MIA06LA091

During the initial takeoff climb on the instructional flight, the airplane's pitch attitude began to increase. A constant forward pressure was necessary on the yoke to maintain control, and the use of nose down trim did not rectify the problem. The necessary forward pressure on the yoke increased. After declaring an emergency, the flight instructor made a 180-degree turn in an attempt to land back on the runway. Witnesses observed the airplane reverse course and then as it was flying over the runway, turn sharply left, enter a nose down attitude, and impact the ground. Post-accident examination of the airplane's flight control system did not reveal any anomalies. The reason for the excessive forward pressure on the yoke required to maintain control was not determined.

On April 16, 2006, about 1535 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172R, N417FR, registered to and operated by Beaver Aviation South Inc, impacted the ground following a loss of control while returning to land at the Page Field Airport, Fort Myers, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The flight instructor and the student pilot reported serious injuries, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

The flight instructor stated that a preflight was completed and during the run up all gauges were in the green. The takeoff roll, rotation and initial climb were normal during the departure from runway 23. The normal climb increased into a "drastic" nose up attitude. A constant forward pressure was necessary on the yoke; the use of nose down trim did not rectify the problem. The necessary forward pressure on the yoke increased. The flight instructor declared an emergency and made a 180-degree turn to the left in an attempt to return to the airport. The airplane "began to sink more" and he made another 180-degree turn to the left. He knew that contact with the ground was imminent. The airplane hit the ground upright and flipped over.

An air traffic controller in the airport tower stated the accident airplane was cleared for takeoff on runway 23 with instructions to proceed on course once airborne. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot stated they had an emergency and were returning to land. The airplane was cleared to land on any runway and given wind directions. He observed the airplane making a left turn back to the runway. As it was flying over runway 5, the airplane made an "abrupt" left turn toward the north ramp and crashed nose first near the ramp.

Another air traffic controller reported observing the airplane about 300 feet above ground level at midfield. The airplane appeared to be attempting to reverse course to land on runway 5. The controller stated that the airplane "appeared to be too high and fast to land on the last 2,000 feet of runway 5." When the airplane was about 800 feet from the departure end of runway 5, it made a "sharp left turn" of 90 degrees, entered a nose down attitude, and impacted the ground.

On April 17, 2006, an FAA inspector supervised an examination of the airplane's control system conducted by an airframe and powerplant mechanic. The airplane had been recovered from the accident site and secured in a hangar on the airport. All continuity checks were "found to be good with the only problems being from the accident damage sustained by the airframe."

On April 18, 2006, the FAA inspector supervised a second examination of the airplane's control system conducted by a representative of the aircraft manufacturer. Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit controls to the empennage surfaces and from the cockpit controls through control cable separations, consistent with tension overload, to the ailerons and flaps. The elevator moved easily from the nose up stop to the nose down stop. The elevator trim tab moved easily in both directions, within the range allowed by airframe damage, when the elevator trim actuator control cables in the tailcone were manipulated. Elevator control yoke and elevator trim cable travel in the cockpit were restricted by airframe damage. Trim tab cable stops were observed in place. The flap actuator measurement indicated a retracted flap position.