MIA02FA041

The airline completed weight and balance and dispatch release forms for the initial flight showed an incorrect fuel load at the time the engines were started. The first officer performed a walk-around before the first flight leg which included checking the fuel tanks. A total of 460 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks, and a delay loading cargo occurred. After both engines were started to begin the first flight, the engines remained operated for between 9-10 minutes before they were secured due to a radio problem. Maintenance personnel reracked the VHF radios, and again the engines were started where the airplane remained on the ramp 3-4 minutes before taxiing to the runway. The airplane remained at the runway hold short area for between 20 and 25 minutes before returning to the ramp due to a radio problem. The engines were secured, and a new VHF radio was purchased and installed. The company did not prepare new dispatch release, or weight and balance forms for the flight taking into account the additional fuel consumed with the engines operating. The engines were started, and the airplane was taxied to the runway and departed for the planned first leg. The airplane landed uneventfully at the destination airport where the cargo was offloaded. The first officer performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks; 300 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks (150 gallons in each side). The flight departed to return and when near the coastline, the flight was vectored to an airport other than the planned destination due to a issue with U.S. Customs. The flight landed uneventfully, and experienced a delay clearing customs. While on the ground before departure on the accident flight, the first officer reportedly performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks with the captain looking on. The first officer reported that each fuel tank had approximately 1,100 pounds of fuel, and he and the captain both agreed before takeoff as to the quantity of fuel on-board as indicated by the magna-sticks. No fuel was purchased. Following starting of both engines for the accident flight, the first officer checked the fuel quantity gauges indications against the magna-sticks indications he observed; the fuel quantity gauges indicated approximately 200 pounds more. The flight departed, proceeded eastbound, and climbed to approximately 2,100 feet msl. During a right turn from a southeast to westerly heading, the right engine experienced a loss of horsepower which decreased from 900 to zero. The right engine was secured as a precaution, and priority handling to the destination airport was requested with air traffic control. The left engine horsepower remained the same (900) for a period of 31 seconds following the right engine horsepower decrease, then increased to 2,200, and remained at that value for 1 minute 13 seconds. The left engine horsepower then began to decrease and dropped to zero. The airplane was turned to the east, then turned to the south and ditched. The captain and first officer evacuated but remained with the airplane, and made it to shore where the first officer advised his wife that something was wrong with the fuel gauges. Following recovery of the airplane, pressure testing of the left fuel tank revealed no evidence of preimpact leakage. Pressure testing of the right fuel tank revealed slight leakage past the fuel cap. Boroscope examination of the engines, and functional test of each engine ignition system, fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the installed magna-sticks revealed no evidence of preimpact failure. The left fuel tank was drained and found to contain 2 gallons of Jet A fuel, while the right fuel tank was drained and found to contain approximately 540 gallons of salt water and 1/2 gallon of Jet A fuel. Fuel consumption calculations performed by FAA personnel revealed that at the time of engine start for the accident flight, the fuel tanks contained approximately 714 pounds of fuel. According to a representative of the engine manufacturer, the amount of fuel drained from the engine components post accident was consistent with, "low residual fuel."

History of flight

On December 6, 2001, about 2258 eastern standard time, a Convair 340-580STC, N582HG, registered to World Aviation Services, Inc., and operated by Trans Air Link Corporation, was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, near Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, following a precautionary shutdown of the right engine and a subsequent loss of engine power from the left engine. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight from the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), to the Opa-Locka Airport, Opa-Locka, Florida. The airplane was substantially damaged and the airline transport-rated captain and first officer sustained minor injuries. The flight originated about 2250, from Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

