LAX99FA218

At night, a Boeing 747-4F6B, N751PR, taxied into a Boeing 747 SP-44, F-GTOM. During the collision, N751PR was proceeding westbound on taxilane "C" for its planned departure for Manila. F-GTOM had landed from France and was standing short of its assigned gate 101. F-GTOM was oriented in a northwesterly direction, and its left wing was extending onto taxilane "C". Six ground service personnel were in proximity to F-GTOM, awaiting the connection of a tow tractor to pull it into the gate at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT). During the collision sequence, N751PR impacted the aft portion of F-GTOM's left wing. N751PR's right wing's winglet was severed off and F-GTOM's left wing was substantially damaged.

ATC had cleared the departing N751PR to taxi past the standing F-GTOM and make a 90-degree turn onto a nearby taxiway. The ground crew's wing walkers for the standing airplane were aware that its left wing was partially blocking taxilane "C." One of the wing walkers issued its company-authorized "engine operating" signal that was observed by N751PR's crew. This nonstandard signal was interpreted by the departing airplane's crew as an "all clear to taxi" signal in accordance with the standard hand signals published in the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual and by its airline.

The collision occurred as the departing airplane commenced a sharp left turn, from the centerline of taxilane "C" toward a perpendicular taxiway. During the turn the effective length of the airplane's wing increased. The right wing tip was not visible to the captain, and he relied upon his first officer and crewmembers to monitor its proximity to the standing airplane. However, after passing abeam the standing airplane's empennage and observing the wing walker's "all clear signal," the first officer redirected his attention toward their new course and away from the standing airplane's left wing.

Due to a lack of available ground area, and to accommodate the airport's need for additional airplane movement areas, the FAA had approved a reduction in clearance between the terminal gates and the adjacent taxiway/taxilane. Airport management was aware of the collision hazard related to the proximity between taxilane "C" and adjacent terminal gates. During the previous 5-year-period, three other collisions had occurred between Boeing 747 airplanes on the taxilane.

TBIT airport management personnel were responsible for enforcing published airport rules that required the arriving Boeing 747 SP-44 (F-GTOM) to power into gate 101, which was equipped with an operative docking light guidance system. However, this guidance system had not been used by the contract ground service company for several years. The TBIT management personnel failed to enforce the policy and allowed the ground service personnel to stop the arriving F-GTOM short of gate 101 thus partially blocking taxilane "C." The ground personnel, using their outdated airport rules manual (that directed a tow-in procedure), planned to utilize a tow tractor to pull the airplane the remaining distance to the gate. This was contrary to the revised manual, which required a power-in procedure. Airport management had failed to ensure that all manual holders were using updated versions of the manual.

At night, a Boeing 747-4F6B, N751PR, taxied into a Boeing 747 SP-44, F-GTOM. During the collision, N751PR was proceeding westbound on taxilane "C" for its planned departure for Manila. F-GTOM had landed from France and was standing short of its assigned gate 101. F-GTOM was oriented in a northwesterly direction, and its left wing was extending onto taxilane "C". Six ground service personnel were in proximity to F-GTOM, awaiting the connection of a tow tractor to pull it into the gate at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT). During the collision sequence, N751PR impacted the aft portion of F-GTOM's left wing. N751PR's right wing's winglet was severed off and F-GTOM's left wing was substantially damaged.

ATC had cleared the departing N751PR to taxi past the standing F-GTOM and make a 90-degree turn onto a nearby taxiway. The ground crew's wing walkers for the standing airplane were aware that its left wing was partially blocking taxilane "C." One of the wing walkers issued its company-authorized "engine operating" signal that was observed by N751PR's crew. This nonstandard signal was interpreted by the departing airplane's crew as an "all clear to taxi" signal in accordance with the standard hand signals published in the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual and by its airline.

The collision occurred as the departing airplane commenced a sharp left turn, from the centerline of taxilane "C" toward a perpendicular taxiway. During the turn the effective length of the airplane's wing increased. The right wing tip was not visible to the captain, and he relied upon his first officer and crewmembers to monitor its proximity to the standing airplane. However, after passing abeam the standing airplane's empennage and observing the wing walker's "all clear signal," the first officer redirected his attention toward their new course and away from the standing airplane's left wing.

Due to a lack of available ground area, and to accommodate the airport's need for additional airplane movement areas, the FAA had approved a reduction in clearance between the terminal gates and the adjacent taxiway/taxilane. Airport management was aware of the collision hazard related to the proximity between taxilane "C" and adjacent terminal gates. During the previous 5-year-period, three other collisions had occurred between Boeing 747 airplanes on the taxilane.

