MIA02FA111

NTSB accident investigation · Piper PA-46-310P · Osteen, FL · June 15, 2002

Accident · FatalField investigationFinal report
Date
June 14, 2002, 20:35 local (Jun 15, 2002, 00:35 UTC)
Place
Osteen, FL
Injuries
3 fatal
Damage
Destroyed
Phase of flight
Enroute
Aircraft
N9143BPiper PA-46-310P
Weather
Instrument (IMC) · Dusk
Status
Completed · report June 30, 2004
Report
Approved by Office Director
Parties
FAA, Piper, P&W Canada
FAA report
20020614020229A
Case key
54939

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

the pilot's inadequate weather evaluation and his failure to maintain control of the airplane after entering an area of thunderstorms resulting in an in-flight separation of the right wing and right horizontal stabilizer and impact with the ground during an uncontrolled descent.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

In flight encounter with weatherCruise
Weather condition - thunderstorm
Weather evaluation - inadequatePilot in commandCause
Loss of control - in flightManeuvering
Aircraft control - not maintainedPilot in commandCause
Airframe/component/system failure/malfunctionDescent - uncontrolled
Wing - overload
Wing - separation
Horizontal stabilizer - overload
Horizontal stabilizer - separation
In flight collision with terrain/waterDescent - uncontrolled
Terrain condition - ground

Analysis

The pilot of N9143B had asked the controller if he could deviate about 12 miles west, because he thought he saw "a hole" in the weather. The radar ground track plot showed the pilot had observed a 3 to 5 mile gap between two thunderstorm clusters and attempted to fly through an area of light radar echoes between the two large areas of heavier echoes. N9143B departed level flight, and radar showed that a cluster of thunderstorms, level three to four were present in the vicinity of N9143B's ground track position. Radar data showed that N9143B started an uncontrolled descent from FL260 (about 27,500 feet msl). Witnesses reported hearing the engine make a winding noise, then observed the airplane come out of the clouds about 300 feet above the ground, in a nose low spiral, and the right wing was missing. The right wing was not found at the crash site, but was located 1.62 miles from the main wreckage. The pilot of N9143B had requested and received a weather briefing. He was advised that the weather data indicated that an area forecast for his route of flight predicted thunderstorm activity and cumulonimbus clouds with tops as high as FL450 (flight level 45,000 feet), and a weather system impacting the Florida Gulf Coast, consisted of "looming thunderstorms" in that area. The pilot had contacted the Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS, commonly known as "Flight Watch") for enroute weather advisories, and advised of "cells" east of St. Augustine, advised of convective SIGMET 05E in effect for southern Florida, and was advised that a routing toward the Tampa/St. Petersburg area and then southward, would avoid an area of thunderstorms.

Factual narrative

History of flight

On June 14, 2002, about 2035 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-46-310P, N9143B, operated and registered to an individual, had an in-flight separation of the right wing, and the left horizontal stabilizer, and impacted the ground about 8.5 miles northeast of Osteen, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed. The private-rated pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The flight had originated from Raleigh, North Carolina, that same day, about 1828, and was en route to Marco Island, Florida.

At 1652, the pilot of N9143B contacted Macon, Georgia, Automated Flight Service Station (MCN AFSS) and requested a briefing for a flight from Salisbury, North Carolina (RUQ) to Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina (RDU), then for a flight from RDU to Marco Island, Florida (MKY). The MCN AFSS Preflight Specialist (PF01) entered a flight plan for N9143B from RUQ to RDU and requested weather information from the computer. Weather data indicated that an area forecast for southern North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, northern Florida and coastal waters predicted thunderstorm activity and cumulonimbus clouds with tops as high as FL450 (flight level 45,000 feet). The Preflight Specialist (PF01) provided a synopsis of a weather system impacting the Florida Gulf Coast, stating there were "looming thunderstorms" in that area. The pilot of N9143B filed another flight plan from RDU to MKY via Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, and Orlando, Florida (ORL). The pilot stated, "oh...out over the water" when describing the route. He filed for a proposed departure time of 1800, requested an altitude of FL260, true airspeed of 250 knots, estimated time en route of 2 hours 45 minutes, with 4 hours of fuel on board. According to the FAA there were no weather avoidance re-route programs in effect that evening for N9143B's route of flight.

The specialist at Macon AFSS Preflight 01 (P01) said that when he spoke to the pilot of N9143B he focused on weather conditions in Florida because "that's where the activity was." While looking at the radar display, he saw that the major influence was in the south Gulf Coast area of Florida. He said that convective SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Advisory) products are not automatically displayed, and he did not remember any convective SIGMETs for the route. He focused on thunderstorm activity and issued the forecast for Fort Myers. He said his requirement was to "give the pilot weather pertinent to the route of flight." He said pilot reports (PIREPs) would normally be displayed, but he did not remember any.

