MIA01FA152

About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut the engine down. The flight had just leveled at 23,000 feet. The controller told the pilot that he was near Jackson, Tennessee, and that he could descend to 7,000 feet. About 10 minutes later, the pilot reported he was at 8,000 feet and requested radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, at Jackson. The pilot told the controller he had the left engine shut down. About 5 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a propeller runaway. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported he was in visual conditions and requested radar vectors direct to the airport. About 2 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a cloud layer under him and that he had the localizer frequency for runway 2 set. About 1 minute later, the pilot was told to contact the McKellar Airport control tower. The pilot acknowledged this instruction. No further transmissions were received from the flight. Examination of the left engine at the accident site showed the left propeller control was found disconnected at the point the propeller control extension bracket attaches to the propeller governor. The propeller control cable had also pulled loose from a swaged point at the control rod and was also separated further aft due to overstress. The housing for the propeller control rod was found securely attached to the engine and the control rod was securely attached to the extension bracket. The propeller governor control arm, which was disconnected from the propeller control cable and rod, was found spring loaded into the high RPM position. Examination of the fractured left propeller bracket assembly was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The bracket assembly was fractured in the area of the outermost eyehole, at the point a bolt passes through the bracket assembly and the propeller governor arm. The fracture surface contained small amounts of dirt, grease, and minor corrosion. The fracture surface features include flat areas that lie on multiple planes separated by ratchet marks, features typically left behind by the propagation of a fatigue crack. The fatigue crack emanated from multiple origins on opposite sides of the bracket. The total area of the fatigue crack occupied approximately 85 percent of the fracture surfaces. The fatigue fractures initiated on the outer edges of the surface and propagated inward toward the center. The remaining 15% of the fracture surface had features consistent with overstress separation. Near the middle of each fatigue region were micro-fussures suggesting that the crack propagated under high-stress conditions. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined the separation point between the left propeller control flexible cable and the rigid rod that connects to the bracket assembly. The cable and the swaged part of the rigid rod were in good condition with no fractures or damage. The Piper PA-31-T2 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, does not contain a procedure for loss of propeller control. Section 3 did contain a procedure for "Over speeding Propeller", which stated that if a propellers speed should exceed 1,976 rpm, to place the power lever of the engine with the over speeding propeller to idle, feather the propeller, place the engine condition lever in the stop position, and complete the engine shutdown procedures. Pilot logbook records show the pilot completed a simulator training course for the accident model airplane about 9 days before the accident and had about 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2.

History of flight

On June 3, 2001, about 1611 central daylight time, a Piper PA-31-T2, N31XL, registered to Falcon Communications, Inc., crashed near Jackson, Tennessee, while on a 14 CFR Part 91 corporate flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed and the commercial-rated pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated from Malden, Missouri, the same day, about 1525.

Transcript of communications, from the FAA Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center, show that at 1526:49, the pilot of N31XL reported to the controller that they were off Malden, Missouri, and requesting a instrument flight rules clearance to Fulton County Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. The pilot was given the clearance and told to climb and maintain 23,000 feet. At 1550:52, the pilot reported the flight was level at 23,000 feet. At 1552:15, the pilot of N31XL reported that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut it down and find somewhere to land. The controller reported to the pilot that the flight was over the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, Jackson, Tennessee, and that the flight could descend to 7,000 feet. At 1553:42, the pilot was told that the airport was seven miles behind him. The pilot responded that he was trying to get down and would keep circling. The controller cleared the flight to circle as necessary and to descend to 2,500 feet. At 1601:47, the pilot reported that the flight was descending through 8,000 feet and request that the flight be set up for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at McKellar-Sipes. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain 3,500 feet and to fly heading 185 degrees for radar vectors to the final approach course.

At 1602:26, the controller asked the pilot to confirm his previous transmission that he did not need the emergency equipment standing by at the airport. The pilot confirmed he did not need the emergency equipment. At 1603:21, the controller asked the pilot which engine was shutdown. The pilot responded the left engine was shutdown. At 1606:12, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 200. The pilot acknowledged. At 1606:51, the controller instructed the pilot to maintain 3,500 feet. The pilot acknowledged. At 1607:12, the controller asked the pilot if he was turning right to 200 degrees. The pilot responded "one xray lima we got a prop runaway here we're gonna have to make a three sixty to come down to two zero zero for xray lima". At 1607:29, the pilot reported the flight was in visual flight rules conditions and requested radar vectors to the airport. The controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 340 degrees to the airport. The controller also stated he could give the flight a lower altitude, but would lose radar contact with the flight. The pilot responded that would be fine and the controller cleared the flight to 2,500 feet.