TBIT airport management personnel were responsible for enforcing published airport rules that required the arriving Boeing 747 SP-44 (F-GTOM) to power into gate 101, which was equipped with an operative docking light guidance system. However, this guidance system had not been used by the contract ground service company for several years. The TBIT management personnel failed to enforce the policy and allowed the ground service personnel to stop the arriving F-GTOM short of gate 101 thus partially blocking taxilane "C." The ground personnel, using their outdated airport rules manual (that directed a tow-in procedure), planned to utilize a tow tractor to pull the airplane the remaining distance to the gate. This was contrary to the revised manual, which required a power-in procedure. Airport management had failed to ensure that all manual holders were using updated versions of the manual.

History of flight

On June 6, 1999, about 2316 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 747-4F6B, N751PR, collided on the ground with a Boeing 747 SP-44, F-GTOM, at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California. When the collision occurred N751PR, operated by Philippine Airlines as flight 103, was taxiing for takeoff with an intended destination of Manila, Philippines. F-GTOM, operated by Corsair as flight 942, was parking following its arrival from Paris, France. Onboard the Philippine airplane were 4 flight deck crewmembers, 16 cabin attendants, and 405 passengers. None of the 425 occupants were injured. Onboard the Corsair airplane were 4 flight deck crewmembers, 9 cabin attendants, and 261 passengers. None of the 274 occupants were injured. In close proximity to the Corsair airplane were two United Airlines mechanics and four Hudson General LLC ground support personnel. None was injured. Both airplanes were operated as scheduled, international, passenger flights under 14 CFR Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed during the nighttime collision that occurred as the Philippine airplane taxied for takeoff in a westerly direction on taxilane "C," and collided with the Corsair airplane, which had stopped in a northwesterly direction short of its assigned gate 101, at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT). The Philippine airplane received minor damage. Its right winglet was severed. The Corsair airplane's left wing was substantially damaged. (All time references in this report are converted to Pacific daylight time, and are based upon the 24-hour clock.)

F-GTOM (Corsair) Arrival and Delayed Parking.

About 1110, F-GTOM departed from Paris, and about 2236, it landed at LAX's runway 25L. The crew advised Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control tower personnel (ATC) that its assigned arrival gate was 101. (See the Jeppesen airport diagram and the airport layout charts for a view of the taxiways, taxilanes, and gate locations.) At 2236:41, ATC advised the crew that gate 101 was occupied (by N751PR), and to hold short of the gate. The crew acknowledged the clearance and held its position.

N751PR (Philippine) Delayed Pushback.

N751PR's scheduled 2230 pushback from TBIT gate 101 was delayed because of an onboard passenger medical emergency. About 2301, N751PR's crew advised ATC that their airplane was ready to be pushed back from the gate. ATC issued N751PR instructions to pushback in a tail west direction (onto taxi lane "C") for a runway 25R departure. The crew repeated the pushback instructions to ATC, to which ATC stated, "that's correct."

The captain reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that he repeated the ATC pushback instructions to the tug driver responsible for the pushback. The captain stated that the driver confirmed receipt of the instructions. Thereafter, the tug driver initiated the pushback in a direction opposite that of the captain's instructions.

ATC observed that N751PR's ground service crew was pushing the airplane in a tail east direction. At 2305:19, ATC amended its clearance and instructed the crew to continue the easterly pushback until the airplane was positioned south of the American satellite, east of "C-10." The pushback process continued, and the ground crew disconnected its tow tractor from N751PR when it was located south of the American satellite.

F-GTOM (Corsair) Taxi to Parking, Procedure, and Captain's Statement.

At 2311, ATC instructed F-GTOM to taxi to gate 101 via a left turn on taxiway "B" and a right turn at "taxiway Charlie ten." The crew repeated the instruction and proceeded toward the gate. En route, F-GTOM taxied in a northerly direction and crossed in front of the west facing N751PR, which was holding on taxi lane "C" to the east of "C-10."

During the subsequent accident investigation, on June 9, 1999, the Corsair captain reported that he followed the lead-in line toward the terminal building as he approached TBIT gate 101. The airplane's taxiing was stopped upon observing a stop signal from his ground marshaller.

Within about 45 minutes after the accident, the captain provided a statement to a Los Angeles City Airport Police Bureau uniformed officer. In pertinent part, the captain reported that a ramp agent (marshaller) had ordered him to stop taxiing the airplane in order to connect the tow bar.

In another statement, the captain wrote, "so we stopped the plane, set the parking brake, shut down all the engines. The ramp agent connected [a communication line] to the aircraft. At this time we felt a shock...." The captain also reported that during this sequence of events the airplane's navigation lights and the beacons remained "on."