N9143B departed RDU about 1828. At 1850, the pilot made initial contact with Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC-ZJX). The pilot requested a clearance direct to ORL. The ZJX controller offered a clearance direct to MKY, which the pilot accepted. The ZJX controller amended the flight plan data on N9143B to reflect the direct routing. Subsequent ZJX controllers accomplished routine handoffs and frequency changes.

At 2002, the pilot requested permission to leave the ZJX sector 58 (J58), radio frequency to check enroute weather. The J58 controller approved the request. About 2004, J58 broadcast SIGMET 04E.

At the same time, the pilot contacted Gainesville, Florida (GNV), AFSS, En route Flight Advisory Service (EFAS, commonly known as "Flight Watch") for enroute weather advisories. The EFAS specialist (FW) advised the pilot of "cells east of St. Augustine, they continue to move east at around two zero knots" and advised of convective SIGMET 05E in effect for southern Florida. FW advised that a routing "towards the Tampa-St. Pete area and then southwards" would avoid an area of thunderstorms. During this exchange, the airplane was about 60 miles east-northeast of Jacksonville, about 100 miles north of the accident site. The Gainesville AFSS Flight Watch specialist advised the pilot of "cells" in the area described by SIGMET 04E, and read the full text of SIGMET 05E to the pilot. The Gainesville specialist did not read SIGMET 04E verbatim, but did advise the pilot of the pertinent information.

At 2006, the pilot reported back on frequency to the J58 controller. The controller approved any deviations off course that the pilot wished to make. The pilot replied that he did not need to deviate.

At 2021, J58 transferred control of N9143B to Miami ARTCC (ZMA) sector 02 (R02).

At 2021:31, the pilot of N9143B reported to R02 level at FL260, R02 acknowledged.

At 2027:36, the pilot requested to deviate west of course to avoid weather. The pilot said he wanted to fly through "a little hole." At this time N9143B was just east of Daytona Beach, Florida. R02 asked the pilot how far he needed to go, the pilot replied "about ten or twelve miles." R02 asked the pilot if he could fly a heading of 170 degrees. The pilot responded that he could not and that he was "blocked in on the east side." R02 acknowledged, and approved the deviation, and instructed the pilot to proceed direct to MKY when able. Radar indicated that the pilot turned about 20 degrees to the right at this time.

At 2028:17, R02 informed ZJX that N9143B was deviating west of course, and completed a handoff of N9143B to R65.

At 2029:44, R02 instructed the pilot to contact R65. The pilot acknowledged and stated "Ok…(unintelligible) and a little hole here." Radar indicated that at this time, N9143B was in the vicinity of returns consistent with ARTCC long-range radar weather depiction of both light and heavy intensity. The R65 controller stated that he observed the weather area and was aware of other pilots deviating away from it on the west side.

At 2029:49, the ground track plot showed the pilot had observed a 3-5 mile gap between two thunderstorm clusters and attempted to fly through an area of light radar echoes between the two large areas of heavier echoes.

At 2029:53, the pilot of N9143B made an unintelligible transmission to R65.

At 2033:36, N9143B departed level flight and radar showed that a cluster of thunderstorms had moved east-northeast, and level three to four thunderstorms were present in the vicinity of N9143B's ground track position. N9143B's uncontrolled descent from FL260 (about 27,500 feet msl) began about 335 degrees at 53 nautical miles from the Melbourne, Florida (KMLB), radar antenna. The last transponder return displayed at ZMA was at 2034:33.

At 2035:26, R65 transmitted "N9143B reset transponder, radar contact lost." There was no reply. The controller attempted to contact the pilot numerous times, with no response. At 2039, search and rescue actions were initiated.

Witnesses reported hearing the engine make a winding noise, then observed the airplane come out of the clouds about 300 feet above the ground, in a nose low spiral, and the right wing was missing. The right wing was not found at the crash site, but was located the morning of June 17, 2002, by a sheriff's helicopter.

Personnel information

The pilot, held a FAA private pilot certificate, issued on July 23, 1986, with airplane single engine land, airplane instrument. The pilot held an FAA class 3 medical certificate issued on April 23, 2002, with the limitations the "Holder shall wear corrective lenses."

The pilot's personal flight logbook number one revealed that he had received his instrument rating September 8, 1992. The last dated entry in the logbook was April 10, 1996. FAA records, and information obtained from an application, dated March 9, 2001, from the ATM Flight School, at Vero Beach, Florida, where the pilot had completed a 16-hour "Piper Malibu PA-46T," ground and flight recurrent course on May 24, 2002, revealed the pilot had accumulated a total of 2,800 total flight hours, all of which were single engine flight

Aircraft

Registration
N9143B
Reported as
Piper PA-46-310P
Category
Airplane
Serial number
4608134
Airframe hours
2,813.9
Engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34, 750 horsepower, turbo prop
Damage
Destroyed
Fire
Both
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Registered owner
Calvin M. Miller
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Annual · March 21, 2002 · 38.2 hours before
Departed
KRDU · Raleigh, FL
Destination
MKY · Marco Island, FL
Flight plan
IFR

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
60
Injuries
Fatal
Certificate
Private
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 3, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Seat
Left
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
2,800 total · 380 in this make and model · 2,300 as pilot in command

Weather

Conditions
Instrument (IMC) · Dusk
Wind
180° at 9 knots
Visibility
7 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
7,000 ft overcast
Temperature
75 °F, dew point 73 °F
Altimeter
29.85 inHg
Observed at
KSFB, 12 nm away

Docket · 60

The files NTSB released with the investigation on April 19, 2004, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 100 MB in all.

