LAX96FA078

The aircraft impacted mountainous terrain in controlled flight during hours of darkness and marginal VFR conditions. The flight was being vectored for an instrument approach during the pilot's 14 CFR Part 135 instrument competency check flight. The flight was instructed by approach control to maintain VFR conditions, and was assigned a heading and altitude to fly which caused the aircraft to fly into another airspace sector below the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA). FAA Order 7110.65, Section 5-6-1, requires that if a VFR aircraft is assigned both a heading and altitude simultaneously, the altitude must be at or above the MVA. The controller did not issue a safety alert, and in an interview, said he was not concerned when the flight approached an area of higher minimum vectoring altitudes (MVA's) because the flight was VFR and 'pilots fly VFR below the MVA every day.' At the time of the accident, the controller was working six arrival sectors and experienced a surge of arriving aircraft. The approach control facility supervisor was monitoring the controller and did not detect and correct the vector below the MVA.

History of flight

On December 23, 1995, at 0019 hours Pacific standard time, a Piper PA-31, N27954, impacted terrain 16 miles north-northeast of San Jose, California. The aircraft was destroyed and the two pilots were fatally injured. The flight, operated by Ameriflight, Inc., with call sign "Amflight 41", was an instructional flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. An IFR flight plan was filed and the flight completed two IFR and two VFR segments prior to the accident. The flight was operating under visual flight rules at the time of the accident. Weather conditions at the accident location are unknown; however, visual meteorological conditions prevailed at Oakland. The flight departed from Oakland at 2320.

The purpose of the flight was to conduct a 6-month instrument proficiency check for the second pilot. The other pilot was a check airman employed by the operator. In accordance with the operators Operations Manual, the check airman was the designated pilot-in-command (PIC).

After an IFR departure from Oakland, the flight completed two ILS approaches back to the Oakland airport before requesting vectors for approach to Hayward. The first ILS was terminated in a VFR missed approach which was followed by radar vectors from Bay TRACON for the second (IFR) ILS approach at Oakland. The second ILS approach also terminated with a VFR missed approach from Oakland to the east. Oakland Tower personnel inhibited the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system for the flight when it initiated the VFR missed approach. The pilot then contacted Bay TRACON and requested a localizer DME runway 28L approach to the Hayward airport. After determining the aircraft's heading, Bay TRACON controllers instructed the aircraft to maintain 3,000 feet and then, 4 minutes later, instructed the aircraft to fly heading 120 degrees (downwind leg) and maintain VFR conditions. The pilot acknowledged the heading assignment but not "maintain VFR." Five minutes later, the pilot asked the controller if they could turn onto the localizer and was told that there were two Oakland arrivals inbound and that the turn would be issued in "just a couple more seconds." Four minutes later, radar contact was lost with the aircraft.

Rescue helicopters received an emergency locator beacon signal in the area where radar contact was lost, but were initially unable to locate the aircraft due to low clouds obscuring the mountains. The wreckage was located at 0915 when the weather improved. The aircraft had impacted a north facing mountain slope at the 3,000-foot elevation level.

Personnel information

The PIC/check airman was hired by Ameriflight, Inc., on July 5, 1994, and held an Airline Transport Pilot license with a multiengine land rating and commercial privileges in single engine land airplanes. He was authorized by the operator to act as PIC of Piper PA-32R, Piper PA-31, and Beech BE-99 aircraft under day or night and VFR or IFR conditions. At the time of the accident he had acquired total flying time of approximately 4,500 hours, of which approximately 1,200 hours were in multiengine aircraft. He held a valid first-class airman's medical certificate with no waivers or limitations.

In the 7-day period before the accident the pilot had flown a total of 14.1 hours. The first 2 days were off-duty (Saturday and Sunday), followed by 5 workdays. The first 3 workdays (Monday to Wednesday), the pilot's schedule consisted of reporting for work at Oakland early in the morning, flying an outbound Piper PA-31 trip of around 2 hours duration, being off-duty at the outbound station through the day (rest time), and returning to the home base in the early evening. The fourth workday (Thursday), the pilot reported for duty (at Oakland) at 0100, departed on an outbound Beech BE-99 trip at 0300, turned around at the outlying station, returned to Oakland and was off-duty at 0700.

The 5th workday, the day of the accident, the pilot reported for duty at Oakland at 0600 hours, flew an outbound trip in a PA-31 and was off-duty at the outbound station (Eureka, California) at 0900 hours. He departed the outbound station at 2030 hours and returned to his Oakland base at 2300 hours. The pilot then departed on the accident flight at approximately 2330 hours. The hours between 0900 and 2030 were off-duty (rest time), however, it was reported by the operator that the pilot used the time to return to Oakland (deadhead) on another Ameriflight aircraft for undetermined personal reasons.

The pilot's fiancee reported that he was very upbeat and happy about prospects for the future. He liked his job and had recruited several of his friends to Ameriflight. She reported that on Thursday, the day before the accident, he slept from about 1000 to 1400 hours after returning home from his early morning flight. He went to bed again at 2200 hours and was out of the house at 0445 Friday morning. After flying his outbound leg to Eureka in the morning he was supposed to meet the second pilot there to complete the check ride, however, the second pilot had called in ill. The pilot then deadheaded back to Oakland for undetermined reasons before returning to Eureka for his return flight. The pilot's fiancee didn't know of any sleep he got through the day, but doubted he was fatigued because of excellent sleep the previous day and his good health and stamina.

The second pilot was hired by Ameriflight, Inc., on January 4, 1993, and held an Airline Transport Pilot license with a multiengine land airplane rating and commercial privileges in single engine land airplanes. He was approved by the operator to serve as PIC of Piper PA-32R, Piper PA-31, and Beech BE-99 aircraft. He had accumulated a total flying time of approximately 5,150 hours, of which approximately 2,500 hours were in multiengine aircraft.

In the 7-day period before the accident the second pilot had flown a total of 13.1 hours. The first 2 days were off-duty (Saturday and Sunday), followed by 5 workdays. On the first 4 workdays (Monday through Thursday), his schedule each day consisted of a morning outbound flight from Oakland to Eureka, California, arriving about 0930 hours. He was off-duty in Eureka until 1830 hours, and then made a return flight to Oakland with stops in Ukiah and Sacramento, California. He was off-duty in Oakland about 2230 hours each night. On Friday, December 22, he was scheduled to fly the same trip, however, he called in sick and did not fly until the accident flight.

The second pilot's wife reported that he had called in sick due to cold symptoms, and that he remained at home during the day Friday while she worked. She did not know if he took any medication. When she returned home in the evening they had dinner together and she reported that he seemed rested and alert, and showed no signs of having a cold. She said that he was very happy and content, liked his job, and was eager to complete his check ride in anticipation of spending the weekend with his family.

Another Ameriflight pilot talked with the pilots about 2300 hours Friday evening as they were preparing to go to the aircraft. He reported that they both seemed rested and alert and that neither pilot showed any signs of illness. This pilot had known the PIC a long time and considered him a very good airman and said that he knew what the clearance phrase "maintain VFR" meant.

Aircraft information

The aircraft was acquired by Ameriflight in July 1994, and at the time of the accident had acquired 9,840 hours total time and 10,966 cycles. The aircraft was maintained by the operator in accordance with their FAA approved continuous airworthiness inspection program. The inspection program consists of four inspection events at 100-hour intervals. The most recent maintenance was an event three inspection on December 19, 1995, at 9,828 hours. The aircraft was dispatched for the accident flight with no deferred