MIA02FA102

On the day of the accident about 25 minutes before the flight departed the pilot phoned the Raleigh AFSS, and filed his IFR flight plan. During the phone call the briefing specialist (specialist) asked the pilot if he had Convective Sigmet 47E, which was covered the departure airport and was issued approximately 10 minutes earlier. The pilot advised the specialist he had the information about the sigmet, but he did not need any weather services. There was no record that the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing from the 2 DUAT vendors. Additionally, the departure airport had a computer with access to weather but it does not record who accessed the computer and there was no records found in the wreckage associated with the computer printout. The flight departed, and shortly after takeoff air traffic control communications were transferred from the air traffic control tower to Myrtle Beach Air Traffic Control Tower. The pilot established contact with that facility and the controller questioned why the pilot was deviating without clearance. The controller asked the pilot if he could accept a northerly heading and he advised he could not. The controller vectored the pilot to fly a south-southwesterly heading for traffic which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then advised the pilot that after climbing through 2,600 feet to resume his own navigation. The flight then proceeded on a northwesterly heading where radar plots indicate that at the altitude flown, the flight encountered VIP Level 5 (intense) echoes. The airplane was observed on radar in a right descending turn and crashed into a wooded area. The average rate of descent was calculated to be 4,085 feet-per-minute. A search for the airplane was initiated and it was located the following morning. The airplane was equipped with a stormscope and a moving map display with monochromatic weather depiction. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of in-flight break-up. All major structural components were located in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The flaps were nearly retracted and the landing gear was retracted. Examination of the flight control system for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the engine and propeller revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No specimens were available for a FAA Toxicology screen. Examination of the vacuum pump which was impact damaged revealed the drive coupling was not failed.

History of flight

On May 29, 2002, about 1738 eastern daylight time, a Beech F33A, N858KS, registered to a private individual, was lost from radio and radar contact and crashed in a wooded area near Conway, South Carolina. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight from the Grand Strand Airport, North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, to Lincolnton County Regional Airport, Lincolnton, North Carolina. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and the private-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated about 1730, from the Grand Strand Airport.

According to a transcription of communications with the Raleigh, North Carolina, Automated Flight Service Station (Raleigh AFSS), a person using the accident airplane's call sign contacted the facility on the day of the accident at 1705:37, and filed an IFR flight plan for the flight. During the phone call the briefing specialist asked the pilot if he needed "...weather, notams, or winds aloft", to which the pilot replied, "nah i got it just a little bit ago." The briefing specialist then asked the pilot if he had convective sigmet 47E, to which he replied, "yeah." The briefing specialist advised the pilot, "okay [thats] ah yeah thats right near your vicinity and do you have a few clouds ah areas of precipitation there also can i get you anything else" to which the pilot replied "thats it." The phone call was ended and there was no further contact by the pilot to the facility.

According to a transcription of communications with the Grand Strand Airport (KCRE) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), the pilot obtained his IFR clearance and was cleared to taxi to runway 05. The flight was cleared to takeoff flying runway heading at 1729:32, which was acknowledged by the pilot. At 1730:19, the KCRE ATCT controller advised the pilot to contact Myrtle Beach departure control. According to a transcription of communications with the Myrtle Beach Air Traffic Control Tower, the pilot established contact with that facility at 1731:12, and the controller then advised the pilot to climb and maintain 4,000 feet and to say the heading he was flying. The pilot responded by stating he was flying 330 degrees and, "...i'm doing a little bit of ah deviation to the right here around a little buildup here", to which the controller asked the pilot if he could fly heading 360 degrees. The pilot responded, "...negative not right now." At 1731:45, the controller advised the pilot to fly heading 210 degrees for vectors around traffic which the pilot acknowledged. At 1732:30, the controller then advised the pilot that when leaving 2,600 feet to resume own navigation and that deviation as necessary was approved, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller again advised the pilot resume own navigation and deviation as necessary was approved to which the pilot responded at 1733:19, "ah eight kilo sierra roger i'm deviating a little bit here to the south uh looks maybe about ah two or three miles and then i'll be able pick up my northwesterly heading." That transmission was acknowledged by the controller; there was no further recorded radio transmission from the pilot. At 1739:06, the controller broadcast on the frequency that radar contact was lost. A search for the airplane was initiated, it was located the following day at 1003 hours.

