LAX98FA086

A flight of two military helicopters was on a northerly heading while N8343D was on a converging northwesterly heading at the same altitude. There were no indications that the occupants of either aircraft saw each other prior to colliding in midair. The crew of the second helicopter saw the airplane approaching, but did not have time to radio a warning. After the collision, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter pilot made a precautionary, run-on landing, and made an emergency shutdown. The 5 feet 2 inch airplane pilot used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom to increase his seated height. The seat did not have a vertical adjustment. The sun was in the southwest quadrant, with scattered clouds and 20 miles visibility. The top and bottom rotating beacons, as well as landing lights of both helicopters were illuminated. The helicopter pilot was flight following, but had not received any conflicting traffic advisories. The airplane pilot was not communicating with ATC. The transponder in the airplane was squawking 1200 but the altitude was reported as erratic and unreliable. The unreliable altitude returns from the airplane disabled the automatic intruder program. The controller did not see the airplane as a primary target because he was busy handling other traffic.

A flight of two military helicopters was on a northerly heading while N8343D was on a converging northwesterly heading at the same altitude. There were no indications that the occupants of either aircraft saw each other prior to colliding in midair. The crew of the second helicopter saw the airplane approaching, but did not have time to radio a warning. After the collision, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter pilot made a precautionary, run-on landing, and made an emergency shutdown. The 5 feet 2 inch airplane pilot used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom to increase his seated height. The seat did not have a vertical adjustment. The sun was in the southwest quadrant, with scattered clouds and 20 miles visibility. The top and bottom rotating beacons, as well as landing lights of both helicopters were illuminated. The helicopter pilot was flight following, but had not received any conflicting traffic advisories. The airplane pilot was not communicating with ATC. The transponder in the airplane was squawking 1200 but the altitude was reported as erratic and unreliable. The unreliable altitude returns from the airplane disabled the automatic intruder program. The controller did not see the airplane as a primary target because he was busy handling other traffic.

History of flight

On February 11, 1998, at 1525 hours Pacific standard time, a Beech J35, N8343D, collided with a California Army National Guard Boeing CH-47D, S/N 91-0234, the flight lead ship of a two helicopter formation flight near Morgan Hill, California. The lead and trail aircraft were using the call signs Schooner 14 and Schooner 44, respectively. The Beech was destroyed and the certificated commercial pilot, the sole occupant, received fatal injuries. Schooner 14 sustained substantial damage; however, neither the pilot, copilot, nor the two flight engineers were injured. The Beech was being operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight by its owner/pilot. Schooner 14 was being operated under 14 CFR Part 91 and AR 95-1 of United States Army Regulations as a military training flight by the California Army National Guard. The Beech originated at 1510 from the Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport in San Jose, California. The Army flight originated from the Monterey Peninsula Airport, Monterey, California, at 1505. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. Schooner 14 had a VFR flight plan on file, while the Beech had none.

The pilots of Schooner 14 and 44 reported that they both were on a heading of 004 degrees, cruising at 2,500 feet msl, with an indicated airspeed of 115 knots, when the westbound Beech J35 collided with the lead ship. The pilot of Schooner 44 reported that he was 7 to 8 rotor disks to the rear of the Schooner 14 at the 5:30 position.

The crew in Schooner 14 stated that they did not see the Beech at any time prior to the collision. At least two of the crewmembers in Schooner 44 reported first seeing the Beech approach their formation from the right about 3 to 5 seconds before the collision occurred. They stated that neither aircraft made any perceptible changes in heading or altitude before the collision.

A flight engineer and the copilot of Schooner 14 were both seated on the right side of the aircraft. The pilot-in-command's preflight briefing instructed all crewmembers to be alert for possible conflicting traffic and to promptly advise him of their observations. This has been a standard portion of the preflight briefing and the crewmembers had received the same instructions on previous flights.

After colliding with the right rear of Schooner 14's fuselage, the right wing of the Beech separated and the aircraft made an uncontrolled descent. The pilot of Schooner 14 subsequently made a precautionary, run-on landing and then performed an emergency shutdown.

Recorded radar data of the accident area was retained and reviewed. The Continuous Disk Recording (CDR) data was obtained from the Mountain View Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) site. The period covered was from 23:20:00 to 23:27:55 UTC. The data showed the Beech on a northwest heading prior to the accident and Schooner 14 on a north-northeasterly course. The rate of target return from the radar site was once every 4.5 seconds.

The radar returns indicated that Schooner 14 had a ground speed of 130 knots at the time of the accident. No ground speed was calculated for the Beech due to the erratic radar returns from the aircraft.

Personnel information

The pilot of the Beech was reported on his pilot's certificate to be 5 feet 2 inches in height.

The pilot's last logged flight was a round trip flight from Reid-Hillview to San Bernardino, California, on December 22, 1997, for a total duration of 4.7 hours. His logbook showed a total of 6,165 hours at that time.