ATC 3 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 1 · .PDF · 2 photos · 2.3 MBMeteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 2 · .PDF · 445 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 1Item 3 · .PDF · 794 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 2Item 4 · .PDF · 13.8 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 3Item 5 · .PDF · 3.7 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 4Item 6 · .PDF · 4.9 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 5Item 7 · .PDF · 221 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 6Item 8 · .PDF · 80 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 7Item 9 · .PDF · 150 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 8Item 10 · .PDF · 120 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 9Item 11 · .PDF · 115 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 10Item 12 · .PDF · 110 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 11Item 13 · .PDF · 170 KBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 12Item 14 · .PDF · 1.1 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 13Item 15 · .PDF · 4.3 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 14Item 16 · .PDF · 5.6 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 15Item 17 · .PDF · 3.4 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 16Item 18 · .PDF · 7.6 MBMeteorology 5 - Attachment 17Item 19 · .PDF · 5.9 MBSupplement SItem 20 · .PDF · 44 KBMaterials Laboratory 15 - Factual Report 03-001Item 21 · .PDF · 65 KBAircraft Performance 13 - Factual Report of Group ChairmanItem 22 · .PDF · 10.7 MBReports from Parties to the InvestigationItem 23 · .PDF · 2.7 MBWitness StatementsItem 24 · .PDF · 157 KBToxicological ReportItem 25 · .PDF · 76 KBStatement of Party Representatives to NTSB InvestigationItem 26 · .PDF · 350 KBAircraft Maintenance RecordsItem 27 · .PDF · 3.4 MBCertificate of CompletionItem 28 · .PDF · 41 KBRelease of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15Item 29 · .PDF · 108 KBStatement of the Pilot’s Certified Flight InstructorItem 30 · .PDF · 62 KBMaps or Charts of Accident Area, Wreckage DiagramsItem 31 · .PDF · 12.3 MBPilot Logbook EntriesItem 32 · .PDF · 1.0 MBPhoto 1. General view of the main wreckage (Digital photo no negative).Item 33 · .PDF · 27 KBPhoto 2. Wreckage as found at the crash site (Digital photo no negative).Item 34 · .PDF · 40 KBPhoto 3. Same as #3 different view (Digital photo no negative).Item 35 · .PDF · 34 KBPhoto 4. Both wings after removal from the crash site. The upper wing is the left. (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 36 · .PDF · 683 KBPhoto 5. Left wing after removal from the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 37 · .PDF · 711 KBPhoto 6. Left wing leading edge and inboard (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 38 · .PDF · 659 KBPhoto 7. Right wing as found at the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 39 · .PDF · 719 KBPhoto 8. Inboard right wing (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 40 · .PDF · 717 KBPhoto 9. Right wing after removal from the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 41 · .PDF · 669 KBPhoto 10. Right wing fracture surface (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 42 · .PDF · 660 KBPhoto 11. Same as #10 different view (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 43 · .PDF · 684 KBPhoto 12. Right wing lower spar fracture (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 44 · .PDF · 667 KBPhoto 13. Vertical stabilizer as it was found at the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 45 · .PDF · 33 KBPhoto 14. Horizontal stabilizer (left side) after removal from the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 46 · .PDF · 647 KBPhoto 15. Vertical and right side horizontal stabilizers (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 47 · .PDF · 665 KBPhoto 16. Engine after removal from the crash site (Digital photo no negative).Item 48 · .PDF · 45 KBPhoto 17. Propeller (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 49 · .PDF · 685 KBPhoto 18. Vacuum pump (Digital photo no negative).Item 50 · .PDF · 38 KBPhoto 19. Vacuum pump (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 51 · .PDF · 671 KBPhoto 20. Vacuum Valve (Digital photo no negative).Item 52 · .PDF · 27 KBPhoto 21. Airspeed indicator as found at the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 53 · .PDF · 610 KBPhoto 22. HIS as found at the crash site (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 54 · .PDF · 654 KBPhoto 23. Instruments after removal from the aircraft (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 55 · .PDF · 664 KBPhoto 24. Instruments from a closer view (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 56 · .PDF · 688 KBPhoto 25. Propeller RPM (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 57 · .PDF · 668 KBPhoto 26. Instruments (Digital photo provided by Piper Aircraft, no negative).Item 58 · .PDF · 656 KBPhoto 27: View of gyro. Piper Aircraft digital photo.Item 59 · .PDF · 677 KBPhoto 28: View of gyro housing. Piper Aircraft digital photo.Item 60 · .PDF · 671 KB

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.