LAX99FA177

In the takeoff initial climb, the balloon contacted power lines, caught fire, and crashed into a field. The pilot setup the balloon for takeoff from a 798-foot-long open field, 298 feet upwind from 21,000-volt power lines. The FAA approved flight manual specifies that a horizontal distance of 100 feet for each 1-knot of wind speed be allowed between the takeoff point and any obstacle in the takeoff path. During the envelope inflation process, a 7- to 10-mph surface wind developed, which started dragging the basket toward the lines. The pilot elected to continue with the planned flight. He and the two fare-paying passengers took off and drifted into the power lines, which shorted and arced. An unapproved aluminum fuel tank in the basket ruptured and ignited the basket, envelope, and occupants. The pilot jumped from the basket and sustained serious injuries. The passengers remained in the basket and succumbed to thermal injuries. The balloon had been modified by the addition of an uncertified aluminum fuel tank to the two existing factory tanks that were composed of steel. During postaccident examination of the wreckage, a fuel line to one of the two burners was found not connected; with one burner inoperative, the balloon's climb capability was significantly reduced. The envelope's emergency deflation panel was found in the closed position and subsequent testing found it functional. According to the flight manual, the pilot's preflight actions should have included providing safety helmets to the passengers, ascertaining the winds aloft by launching a pibal, and ensuring that both burners were connected to fuel tanks and operational; none of the actions were completed. In addition, the pilot did not vent activate the envelope's emergency deflation panel to land when the collision with the power lines was eminent.

History of flight

On May 9, 1999, at 0746 hours Pacific daylight time, an Aerostar International, Inc., Rally RX-8, N70290, operated by Balloons by the Sea, Marina, California, drifted into power lines during the initial takeoff climb from an open field in Morgan Hill, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 aerial sightseeing passenger flight. The balloon was destroyed. The commercial pilot was seriously injured, and the two revenue passengers were fatally injured. The planned local area flight commenced from the field about 0745.

The pilot reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that he drove onto the open field and chose the location where the balloon was set up for the flight. During a previous occasion, he had used the same field to launch the balloon, and he was aware of the field's proximity to the power lines.

The pilot's sole ground crewmember reported to the Safety Board investigator that he was not a pilot. The crewmember stated that the pilot set up the balloon for takeoff. The crewmember identified the location where the balloon had been set up. This location was subsequently determined to be approximately 298 feet west of the east side of the rectangular shaped field. Power lines are located along the field's east side, where the entranceway to the field is located.

The pilot reported to the Safety Board investigator that he was unable to complete the pretakeoff check of the balloon before taking off because the wind speed increased rapidly. However, he believed that all of the balloon's systems were functional, and no mechanical malfunctions were experienced during the flight. As the balloon ascended it drifted into the power lines.

The ground crewmember stated that a fire erupted within seconds following the wire impact. Flames were visible emanating from the basket in horizontal and vertical directions. While the basket was still airborne, the partially burned pilot exited the basket and fell to the ground.

Responding fire department personnel reported that the pilot stated he had jumped out of the basket. The passengers remained in the basket. The basket, which was engulfed in fire, came to rest in a broccoli field about 121 feet downwind (east) of the impacted power lines. Both passengers subsequently died from thermal injuries.

Other damage

Pacific Gas and Electric Company personnel reported that they examined the impacted 21,000-volt distribution electric lines, which are oriented in a north-to-south direction at the eastern edge of the field. Evidence was observed that, at 43 feet above ground level (agl), the north A phase power line had been pushed eastward until contacting the middle B phase line. This action created a fault. The associated circuit relayed and locked out, thus interrupting power to 3,558 customers. Power was restored by 1355.

Personnel information

The pilot was issued a student pilot certificate on March 5, 1992 with a limitation that it was for balloons only. He soloed on September 2, 1992.