The captain reported that prior to departing Fort Lauderdale, he went to the airplane after clearing customs from the previous flight from the Bahamas. The first officer performed a quick walk-around which included checking the fuel while he watched. The total fuel capacity was estimated to be between approximately 320 to 340 gallons (2,144 to 2,278 pounds of fuel). The left fuel gauge indicated approximately 200 pounds less than the magna-stick reading while the right fuel gauge agreed with the magna-stick indication. The engines were started, air traffic control was advised the destination was the Opa-Locka Airport, and the flight taxied to the runway. After takeoff the flight proceeded on a heading of 100-110 degrees, climbed to 2,000 feet mean sea level, and while over water, the flight was vectored heading 270 degrees. When the flight was within about 1/2 mile from the shoreline, the captain heard a strange noise he associated with negative torque sense "NTS'ing" from the right engine; there were no lights or indications. A precautionary shutdown of the right engine was performed, and at that point, the left fuel gauge indicated 600-700 pounds of fuel remaining and the right fuel gauge indicated approximately 900 pounds of fuel remaining. The crossfeed valve was opened to provide fuel to the left engine, and air traffic control was contacted and priority handling to the Opa-Locka Airport was requested. He intended on flying to the Opa-Locka Airport on one engine. Air traffic control asked if they were declaring an emergency, and the response was no, he considered the securing of the right engine as a precaution. While the first officer was talking with air traffic control, the same "NTS'ing" occurred to the left engine, which didn't completely lose power. The first officer advised air traffic control that they were going to ditch the airplane. They were unable to see a nearby airport but felt they were close to the Opa-Locka Airport; at that time he didn't know exactly where they were located. He banked to the left and flew towards the ocean, and the left engine lost power completely. The first officer advised air traffic control of the intention of ditching, and he maneuvered the airplane between two buildings, and turned to the south. He wanted to do a restart of the right engine, but didn't think he could because the propeller was feathered, and AC power was needed to unfeather the propeller. The first officer continued talking with air traffic control, and because of safety concerns, a restart of the left engine was not attempted. While flying in a southerly heading at approximately 150 knots, at a low altitude, he asked for full flaps several times. He saw a pier with lights, veered to the left, flared, and heard the tail hit the water.

The first officer stated that during his check of the fuel tanks before takeoff, each fuel tank contained approximately 1,100 pounds of fuel. While in the cockpit with the captain before electrical power was applied, he and the captain agreed on the quantity of fuel on-board as indicated by the "drip sticks." After the engines were started for the flight, the fuel gauges were indicating approximately 200 pounds more than the quantity indicated by the "drip sticks." No fuel was added while on the ground at the KFLL airport. Visual flight rules (VFR) flight following was requested with air traffic control (ATC), and the airplane was taxied to and departed from runway 9L. After takeoff the flight was cleared to climb to 2,000 feet on a heading of 100 degrees, and proceeded over the ocean for approximately 1 minute when the flight was vectored heading 270 degrees. At a point in the flight when the shoreline was in sight, he began hearing a "weird sound coming from the right engine." He checked the rpm and fuel gauges, and noted that the right rpm gauge needle was climbing but never to the green arc; the needle was fluctuating. He was prepared to execute the propeller overspeed checklist but noted that the right fuel gauge needle was "making heavy oscillations", and was moving "strong." It moved twice to zero then returned to the original reading. The left fuel tank gauge needle did not fluctuate. He advised the captain he was losing the right engine and with concurrence from him, performed a precautionary shutdown of the right engine using the emergency handle. Power was applied to the left engine, and rudder trim was applied. The captain also began "transferring" fuel from the right fuel tank to the left engine after the right engine was secured. Air traffic control (ATC) was notified of the situation, and priority handling to the Opa-Locka Airport was requested. He thought about restarting the right engine but did not attempt to due to the circumstances. A short time after securing the right engine, the left engine tachometer began fluctuating as the right had, but to a lesser extent. He advised the captain to fly to the ocean and advised ATC of the intent to ditch. The flight was descending at 1,500 fpm and he intended on lowering full flaps but his attention was diverted outside and he could not confirm that the flaps fully extended. The flight proceeded in a southerly direction paralleling the shoreline, and before ditching east of a buoy, he placed his hand on the flight controls. The ditching was soft and he donned his personnel floatation device (PFD); he smelled fuel in the water.

A witness observed the airplane flying southeast bound towards the ocean and when near the shoreline, the airplane banked to the right flying southbound paralleling the beach. The airplane was ditched east of a buoy and remained floating after the ditching.

Following the ditching, the captain and first officer evacuated the airplane from the first officer's sliding window, waited with the airplane while it moved closer to shore, then made it to the beach with the first officer assisting the captain and assistance from a buoy offered by rescue personnel. While on-shore, the first officer advised his wife in spanish of the ditching, and there was something wrong with the fuel gauges. He advised her he thought they had fuel but didn't, and that he didn't know what occurred because he had fuel and the fuel gauges indicated he had fuel, but then there was no fuel, and everything shutoff. Both occupants were then taken by ambulance to a local hospital for treatment.

Review of recorded radar data from the Miami Air Traffic Control Tower revealed that the first recorded transponder return occurred at 2250:30, at which time the airplane was at 200 feet mean sea level (msl) flying on a easterly heading. The flight continued, climbed to 2,100 feet msl which occurred at 2253:10, while flying a east-southeasterly heading. The next radar return 28 seconds later indicates the airplane was at 2,000 feet msl, on a westerly heading. The airplane maintained the westerly heading and approximately 2,000 feet msl until 2256:34, at which time the airplane was on a east-southeast heading flying at 1,000 feet msl. The airplane remained at that altitude and heading for the next radar target 5 second