safety Board investigators he had been informed by the captain of the preceding flight, following its arrival in Houston, that the #1 thrust reverser was inoperative and had been MEL'd.

At 1840, while approaching Phoenix during the accident flight, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic local controller issued the airplane (call sign Cactus 794) a clearance to land on runway 08. The crew acknowledged the clearance and continued their straight-in visual approach to the runway.

FAA recorded radar data indicates that the airplane descended at an approximate 3-degree descent angle from at least 7 miles west of the airport until arriving in the vicinity of the runway threshold.

The airplane's captain indicated to the Safety Board's Operations Group Chairman that he was the pilot flying (handling the flight controls). The captain indicated that the airplane's touchdown and his derotation on the runway's centerline was normal. The touchdown occurred about 1,200 feet beyond the threshold, and he initially maintained directional control of the airplane.

At 1843:40, the air traffic controller stated to the crew of Cactus 794, "I appreciate the first right turn you can make then a left turn on Bravo and contact ground."

In the captain's written statement he reported, in part, that after retarding both thrust levers to the idle position, he engaged the #2 (right side) thrust reverser. Shortly thereafter, the airplane started slowly diverging to the right. The captain reported that he reached down to ensure that the #1 (left side) thrust lever was in idle, and he reduced thrust on #2 while feeding in left rudder steering. The airplane did not respond to the steering input, so he added more pressure to the left brake, which did not correct the airplane's course. The airplane exited off the right side of the runway, and the nose wheel dropped into a ditch. (See the "Airplane Information" section of this report and the "Safety Board Operations Group Chairman's Factual Report" for a description of thrust reverser operation and procedures.)

The air traffic controller observed the airplane veer off the runway and traverse the infield. The controller stated to the flight crew, at 1844:35, "there doesn't appear to be any fire coming out of your wings." At 1845:00, the controller said, "ah theres we see no fire or smoke coming out the vehicles are on their way out right now." The crew responded and stated, at 1845:04, "we're going to evacuate the aircraft."

1.2 Injuries to persons

Fire department personnel reported having evaluated 150 occupants. Five of the occupants were transported to medical facilities; the others were treated locally, as needed. The injuries generally consisted of head, neck, shoulder, and back trauma.

1.3 Damage to airplane

In pertinent part, the external examination of the airplane revealed lateral skin panel buckling on the sides of the airplane from the aft nosecone area near frame #1, through frame #12, located about 9.5 feet aft. The bottom surface of the airplane's nose was crushed upward a maximum of 12 inches.

Regarding interior structure in the vicinity of the nose gear wheel well, the forward pressure bulkhead was found bent and cracked. The rear pressure bulkhead was bent.

1.4 Personnel information, flight crew

The accident occurred on the second day of the flight crew's scheduled 3-day flight sequence, which began on August 27 with a flight from Phoenix, Arizona, to San Diego, California, to Phoenix, and then to Houston, Texas. On August 28, the flight to Phoenix blocked out of the gate about 1744 central daylight time.

1.4.1 The Captain.

The captain, age 59, held an airline transport pilot certificate, with an airplane single and multiengine land and rotorcraft helicopter ratings. He held type ratings in the Airbus A320 and the DHC-8. He possessed a first-class aviation medical certificate with the limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision.

A review of the captain's FAA records indicated that he had no history of prior accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions. The captain's total flight time was reported at 19,500 hours, of which 7,000 hours were as captain flying an A320. During the preceding 24 hours, 30, and 90 days the captain had flown for 4, 76, and 232 hours, respectively. The captain's last A320 proficiency check was accomplished in July 2002.

The captain reported that following his arrival in Houston on August 27, he had a 15-hour layover. He stated that he had sufficient sleep in Houston. On August 28, he had lunch with his first officer prior to reporting for duty.

1.4.2 The First Officer.

The first officer, age 40, held an airline transport pilot certificate, with airplane single and multiengine land ratings. He held type ratings in the B-737, BA3100, and SF-340. He possessed a first-class aviation medical certificate with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses.

A review of the first officer's FAA records indicated that he had no history of prior accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions. His total flight time was reported at over 11,000 hours, of which 800 hours were acquired flying an A320. During the preceding 24 hours, 30, and 90 days the first officer had flown for 4, 53, and 173 hours, respectively. The first officer's last A320 proficiency check was accomplished in February 2002.

The first officer reported that following his arrival in Houston on August 27, he likewise had a 15-hour layover. He stated that he had sufficient sleep in Houston. He stated that his rest the night before was adequate, sleep was sufficient and normal, and his fatigue level was insignificant.

1.5 Aircraft information

1.5.1 Maintenance, General.

The airplane, serial number 092, was manufactured in 1990. America West Airlines maintained the airplane on a continuous airworthiness basis following the Airbus maintenance inspection program. The program was reviewed for accomplishment of the prescribed Through-Flight Checks, 4- and 8-Day Checks, A & C Checks, and for compliance with airworthiness directives. According to the FAA participant, the program audit revealed that America West Airlines had followed the approved maintenance program. The last "C" check and "A" checks were accomplished as scheduled on September 27, 2001, and on July 22, 2002, respectively. By the accident date, the airplane had 40,084 total hours and 18