The captain also reported that he had observed (on the side of the building at TBIT gate 101) that the guidance system light box (aka the docking light station) was "completely dark" and "no lights were on." (The docking station is designed to provide lateral guidance and closure information to the flight crew when power-in procedures are used to taxi the airplane to the gate.)

The captain indicated to the Safety Board investigator during the interview that contrary to the printed statement on the Jeppesen airport diagram chart, he did not advise ground control that his airplane was not completely blocked at the terminal gate or that his airplane was partially obstructing taxi lane "C." The captain asserted that, until the collision occurred, he was not aware his airplane needed to be towed to the gate.

United Airlines Mechanics' Statements.

Two United Airlines mechanics, which were under contract with Corsair to provide a walk around inspection of the airplane and related duties upon its arrival, reported that they observed the Corsair airplane approach TBIT gate 101 directly on the lead-in line.

As the Corsair airplane approached the gate, a Hudson ground service employee directed the flight crew to stop taxiing. The airplane came to a stop and all engines were shutdown. A tow tractor was already positioned in front of the gate in anticipation of the Corsair airplane's arrival. One of the mechanics plugged in his headset and began communicating with the Corsair crew.

The mechanic reported that the first communication he made with a flight crewmember was "ground to cockpit." A crewmember replied, "this is cockpit." Then the mechanic reported that he said "set brakes," because he planned to insert the bypass pin into the nose gear to lock out the nose steering.

The collision occurred less than 1 minute after the Corsair airplane had come to a stop. (The FAA participant reported that the mechanic's (head set operator's) "set brakes" instruction should have alerted the captain that the airplane was to be towed. The instruction typically given to a captain when the airplane has reached the gate is "chocks in" to signal to the captain that it is safe to release the brakes.)

N751PR (Philippine) Taxis toward the Departure Runway.

At 2313:17, ATC issued the following clearance to the crew of N751PR, which was holding its position on taxilane "C" at "C-10:" "...when able taxi ahead on charlie to papa turn left at papa onto bravo eastbound taxi to runway two five right." A N751PR crewmember read back the clearance. According to the captain, the airplane then taxied at a slow rate of speed via taxi lane "C's" centerline in a westerly direction toward taxiway "P."

N751PR (Philippine) Taxi procedure and Captain's Statement.

The captain and his crewmembers indicated that they observed the Corsair airplane, and they were aware that a few minutes earlier it had taxied to TBIT gate 101. The captain stated to the Safety Board investigator that he was handling the airplane's controls. He indicated that he and his crew observed a ground service employee (wing walker) with a lighted nigh

History of flight

On June 6, 1999, about 2316 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 747-4F6B, N751PR, collided on the ground with a Boeing 747 SP-44, F-GTOM, at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California. When the collision occurred N751PR, operated by Philippine Airlines as flight 103, was taxiing for takeoff with an intended destination of Manila, Philippines. F-GTOM, operated by Corsair as flight 942, was parking following its arrival from Paris, France. Onboard the Philippine airplane were 4 flight deck crewmembers, 16 cabin attendants, and 405 passengers. None of the 425 occupants were injured. Onboard the Corsair airplane were 4 flight deck crewmembers, 9 cabin attendants, and 261 passengers. None of the 274 occupants were injured. In close proximity to the Corsair airplane were two United Airlines mechanics and four Hudson General LLC ground support personnel. None was injured. Both airplanes were operated as scheduled, international, passenger flights under 14 CFR Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed during the nighttime collision that occurred as the Philippine airplane taxied for takeoff in a westerly direction on taxilane "C," and collided with the Corsair airplane, which had stopped in a northwesterly direction short of its assigned gate 101, at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT). The Philippine airplane received minor damage. Its right winglet was severed. The Corsair airplane's left wing was substantially damaged. (All time references in this report are converted to Pacific daylight time, and are based upon the 24-hour clock.)

F-GTOM (Corsair) Arrival and Delayed Parking.

About 1110, F-GTOM departed from Paris, and about 2236, it landed at LAX's runway 25L. The crew advised Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control tower personnel (ATC) that its assigned arrival gate was 101. (See the Jeppesen airport diagram and the airport layout charts for a view of the taxiways, taxilanes, and gate locations.) At 2236:41, ATC advised the crew that gate 101 was occupied (by N751PR), and to hold short of the gate. The crew acknowledged the clearance and held its position.

N751PR (Philippine) Delayed Pushback.