According to the NTSB Air Traffic Control Specialist's Factual Report, radar data revealed that at 1733:50, the airplane's mode C indicated 2,700 feet, and the heading changed from approximately 210 to 310 degrees while the airplane was climbing. The airplane leveled off at 4,000 feet mean sea level at 1735:57, and between 1736:49 and 1737:36 (last recorded radar target), the airplane descended from 4,000 to 800 feet while in a right turn. The average rate of descent between 1736:49 and 1737:36 was later calculated to be 4,085 feet-per-minute. The last recorded radar target was located at 33 degrees 52.515 minutes North latitude and 078 degrees 55.882 minutes West longitude.

There were no known witnesses to the accident. An individual near the accident site reported that the weather conditions about the time of the accident included heavy rain, there was no reported lightning.

Personnel information

The pilot was the holder of a private pilot certificate issued on November 19. 1983, with airplane single engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a third class medical certificate on February 7, 2001, with the limitation "Holder shall wear corrective lenses." The pilot listed on his application for the medical certificate having a total time of 9,200 hours.

No pilot records were located; therefore, no determination was made as to whether the pilot was instrument current.

Aircraft information

The airplane was manufactured by Raytheon Aircraft Company in 1993, as a model F33A airplane, and was designated serial number CE-1727. It was equipped with a Teledyne Continental Motors IO-520-BB engine rated at 285 horsepower, and a constant speed propeller. The airplane was also equipped with a B.F. Goodrich stormscope, and a Eventide Argus 5000 moving map display with monochromatic weather depiction. The stormscope and moving map display were installed on December 16, 1994.

Review of the airplane maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on October 2, 2001, at an airplane total time of 1,401.2 hours. No determination was made as to the hours accumulated at the time of the accident since the inspection. The last recorded test of the altimeter and transponder system occurred on August 7, 2000.

Meteorological information

According to a NTSB Meteorology Factual Report, a meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) taken at the Grand Strand Airport on the day of the accident at 1653 (approximately 12 minutes before the pilot phoned the Raleigh AFSS and 37 minutes before the flight departed) indicates in part few clouds existed at 8,000 feet, and the thunderstorm sensor was inoperative. A METAR taken from the same airport at 1753 (approximately 15 minutes after the accident) indicates in part few clouds existed at 2,600 feet, scattered clouds existed at 3,600 feet, a ceiling of broken clouds existed at 6,000 feet, and again the thunderstorm sensor was inoperative. The Grand Strand Airport is located approximately 11 miles east-southeast of the accident site. A radar summary chart issued for 1715 on the day of the accident (approximately 10 minutes after the pilot first contacted the Raleigh AFSS) revealed a large area of echoes over eastern South Carolina. An area of echoes (intense to extreme) identified as thunderstorms and rain showers was depicted over South Carolina in the immediate vicinity of the accident site, with an echo top to 45,000 feet. Cell motion was depicted to the southwest at 14 knots. The closest National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) was located approximately 26 miles northeast of the accident site in Wilmington, North Carolina (KLTX). The 0.5 degree elevation scan from that facility at 1733:40 (approximately 4 minutes before the accident) which depicts the conditions between 662 and 3,282 feet, indicate a broken line of echoes with VIP Level 1 intensity near the airplane's plotted flight track line. The 1.3 degree elevation scan from that facility at 1735 (approximately 3 minutes before the accident) which depicts the conditions between 3,142 and 5,762 feet, indicate a large area of echoes with VIP Level 6 intensity located approximately 3 miles north of the airplane's plotted flight track line. The 1.3 degree elevation scan from that facility at 1740:30 (approximately 2 minutes after the accident), which depicts the conditions between