MIA01LA125

According to the flight instructor, all pretakeoff checks were conducted by the instrument student, and his observation was that all preflight walk-around, radio, navigational, and engine checks were normal. Engine operation was normal, even characterized as "smooth" for initial power application and rotation, however, at about 200 to 300 feet agl, while crossing the departure end of the runway, the engine "burped" and regained power. About the time both pilots decided to return for a landing, the engine quit completely. The instructor took control of the aircraft, and they completed the emergency checklist for engine failure on takeoff, including switching fuel selector to the other, (left) tank, but power was not regained and a landing in the trees was unavoidable. Both pilots are adamant about the fuel selector being in the right tank detent at the start of the takeoff roll. Enough fuel spillage existed at the wreckage site that the Chapel Hill Fire Department was called, therefore fuel exhaustion was not considered by the FAA inspectors. Atmospheric conditions were not conducive to formation of carburetor ice by reference to icing probability charts. Subsequent engine run at an engine repair station with FAA oversight, after making adjustments for minor impact damage, revealed a satisfactorily running engine from idle to takeoff power.

On April 19, 2001, about 1730 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N118AW, registered to Chapel Hill Flying Club, operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight, collided with trees during departure from Horace Williams Airport, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and the flight instructor and private-rated instrument student were not injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

According to the flight instructor, following a satisfactory pretakeoff engine power check, on takeoff at 200 to 300 feet agl, the engine sputtered and lost power momentarily, regained power, and then quit completely. The crew completed the emergency items for loss of power on takeoff, including switching fuel source from right tank to left tank, but engine operation could not be regained, and the crew's only option was a forced landing into trees off the departure end of runway 27. The flight instructor submitted a separate statement attesting to his certainty that the fuel selector valve was positioned into the right wing tank detent prior to takeoff. The instrument student added that she definitely remembers feeling a detent when she selected "right tank" with the fuel selector prior to takeoff.

According to two FAA inspectors, examination at the accident site revealed adequate and proper fuel was found in the carburetor and gascolator. The Lycoming O-320-D3G engine crankcase contained adequate and proper lubrication oil. Three cylinders appeared to have adequate compression, and no. 2 cylinder compression appeared low. Maintenance records indicated the engine had a total time of 2,011.4 hours since overhaul. The inspectors accompanied the engine, serial no. RL-18625-39A, to an engine overhaul facility, installed it in a test cell, and started it with no difficulty. The engine was operated to 2,700 rpm for 10 minutes. A magneto check was performed at 1,900 rpm and the left magneto showed a 400 rpm drop while the right magneto showed a 150 rpm drop. A no. 4 ignition lead was found damaged and the left magneto was found improperly timed. These discrepancies were corrected and a subsequent magneto check showed an equal 150 rpm drop on both magnetos. The mechanic performing the testing, as well as the FAA inspectors, stated the discrepancies appeared to have been impact related.

On the occasion of the aircraft's most recent annual inspection, March 23, 2001, the following was entered in the maintenance logbook, "Compression check completed on engine as follows: No. 1-73/80, No. 2-62/80, No. 3-75/80, No. 4-74/80. Recheck No. 2 cylinder after 10 hours."

Reference to carburetor icing probability charts for the flight conditions existing at the time of the accident reveal that the flight was operating outside of any regimes of icing by a large margin.