The last recorded biennial flight review (BFR) in the pilot's logbook was accomplished on June 7, 1990, in a Cessna 172. No evidence of a more recent BFR was discovered.

Both military pilots in Schooner 14 met Army currency requirements and both had passed a standardization check ride in the same make and model aircraft within the preceding 12 months as required by Army regulations. Both pilots also had taken Army class II flight physicals within the preceding 12 months and had been found to be fit for flying duty by a designated Army flight surgeon. The pilot's medical examination was dated July 29, 1997. The copilot's was dated May 1, 1997. Neither crewmember was flying with a waiver for a medical disqualification. Neither crewmember was required to wear or possess corrective lenses for near or far vision.

Aircraft information

The Beech was equipped with seatbelts and shoulder harness. Friends of the pilot reported that he used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom, to raise his seated position in the aircraft. The left front seat did not have a vertical adjustment feature.

Schooner 14 was equipped with top and bottom rotating beacons as well as landing lights. These lights were reported by the crewmembers to have been illuminated at the time of the accident.

Meteorolgical conditions

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site with an estimated 20-mile visibility and scattered clouds at 3,000 feet.

According to astronomical sun and moon tables, at the time and date of the accident, the sun was on a magnetic bearing of 235.1 degrees and at an altitude of 43.1 degrees.

Communications

According to statements from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers, the pilot of Schooner 14 was flight following with Licke sector of Bay Terminal Approach Control (TRACON) at the time, but had not received any VFR traffic advisories before the collision occurred. The pilot of the Beech was not currently communicating with any FAA air traffic control (ATC) facility.

The transponder in the Beech was squawking the VFR code 1200, while Schooner 14 was squawking an assigned code of 4263 with Mode C indicating 2,800 feet msl. The Mode C data received from the Beech was reported as erratic and unreliable. The FAA facility automation specialist reported that because there was no valid Mode C data, there was no alert available from the intruder program.

Schooner 14 was handed off to Bay TRACON by Monterey Approach at 1525 for continued VFR advisories. Schooner contacted TRACON and reported level at 2,500 feet. About 2 minutes later Schooner 44 transmitted a Mayday distress call. When Bay TRACON responded to the call, Schooner 44 reported a midair collision between a "Bonanza" and "our . . . Chinook."

The controller described the radar coverage at 2,500 feet as "intermittent, in and out of radar contact." He said that he did not see either the primary or secondary target. When investigators asked why he did not notice the conflict, the controller replied, "Because I was busy."

The controller's workload at the time of the accident was described by his supervisor as moderate. He was working Hooks sector in addition to Licke. He recalled working six different aircraft at time he was handed Schooner 14. Most of that traffic was in the northern portion of his sector, while Schooner 14 and another VFR aircraft were in the southern area. He said his radar presentation was normal and that he felt comfortable with the situation.

Wreckage and impact information

The Beech accident site was located at 37 degrees 7 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 35 minutes west longitude. The site was 19 nautical miles from the Reid-Hillview airport on a 120-degree bearing.

Schooner 14 made a precautionary landing about 2 statute miles southeast of the Beech accident site.

A single propeller blade from the Beech, the upper engine cowling, right wing tip, and outboard 7-foot section of the right wing with the aileron attached were located in proximity to each other, approximately 0.5 statute miles southeast of the main wreckage site. The engine cowling was located at 37 degrees 7.589 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 34.899 minutes west longitude. The wing section, which was located at 37 degrees 7.054 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 34.

History of flight

On February 11, 1998, at 1525 hours Pacific standard time, a Beech J35, N8343D, collided with a California Army National Guard Boeing CH-47D, S/N 91-0234, the flight lead ship of a two helicopter formation flight near Morgan Hill, California. The lead and trail aircraft were using the call signs Schooner 14 and Schooner 44, respectively. The Beech was destroyed and the certificated commercial pilot, the sole occupant, received fatal injuries. Schooner 14 sustained substantial damage; however, neither the pilot, copilot, nor the two flight engineers were injured. The Beech was being operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight by its owner/pilot. Schooner 14 was being operated under 14 CFR Part 91 and AR 95-1 of United States Army Regulations as a military training flight by the California Army National Guard. The Beech originated at 1510 from the Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport in San Jose, California. The Army flight originated from the Monterey Peninsula Airport, Monterey, California, at 1505. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. Schooner 14 had a VFR flight plan on file, while the Beech had none.

The pilots of Schooner 14 and 44 reported that they both were on a heading of 004 degrees, cruising at 2,500 feet msl, with an indicated airspeed of 115 knots, when the westbound Beech J35 collided with the lead ship. The pilot of Schooner 44 reported that he was 7 to 8 rotor disks to the rear of the Schooner 14 at the 5:30 position.

The crew in Schooner 14 stated that they did not see the Beech at any time prior to the collision. At least two of the crewmembers in Schooner 44 reported first seeing the Beech approach their formation from the right about 3 to 5 seconds before the collision occurred. They stated that neither aircraft made any perceptible changes in heading or altitude before the collision.

