LAX06FA289

The pilot, who did not possess an instrument rating, departed the airport on a downwind departure toward the mountainous terrain that was between the departure and destination airports. The cloud bases were uneven about 1,400 feet, and a witness observed the airplane as it disappeared into the haze. Review of recorded radar data revealed a radar target appeared to match the airplane's departure time and initial departure path. This target performed multiple climbs and descents while turning left and right at altitudes between 2,100 and 3,000 feet. The last target was in a position that was approximately over the accident site at the time that the accident occurred. Investigators found no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

History of flight

On September 8, 2006, about 1433 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-23-160, N3082P, collided with terrain at Santa Maria, California. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The private pilot was killed; the airplane was destroyed. The personal cross-country flight departed the Santa Maria Public/Capt G Allan Hancock Field (SMX), Santa Maria, about 1430, with a planned destination of Kern Valley Airport (L05), Kernville, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed.

A Santa Maria tower controller reported that he cleared the pilot for a downwind departure from runway 30 at 1428. He observed the airplane depart, enter a left turn, and then depart the pattern. The controller had no further contact with the pilot.

A ground witness heard an airplane maneuvering, but could not see it because of low-lying clouds in the area. He said that the engines sounded steady and smooth. Then he heard the engines sound increase similar to an airshow performer during a roll. Then the engines sounds stopped abruptly. The witness got in his truck and drove into the hills on his ranch. He observed a cloud of dust, and found the wreckage. He estimated that the cloud base was about 200 to 300 feet above ground level (agl) in the hilly terrain.

Another witness reported that the engine sounds caught his attention. He observed the airplane exit the clouds in a very nose low attitude. He estimated the cloud base at 400 feet agl.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident coordinator and the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) visited the Santa Barbara Terminal Radar Approach Control (Tracon) facility in Santa Barbara, California. A specialist played a video displaying air traffic during the time of the accident flight. A target with a secondary beacon code of 1200 was abeam the departure end of Santa Maria runway 30 about 1430. This target was heading approximately 120 degrees and climbing out of a mode C reported altitude of 2,100 feet mean sea level (msl). The target continued to climb as it also started a right turn. The target climbed and descended, gaining or losing altitude in 100-foot increments. On a heading of approximately 300 degrees, the target reached a mode C altitude of 2,500 feet, and then began descending and climbing in a left turn. It reached a peak mode C altitude of 2,800 feet, and went as low as 2,200 feet. The target began a right turn reaching 3,000 feet, and then stayed at 2,900 feet in a position that was approximately over the accident site. The last contact occurred at 1433.

Personnel information

A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and multiengine land. The pilot did not possess an instrument rating.

The pilot held a third-class medical certificate issued on July 10, 2006. It had the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses.

An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated that he had a total flight time of 824 hours. He logged 14.6 hours in the last 90 days, and 8.9 in the last 30 days. He had 477 hours in this make and model. He completed a biennial flight review on August 27, 2005.

Aircraft information

The airplane was a Piper PA-23-150, serial number 23-1002. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane had a total airframe time of 6,159.7 hours at the last annual inspection. The logbooks contained an entry for an annual inspection dated March 1, 2006.

The left engine was a Lycoming O-320-A3B, serial number 8581-27. Total time recorded on the engine at the last annual inspection was 4,909.4 hours, and time since major overhaul was 278.8 hours.

The right engine was a Lycoming O-320-A3B, serial number 8580-27. Total time recorded on the engine at the last annual inspection was 4,875.1 hours, and time since major overhaul was 251.9 hours.

Meteorological information

The closest official weather observation station was SMX airport, which was 3 nautical miles (nm) north of the accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was 261 feet msl. An aviation routine weather report (METAR) issued for SMX at 1451stated: winds from 240 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 6 miles; skies 1,400 feet overcast; temperature 18/64 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; dew point 12/54 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; and altimeter 29.91 inches of mercury.

Wreckage and impact information

Investigators from the Safety Board and the FAA examined the wreckage at the accident scene. The airplane fragmented along a curved path on the downslope of hilly terrain at 600 feet elevation. The site was about 3 miles at 177 degrees from the Santa Maria airport.

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a ground scar that was about 2 feet wide initially and 20 feet long; it led to an impact crater that was about 6 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep. The ground scar broadened and continued to another impact crater about 10 feet away that was similar in dimensions to the first crater; this crater contained the left propeller.

The debris path curved about 30 degrees to the right, and continued down the ridgeline. The main wreckage pointed in a northerly direction, and consisted of the bottom half of the fuselage and the empennage. The empennage separated from the fuselage structure, but the control cables remained connected. The left engine was underneath the cabin structure; the right engine fragmented with its larger section just to the right side of the main wreckage. The smaller segment of the right engine consisted of the front section of the right crankcase along with the number one cylinder, a section of crankshaft, and the propeller assembly. This piece was a few feet on the left side of the main wreckage. One wheel was several hundred feet northwest of the main wreckage, and at the bottom of the hillside. Some debris pieces were north of the main wreckage, and in tree limbs that were about 600 feet down the ridgeline from the FIPC.

Medical and pathological information

The Santa Barbara County Coroner completed an autopsy. There was no toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot.

Tests and research

Investigators from the FAA, Piper, and Textron Lycoming examined the wreckage at Aircraft Recovery Service, Littlerock, California, on October 11, 2006.

Airframe

The left wing separated into several pieces. The aileron remained attached to the center hinge on one section of the wing. The push/pull rod separated from the bellcrank assembly and the aileron. The bellcrank assembly separated, but remained attached to the aileron cable ends. The left flap separated; the push/pull actuator detached from the flap torque tube.

The right wing fragmented into several pieces. The aileron remained attached to the aft outboard section of the wing by the outboard hinge. The bellcrank assembly separated, but remained attached to the aileron cable ends. The push/pull rod separated from the bellcrank assembly and the aileron. The fracture surfaces were irregularly shaped. The right flap separated. The push/pull actuator detached from the flap torque tube; the fracture surface was angular and uneven.

The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer and rudder separated from the empennage. The rudder torque tube assembly separated from the rudder surface. Both rudder cables remained attached to the rudder torque tube horn assembly.

The horizontal stabilizer and elevator surfaces sustained mechanical crush damage, but remained attached to the tail section. The elevator control assembly tube was broken in several sections forward of the rear attach segment. The rear elevator control assembly segment remained attached to the torque tube. The torque tube remained attached to the left elevat