Upon completion of the balloon school's course of instruction, the pilot was issued a commercial pilot certificate on September 8, 1992. The certificate bore the following ratings and limitations: "lighter-than-air, free balloon, limited to hot-air balloon with airborne heater." When the certificate was issued, the pilot's solo, dual, and total balloon flight time was 5.5, 14.1, and 19.6 hours, respectively.

The pilot first flew an Aerostar RX-8 model balloon when the registered owner of the accident balloon checked him out in it, on February 15, 1999. According to the pilot's logbook, by the accident date his total flying experience in the balloon was amassed during 10 flights between February 15 and April 25, 1999. By the accident date, his total flight experience in the balloon was recorded as 11.9 hours. The pilot's total balloon flying experience was approximately 122.7 hours.

Balloon information

FAA Certification and Ownership.

Aerostar manufactured the balloon in 1994. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued the balloon a standard airworthiness certificate indicating it was constructed in conformity with the requirements of Type Certificate (TC) No. A15CE.

The new balloon, with its Aerostar, HP III dual burners, having a rated power of 15,000 BTU per hour per burner, and a Model RWS-454 wicker basket (gondola) was sold to the current registered owner in November 1994.

The balloon envelope's serial number is RX8-3214. In February 1997, basket serial number RWS-442 and two fuel tanks, bearing serial numbers V853 and V843, were placed in the balloon.

The balloon was designed with a parachute style panel covering the deflation port opening in the top of the envelope. Pulling on the deflation line allows for the rapid discharge of hot air.

Maintenance & Inspection History.

The operator reported to the Safety Board investigator that he contracted out for the balloon's maintenance. On May 19, 1998, at a total time of 75:50 hours, the balloon received its last annual inspection. No subsequent evidence of any maintenance was observed in the logbook.

The last flight listed in the logbook is dated April 25, 1999. On that date, the balloon envelope's recorded total time was 89:40 hours. The basket's total time was approximately 289 hours.

Logbook Entries.

The following statement appears in the FAA Approved Flight Manual (AFM): "All time during which the balloon is inflated and buoyant/upright . . . must be recorded in the envelope log book."

An examination of the balloon's logbook indicated, that at the time of the accident flight, the balloon had been operated for 13:50 hours since its last inspection. In particular, between February 15, and April 25, 1999, the balloon had been operated for a total of 9:20 hours during 8 flights, according to its logbook record.

No record was observed in the balloon's logbook for the pilot's two, 1-hour-long flights in the balloon on March 9 and 16.

Helmets.

The AFM contains a listing of items that must be on board during flight. In pertinent part, the equipment list states that "helmets for all occupants" must be carried as required equipment.

On May 13, 1999, the Safety Board investigator interviewed the operator and inquired if helmets were available for use by the occupants in the accident balloon. The operator stated that his company had helmets, but that they were kept "in the office" and were not used.

Fuel Tanks.

Aerostar personnel and balloon records indicate that upon delivery, the balloon was equipped with two, 15-gallon vertical stainless steel propane storage fuel tanks, serial numbers V868 and V880. Aerostar reported that its tanks are especially manufactured by the company for use in its hot air balloons.

According to the TC, the accident balloon's fuel capacity was limited to two or three or four V-10 (10-gallon capacity) or V-15 (15-gallon capacity) vertical tanks. No authorization was issued for utilizing a combination of both 10- and 15-gallon tanks in the basket.

In February 1997, stainless steel fuel tank numbers V853 and V843 were installed in the basket to replace the original tanks.

The Aerostar participant reported to the Safety Board investigator that to the best of his knowledge, the manufacturer has never experienced a rupture to one of its steel fuel tanks during a wire strike occurrence.

The pilot reported that prior to the day on which the accident occurred, he had placed the extra 10-gallon aluminum fuel tank in the basket. The pilot stated that the balloon's owner had informed him that it was permissible to use the extra tank in the balloon.

No evidence of a Major Alteration and Repair, FAA Form 337, or other logbook entry was found for the addition of a third fuel tank in the balloon's