N751PR's scheduled 2230 pushback from TBIT gate 101 was delayed because of an onboard passenger medical emergency. About 2301, N751PR's crew advised ATC that their airplane was ready to be pushed back from the gate. ATC issued N751PR instructions to pushback in a tail west direction (onto taxi lane "C") for a runway 25R departure. The crew repeated the pushback instructions to ATC, to which ATC stated, "that's correct."

The captain reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that he repeated the ATC pushback instructions to the tug driver responsible for the pushback. The captain stated that the driver confirmed receipt of the instructions. Thereafter, the tug driver initiated the pushback in a direction opposite that of the captain's instructions.

ATC observed that N751PR's ground service crew was pushing the airplane in a tail east direction. At 2305:19, ATC amended its clearance and instructed the crew to continue the easterly pushback until the airplane was positioned south of the American satellite, east of "C-10." The pushback process continued, and the ground crew disconnected its tow tractor from N751PR when it was located south of the American satellite.

F-GTOM (Corsair) Taxi to Parking, Procedure, and Captain's Statement.

At 2311, ATC instructed F-GTOM to taxi to gate 101 via a left turn on taxiway "B" and a right turn at "taxiway Charlie ten." The crew repeated the instruction and proceeded toward the gate. En route, F-GTOM taxied in a northerly direction and crossed in front of the west facing N751PR, which was holding on taxi lane "C" to the east of "C-10."

During the subsequent accident investigation, on June 9, 1999, the Corsair captain reported that he followed the lead-in line toward the terminal building as he approached TBIT gate 101. The airplane's taxiing was stopped upon observing a stop signal from his ground marshaller.

Within about 45 minutes after the accident, the captain provided a statement to a Los Angeles City Airport Police Bureau uniformed officer. In pertinent part, the captain reported that a ramp agent (marshaller) had ordered him to stop taxiing the airplane in order to connect the tow bar.

In another statement, the captain wrote, "so we stopped the plane, set the parking brake, shut down all the engines. The ramp agent connected [a communication line] to the aircraft. At this time we felt a shock...." The captain also reported that during this sequence of events the airplane's navigation lights and the beacons remained "on."

The captain also reported that he had observed (on the side of the building at TBIT gate 101) that the guidance system light box (aka the docking light station) was "completely dark" and "no lights were on." (The docking station is designed to provide lateral guidance and closure information to the flight crew when power-in procedures are used to taxi the airplane to the gate.)

The captain indicated to the Safety Board investigator during the interview that contrary to the printed statement on the Jeppesen airport diagram chart, he did not advise ground control that his airplane was not completely blocked at the terminal gate or that his airplane was partially obstructing taxi lane "C." The captain asserted that, until the collision occurred, he was not aware his airplane needed to be towed to the gate.

United Airlines Mechanics' Statements.

Two United Airlines mechanics, which were under contract with Corsair to provide a walk around inspection of the airplane and related duties upon its arrival, reported that they observed the Corsair airplane approach TBIT gate 101 directly on the lead-in line.

As the Corsair airplane approached the gate, a Hudson ground service employee directed the flight crew to stop taxiing. The airplane came to a stop and all engines were shutdown. A tow tractor was already positioned in front of the gate in anticipation of the Corsair airplane's arrival. One of the mechanics plugged in his headset and began communicating with the Corsair crew.

The mechanic reported that the first communication he made with a flight crewmember was "ground to cockpit." A crewmember replied, "this is cockpit." Then the mechanic reported that he said "set brakes," because he planned to insert the bypass pin into the nose gear to lock out the nose steering.

The collision occurred less than 1 minute after the Corsair airplane had come to a stop. (The FAA participant reported that the mechanic's (head set operator's) "set brakes" instruction should have alerted the captain that the airplane was to be towed. The instruction typically given to a captain when the airplane has reached the gate is "chocks in" to signal to the captain that it is safe to release the brakes.)

N751PR (Philippine) Taxis toward the Departure Runway.

At 2313:17, ATC issued the following clearance to the crew of N751PR, which was holding its position on taxilane "C" at "C-10:" "...when able taxi ahead on charlie to papa turn left at papa onto bravo eastbound taxi to runway two five right." A N751PR crewmember read back the clearance. According to the captain, the airplane then taxied at a slow rate of speed via taxi lane "C's" centerline in a westerly direction toward taxiway "P."

N751PR (Philippine) Taxi procedure and Captain's Statement.

The captain and his crewmembers indicated that they observed the Corsair airplane, and they were aware that a few minutes earlier it had taxied to TBIT gate 101. The captain stated to the Safety Board investigator that he was handling the airplane's controls. He indicated that he and his crew observed a ground service employee (wing walker) with a lighted nigh