LAX97FA065

At the time of the accident the aircraft had accumulated about 32 total hours. The delivery pilot and the owner pilot departed for a local familiarization flight. The aircraft failed to return and the wreckage was located the next day about 12 miles northeast of the departure airport. The aircraft collided with rolling farmland in a wings level attitude with the gear and flaps retracted. There was adequate fuel onboard for the local flight. There was engine power being generated at the time of the ground collision. Disassembly of the engine and a functional testing of system components found no failures or discrepancies. The featherable propeller was in the normal governing pitch range under engine power at the time of ground collision.

History of flight

On December 5, 1996, about 1512 hours Pacific standard time, an Opperman Lancair IV-P, N444LP, operated by Bradford Properties Inc. of Walnut Creek, California, was destroyed after colliding with terrain near Suisun City, California. Both pilots received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area flight and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated at Concord, California, at 1504 with a frequency change issued at 1506. There was no record of communications with any other FAA or military facility after departure.

The amateur built pressurized Lancair IV-P aircraft was being delivered to the owner. Friends of the owner stated that the delivery pilot was to familiarize the owner of the aircraft with the operating characteristics of the aircraft. The delivery pilot borrowed some approach charts and stated that they would do some approaches to another airport before returning to Concord. According to witnesses at Concord, the first pilot was asked if he needed fuel and he replied no, he still had 50 gallons.

When the aircraft failed to return, a friend contacted authorities to report the aircraft as missing. The wreckage was located the next day about 12 miles northeast of Concord.

Personnel information

Information on the first pilot is included in this report. The first pilot's flight logbook was not recovered.

Information on the second pilot is included in this report under Supplemental E. According to the insurance company representative, the second pilot had taken some Lancair pilot training, but had not completed the course of training at the time of the accident. His logbook was not recovered.

Aircraft information

The construction of the experimental aircraft had been started at Concord by a contractor for the owner. The completion of the project was transferred to Chino, California, where it was completed by a second contractor. According to the aircraft logbook found in the wreckage, an FAA special airworthiness certificate was issued on July 12, 1996, by a designated airworthiness representative (DAR).

The second and last entry into the airframe log was dated October 23, 1996, and signed by the first pilot. It stated the aircraft had no hazardous flight characteristics or design features. According to that log entry, the aircraft had a total time in service of 25.3 hours. According to the operating limitations, a minimum of 25 hours were to be flown within a designated area.

At the time of the accident, the aircraft was being delivered to the owner by the first pilot who had flown most of the hours in the aircraft. According to friends of the owner, the aircraft had approximately 32 hours of total flight time when it arrived at Concord.

According to the aircraft owner's business partner, the flight to Concord had taken 1:30 hours at 16,000 feet. The pilot departed full of fuel, and had 50 gallons remaining at Concord. According to a Lancair representative, the accident aircraft held about 96 gallons of usable fuel, and the fuel burn rate per hour should have been about 22 gallons per hour. According to a Safety Board computer program, it was about 330 nautical miles from Riverside, California, to Concord.

Engine information

The manufacture's issued engine logbook was eventually recovered from the contract builder at Chino, California. The date of manufacturer with the model and serial number of the engine was listed on the inside front page of the logbook. There were no other log entries found inside the book.

According to the information available, the aircraft and the engine had accumulated about 32 hours of operation at the time of the accident. During that time a turbo controller had been replaced with a rebuilt unit. Subsequently, at the request of the owner, it was again replaced with a new unit which resolved the turbo adjustment problems they had experienced.

According to hand written flight log pages that were recovered at the accident site, there were numerous discrepancy items. These items were resolved through adjustments and changes to the various aircraft and engine systems during the initial flight testing prior to the delivery flight to Concord.

After the accident, the engine was shipped to Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM), at Mobile, Alabama. On February 24, 1997, under the supervision of the Safety Board, the engine was disassembled and the components were tested where possible.

During the engine disassembly it was revealed that the oil scavenge pump housing had been replaced during the initial installation into the airframe due to a crack in the housing. During the installation of the engine into this airframe, a fitting in the housing is normally changed to adapt to the particular airframe design. The housing had been reinstalled with a red silicone type material. A small amount of the red sealant was found in the oil filter, otherwise the filter was normal. The oil filter cannister installed on the engine was marked 25.0 hours and dated 11-26-96.

The Bendix magnetos were both broken from the engine mount pads. The magnetos were mounted on a magneto test stand and tested satisfactorily. The engine driven fuel pump was damaged by impact forces and not tested. The fuel pump drive coupling was found intact. The fuel flow divider, lines, and nozzles were bench tested to TCM specifications. The fuel control assembly was bench tested to TCM specifications.

According to the TCM engine examination report, the engine exhibited normal operational signatures throughout. All internal components appeared to be well lubricated. The engine did not indicate any condition that would have caused an operational problem.

The left-hand wastegate balance tee was examined and found to have a plastic exhaust gas temperature (EGT) wire union connector melted onto the pipe. The upper half of the connector was intact and normal in appearance. The balance tee of the exhaust system operates at a temperature where the pipe is red hot in color during operation.

The turbo chargers were removed and examined. Both inlet turbo halves were impacted with dirt similar to the accident site dirt. The left inlet turbo shaft nut was missing. The right inlet turbo shaft nut was loose and backed off about two threads. According to the Allied Signal representative, it is likely that as the inlet turbo was impacted with dirt it would lock it up. The outlet side would have inertial energy that would tend to unscrew the turbo shaft nut, as it was spinning free. The turbochargers exhibited rotational scoring.

The fuel selector was examined. An attempt to move the selector from the left position was unsuccessful. The lower plate and the handle were removed. The shaft or spindle was forced out of the selector body. The lower plate was coated with a Permatex gasket coating. The shaft was also coated with the Permatex material. After cleaning the shaft and selector body with acetone, the selector moved freely. The selector had not been moved, nor was it in a fuel environment since the accident.

The Dukes fuel boost pump was opened for internal examination. All four carbon vanes were intact. The pump was damaged externally.

Propeller information

The featherable propeller was shipped to the manufacturer's facility at Vandalia, Ohio, for examination. The examination was witnessed by an FAA inspector. According to his report, the propeller damage was impact induced. The report stated that the propeller was being operated at high power at the time of impact. The amount of power was not determined.

The exact propeller blade pitch angle was not determined, however, the report stated that the propeller was not at or near the feather position at impact.

According to the second contract builder, the featherable propeller was chosen by the owner as a safety feature to enhanc