At 1609:34, the controller reported to the pilot that radar contact was lost, to report the airport in sight, and to expect a visual approach to runway 2. At 1609:59, the controller asked the pilot his distance from the airport. The pilot responded about 10 miles. The controller asked if the flight was in good visual flight rules conditions. The pilot responded that a cloud deck had just passed under him but that he should be able to intercept the localizer course for runway 2. At 1610:52, the controller instructed the pilot to contact the McKellar-Sipes Airport controller on frequency 127.15. The pilot asked for the frequency again and the controller repeated it. At 1611:04, the pilot responded "twenty seven fifteen one xray lima". No further communications were received from the pilot. (See transcripts of communications).

Recorded radar data from the FAA Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center showed the flight climbed to and reached 23,000 feet at 1549:18, at a position about 20 nm south of McKellar-Sipes Airport. The flights groundspeed was 212 knots at this time. The flight maintained about 23,000 feet, on a 148 degree heading, and accelerated to a groundspeed of 241 knots. At 1553:02, the flight began a descent, and entered a right turn. The airplane continued in the turning descent with the groundspeed fluctuating between 150 and 200 knots until about 1606, when it had completed a 360 degree turn and was now flying a southerly heading, at 3,500 feet, at a 182 knot groundspeed. At about 1607, the flight began a left turn, descended to 2,600 feet, and decelerated to 119 knots groundspeed. At 1607:50, the flight was lost from radar about 14 nm, on a heading of 160 degrees from the McKellar-Sipes Airport and about 7 nm, on a heading of 145 degrees from the accident site. The flight was flying on a 121 degree heading, at 2,600 feet, at a 119 knot groundspeed. (See radar data).

A witness located about 7 miles southeast of the accident site, in the area that the airplane was last observed on radar, stated that he was inside his house and his attention was drawn to the airplane by the sound of the airplane's engines. One engine was surging. He went outside and observed the airplane to the south of his position. The airplane was flying on a east-southeast heading at an estimated altitude of 2,000-2,500 feet agl. He lost view of the airplane behind trees, but continued to hear the engine surging and it appeared the airplane was making a left turn. The airplane came back into view to the northeast of his position and it had descended to between 1,000 and 1,500 feet agl, and was flying on a west-northwest heading. He lost sight of the airplane to the north-northwest of his position.

Another witness located about 7 miles from the accident site, in the area that radar contact was lost, stated that he, his wife, and his son, observed the airplane from their house, flying toward the northeast at about 1,000 feet agl. The airplane then made a 90-degree heading change toward the northwest, heading in the direction of the McKellar-Sipes Airport. The landing gear was not down and they observed no smoke coming from the airplane. One of the engines RPM was oscillating and the other engine sounded like the propeller was feathered and the engine was running, sounding more like a helicopter. The airplanes nose was pitched up and he thought the pilot was searching for a place to put the airplane down. They lost site of the airplane behind trees.

Witnesses near the accident site observed the airplane flying at an altitude of 150 feet, below a cloud layer. The airplane was flying from the southeast toward the northwest. The airplane then made a gradual turn to the left and then suddenly turned fast to the left. The engines sounded like they would speed up and then slow down. They lost sight of the airplane behind trees, heading to the west. The engines were not running smooth and he heard engine noise stop, then start, and then stop again. About 10 seconds later, they heard tree branches breaking and then a loud pop sound. They went in the direction they last saw the airplane and located the airplane wreckage. A small fire was burning in the nose and right engine area of the airplane. (See witness statements).

Personnel information

The pilot held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings, issued on May 5, 1989. The pilot held a FAA certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings, issued on March 17, 2000. The pilot held a FAA first class medical certificate, issued on October 17, 2000, with the limitation that the bearer must wear corrective lenses while exercising the privileges of the certificate. Logbook records show the pilot had accumulated about 9,500 total flight hours, about 9,390 flight hours as pilot-in-command, and 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2