MIA04FA049

The instrument rated pilot received three weather briefings on the date of the accident from the Miami Automated Flight Service Station. The pilot obtained his IFR clearance while airborne, was advised to climb to 9000 feet mean sea level (MSL), then later advised to descend and maintain 2000 feet, and to fly heading 030 degrees. Radar data indicates that following the instruction from the controller, the airplane made a right descending turn to a southeasterly heading, followed by a left turn to an easterly heading where the airplane was lost from radar while at 2,200 feet mean sea level. The crash was located 138 degrees and .38 nautical mile from the last radar target. Between 1631:04, and 1631:16, the airplane descended from 7,600 to 6,100 feet. Between 1631:16, and the last radar target 12 seconds later at 1631:28, the airplane descended 3,900 feet. Weather radar data indicates the airplane encountered video integrator and processor (VIP) Level 2, or "moderate intensity" echoes in the area of the in-flight loss of control. Approximately 10 and 20 miles east-northeast through southeast of the accident site, maximum echoes of VIP Level 5 to 6, or "intends to extreme intensity" echoes were noted. The strongest reflectivities were located 20 miles east of the accident site. Disintegration of the airplane was noted; there was no evidence of in-flight, or post crash fire of any recovered components. The full span of the left wing, left aileron, left horizontal, and left elevator were accounted for. A section of the right wing and right outboard flap was identified; the right wing was fragmented. Examination of the engine and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No determination was made whether the pilot met the instrument recency of experience requirement of 14 CFR Part 61.57 (c).

History of flight

On January 31, 2004, about 1632 eastern standard time, a Beech C90, N75GC registered to Global Aerofleet Inc., impacted with the terrain in a remote location of the Everglades National Park, about 10 miles north of the Flamingo Recreation area, Homestead, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight from The Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH), Marathon, Florida, to Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The airplane was destroyed and the commercial-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated about 1610, from The Florida Keys Marathon Airport.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Report of Aircraft Accident Continuation Sheet pertaining to Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center, at approximately 1618, the pilot contacted the facility and advised the controller that the flight was circling 6 miles north of MTH, and requested an IFR clearance to FXE. The controller advised the pilot that an IFR clearance was not available due to other IFR traffic in the area and to remain visual flight rules (VFR). The pilot advised the controller that it was difficult to maintain VFR and the controller provided the pilot with a discrete transponder code and advised him of IFR traffic. The pilot then advised the controller that he was descending to 1,500 feet, and could not see the IFR traffic. The controller again advised the pilot to maintain VFR. At approximately 1620, the controller advised the pilot that radar contact was established, the flight was 9 miles north of MTH, and cleared the pilot to fly heading 350 degrees and climb and maintain 9,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. At approximately 1623, the controller cleared the flight to FXE via direct WEVER intersection, DUVAL arrival, deviation left of course is approved, and to maintain 9,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and at approximately 1625, the pilot asked the controller to spell the name of the intersection WEVER, which the controller complied with. At approximately 1629, air traffic control communications were transferred to Miami International Airport (MIA) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT).

According to a transcription of communications with MIA ATCT, the pilot contacted the facility at 1629:32, and advised the flight was at 9,000 feet. The controller acknowledged that transmission and the pilot then asked the controller for an altimeter setting which the controller provided. At 1630:04, the controller advised the pilot to descend and maintain 2,000 feet and to fly heading 030 degrees. The pilot questioned the descent clearance, and the controller repeated the descent and heading clearance which the pilot correctly read back at 1630:27. At 1632:34, the controller questioned the pilot about what altitude the airplane was flying at; there was no response by the pilot and there was no further recorded radio transmissions from the pilot. Attempts to communicate with the pilot by the pilot of another aircraft were unsuccessful. According to a personnel statement from the controller handling the communications with the accident airplane, he briefly noted the mode C altitude display for a short period of time indicating 5,000, and he asked to the pilot to verify his altitude; there was no reply.

Recorded radar data was obtained by NTSB from FAA air traffic control facilities. The data revealed that the first radar target associated with the transponder code assigned to the accident airplane occurred at 1620:06. At that time the airplane was at 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl), and was located approximately 6 nautical miles east-northeast of the departure airport. The radar plot and data indicates between the first radar contact (1620:06), and 1622:08, the airplane climbed to 2,600 feet msl. Between 1622:18, and 1628:04, the airplane climbed to 9,000 feet msl while flying on a northerly heading. Between 1628:04, and 1630:28, the data indicates the airplane was at 9,000 feet msl. From 1630:40, to 1631:04, the airplane descended from 8,600 to 7,600 feet, and began a right turn to an easterly heading at 1630:52. Between 1631:04, and 1631:16, the airplane continued in a right turn and descended from 7,600 to 6,100 feet. The next radar target 12 seconds later at 1631:28, indicates the airplane was at 2,200 feet msl and was located nearly due east of the previous radar target. No further data concerning the accident airplane was recorded.

Search and rescue operations were initiated; the wreckage was located approximately 1 hour after the accident.

Personnel information

The pilot was the holder of a FAA commercial pilot certificate, with airplane single engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings, last issued on November 13, 1996, when the single engine land rating was added. He was issued a FAA second class medical certificate on February 27, 2002, with the no limitations. On the medical application for his last medical certificate he listed a total flight time of 4,800 hours.

The pilot's wife informed the NTSB investigator-in-charge that her husband started flight training with the Israeli Air Force, but he was "bumped" and did not complete the training. She also provided a document indicating estimated flight time for her husband. The document indicated his estimated total flight time was 4,528 hours, with an estimated 330 hours flown in last 12 months. Of the estimated 330 hours, an estimated 65 hours were flown in the accident make and model airplane. During the last 90 days, he flew an estimated 110 hours, of which she estimated 45 were in the accident make and model airplane. The document also indicated his estimated total instrument time was 786 hours.

NTSB review of a provided copy of one of his pilot logbooks that reportedly does not include his military flight time and begins with an entry dated August 21, 1993, to the last entry of the logbook dated July 9, 2001, revealed no logged flights in a Beech C90 airplane. The logbook reflects that he logged a total time between these dates of 1,482.1 hours, of which 1,464.1 hours were logged as pilot-in-command. Of the logged 1482.1 hours total time, 931.3 hours were in multi-engine land airplanes, 506.2 hours were logged as actual instrument, and 97.0 hours were logged as simulated instrument time. He did log one flight in a Beech 200 airplane in December 1998; the flight duration was not determined. A review of a provided copy of another logbook that begins with an entry dated August 12, 2001, to the last entry dated May 6, 2002, revealed he logged a total time of 128.8 hours, of which 51.4 hours were in the accident airplane. The first flight logged in the accident airplane occurred on February 7, 2002. A review of the entry for that date indicates an introduction flight with a flight instructor signature. During the same time period (8/12/2001 through 05/06/2002), he logged 28.0 hours actual instrument time, and 13.1 hours simulated instrument time. The logbook contains an entry dated March 8, 2002, in which the pilot satisfactorily completed an instrument proficiency check. The logbook also a contains an entry dated October 8, 2003, which was signed by a flight instructor indicating the pilot had completed a flight review required by 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61.56(a).

According to the flight instructor who gave the pilot his last flight review, the flight was conducted in a Beech T-34A (single-engine airplane), and lasted approximately 1 hour 20 minutes. Of the 1 hour 20 minute flight, approximately 20 minutes were spent flying to and from the training area. The flight maneuvers performed consisted of high angle of banked turns, accelerated installs with recovery, spatial disorientation maneuvers with recovery, demonstration of the positi