A flight engineer and the copilot of Schooner 14 were both seated on the right side of the aircraft. The pilot-in-command's preflight briefing instructed all crewmembers to be alert for possible conflicting traffic and to promptly advise him of their observations. This has been a standard portion of the preflight briefing and the crewmembers had received the same instructions on previous flights.

After colliding with the right rear of Schooner 14's fuselage, the right wing of the Beech separated and the aircraft made an uncontrolled descent. The pilot of Schooner 14 subsequently made a precautionary, run-on landing and then performed an emergency shutdown.

Recorded radar data of the accident area was retained and reviewed. The Continuous Disk Recording (CDR) data was obtained from the Mountain View Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) site. The period covered was from 23:20:00 to 23:27:55 UTC. The data showed the Beech on a northwest heading prior to the accident and Schooner 14 on a north-northeasterly course. The rate of target return from the radar site was once every 4.5 seconds.

The radar returns indicated that Schooner 14 had a ground speed of 130 knots at the time of the accident. No ground speed was calculated for the Beech due to the erratic radar returns from the aircraft.

Personnel information

The pilot of the Beech was reported on his pilot's certificate to be 5 feet 2 inches in height.

The pilot's last logged flight was a round trip flight from Reid-Hillview to San Bernardino, California, on December 22, 1997, for a total duration of 4.7 hours. His logbook showed a total of 6,165 hours at that time.

The last recorded biennial flight review (BFR) in the pilot's logbook was accomplished on June 7, 1990, in a Cessna 172. No evidence of a more recent BFR was discovered.

Both military pilots in Schooner 14 met Army currency requirements and both had passed a standardization check ride in the same make and model aircraft within the preceding 12 months as required by Army regulations. Both pilots also had taken Army class II flight physicals within the preceding 12 months and had been found to be fit for flying duty by a designated Army flight surgeon. The pilot's medical examination was dated July 29, 1997. The copilot's was dated May 1, 1997. Neither crewmember was flying with a waiver for a medical disqualification. Neither crewmember was required to wear or possess corrective lenses for near or far vision.

Aircraft information

The Beech was equipped with seatbelts and shoulder harness. Friends of the pilot reported that he used a pillow, placed on the seat bottom, to raise his seated position in the aircraft. The left front seat did not have a vertical adjustment feature.

Schooner 14 was equipped with top and bottom rotating beacons as well as landing lights. These lights were reported by the crewmembers to have been illuminated at the time of the accident.

Meteorolgical conditions

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site with an estimated 20-mile visibility and scattered clouds at 3,000 feet.

According to astronomical sun and moon tables, at the time and date of the accident, the sun was on a magnetic bearing of 235.1 degrees and at an altitude of 43.1 degrees.

Communications

According to statements from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers, the pilot of Schooner 14 was flight following with Licke sector of Bay Terminal Approach Control (TRACON) at the time, but had not received any VFR traffic advisories before the collision occurred. The pilot of the Beech was not currently communicating with any FAA air traffic control (ATC) facility.

The transponder in the Beech was squawking the VFR code 1200, while Schooner 14 was squawking an assigned code of 4263 with Mode C indicating 2,800 feet msl. The Mode C data received from the Beech was reported as erratic and unreliable. The FAA facility automation specialist reported that because there was no valid Mode C data, there was no alert available from the intruder program.

Schooner 14 was handed off to Bay TRACON by Monterey Approach at 1525 for continued VFR advisories. Schooner contacted TRACON and reported level at 2,500 feet. About 2 minutes later Schooner 44 transmitted a Mayday distress call. When Bay TRACON responded to the call, Schooner 44 reported a midair collision between a "Bonanza" and "our . . . Chinook."

The controller described the radar coverage at 2,500 feet as "intermittent, in and out of radar contact." He said that he did not see either the primary or secondary target. When investigators asked why he did not notice the conflict, the controller replied, "Because I was busy."

The controller's workload at the time of the accident was described by his supervisor as moderate. He was working Hooks sector in addition to Licke. He recalled working six different aircraft at time he was handed Schooner 14. Most of that traffic was in the northern portion of his sector, while Schooner 14 and another VFR aircraft were in the southern area. He said his radar presentation was normal and that he felt comfortable with the situation.

Wreckage and impact information

The Beech accident site was located at 37 degrees 7 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 35 minutes west longitude. The site was 19 nautical miles from the Reid-Hillview airport on a 120-degree bearing.

Schooner 14 made a precautionary landing about 2 statute miles southeast of the Beech accident site.

A single propeller blade from the Beech, the upper engine cowling, right wing tip, and outboard 7-foot section of the right wing with the aileron attached were located in proximity to each other, approximately 0.5 statute miles southeast of the main wreckage site. The engine cowling was located at 37 degrees 7.589 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 34.899 minutes west longitude. The wing section, which was located at 37 degrees 7.054 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 34.