MIA97GA119

The day before the accident, spot painting was performed to the upper corners of the windshield, and the mechanic failed to remove the roll of masking material from the canopy. During the preflight without using a checklist, the pilot did not notice the roll of masking material. Weight and balance calculations were not performed by the pilot, and postaccident calculations revealed that the helicopter was 76 pounds over gross weight at takeoff. During the initial climb, a portion of the roll of masking material fell from the helicopter, and about 13 feet wrapped around the main rotor mast. Additionally, about 5 feet was partially sucked over and into the engine inlet. The engine experienced a partial loss of power while climbing about 150 feet agl, with a resulting decrease in main rotor rpm. The low rotor warning was heard by the passengers followed by a hard landing. Postcrash the engine was placed in a test cell and found to operate normally. The checklist does not specifically mention to check the oil cooler inlet area or forward of that area during preflight.

History of flight

On April 8, 1997, about 0844 eastern daylight time, an Aerospatiale AS 350B, N370WM, registered to and operated by the South Florida Water Management District, crashed during takeoff from the Palm Beach International Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the public-use flight. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and four passengers were seriously injured. The flight was originating at the time of the occurrence.

About 0630, on the morning of the accident, a pilot reported that he landed his helicopter on the ramp about 25 feet from near where the accident helicopter was parked. He lifted off about 5 minutes later and during that time, he observed an object fluttering on top of the cabin in about the middle. He thought the object was paper towels that appeared to be dew soaked. He continued the takeoff and did not report his observation until after the accident had occurred.

The pilot stated that he performed a preflight of the helicopter which was positioned on a dolly on the ramp without using a checklist. He stated that he verified the fuel load of 70 percent was on board, and in part verified that the engine intake area was free of obstructions. He also stated that while standing on the ground at the arc of the main rotor blades, he looked toward the oil cooler inlet area which is located on the top portion of cabin forward of the main rotor assembly. He did not observe any foreign objects and he did not clean the windshield that morning. He briefed the passengers about the use of seatbelts and door locations then boarded the helicopter. He did not perform weight and balance calculations.

He further reported starting the engine without the use of a checklist and after the engine was started, the passengers reported hearing a horn and seeing a "door" light illuminated on the instrument panel. The pilot then exited the helicopter twice to examine the doors and after reentry into the helicopter, the horn and door light extinguished. Shortly after lifting from the dolly, he nodded to another South Florida Water Management pilot who was on the ramp near his helicopter. The pilot further stated that he does not recall the airspeed or altitude during the climb nor does he recall the engine malfunction or what procedures he performed following the engine malfunction. The passengers reported that no horn was heard during the initial liftoff but when at 100-150 feet, the horn sounded again which continued until impact with the ground.

During the climb out, a South Florida Water Management District pilot who was on the ramp near where the helicopter departed observed a foreign object fall from the right side of the helicopter and land on a taxiway. He retrieved the object which was a 12-inch wide, partial roll of plastic material with red lettering indicating 3M Hand-Masker Film 48 inch. He then diverted his attention and did not witness the accident.

According to a witness who is an FAA certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic and was in a hangar adjacent to the crash site, he first heard a loud bang that he associated with a compressor stall. At that time the helicopter was flying in a slight nose high attitude past his position about 75 feet above ground level. He then began running toward the area and did not witness the accident.

Another witness who was flying in another helicopter near the accident site reported seeing the helicopter flying eastbound and observed the helicopter flare about 100 feet or less, then observed the helicopter turn toward the north. The helicopter then rolled to the left with a slight flare before a hard impact with the ground first with the left side. The main rotor blades then contacted the ground and the helicopter then cartwheeled one time. A small grass fire aft of the engine exhaust was noted and the engine was still running when the first rescuers arrived on scene. The engine was shut down by spraying fire extinguisher agent into the engine inlet. The wreckage was partially moved to facilitate the rescue of the pilot.

Personnel information

Information pertaining to the pilot is contained on page 3 of the Factual-Report Aviation. Additionally, review of records revealed he last attended recurrent flight training in the accident make and model on December 11, 1996. During the training flight which lasted 1.3 hours the pilot performed in part five straight in autorotations and six 180-degree autorotations.

Aircraft information

Information pertaining to the helicopter is contained on page 2 of the Factual Report-Aviation. The helicopter was signed off as being assembled in accordance with applicable manufacturer's instructions on September 23, 1991. The basis for certification of the helicopter were FAR 21.29, and FAR 27, effective February 1, 1965, including amendments 27-1 through 27-10 plus FAA special conditions No. 27-79-EU-23, dated August 23, 1977. Review of FAR 27.1413, as of January 1, 1977, revealed the strength of the restraints and their anchorage locations must not be less than the ultimate load as specified in FAR 27.561 (b) which is in part 4.0 Gs downward and 4.0 Gs forward. Review of the aircraft log book revealed that there was no entry to indicate that the right rear seat restraint had been replaced. Review of the flight manual indicates that the bleed valve annunciator light located in the annunciator panel is designed to illuminate when the Ng is below 93 percent.

The total fuel capacity is 143 gallons of which .33 gallon is unusable, and the usable fuel on board at the time of takeoff as documented by the pilot was 99.77 gallons. The empty weight and gross weight of the helicopter are 2,832.58 and 4,300 pounds respectively. By design, the horn activates when either the hydraulic pressured drops below 30 bar, when the main rotor rpm drops below 360 rpm, or in normal flight when testing the caption panel. The flight manual indicates that the main rotor speed during stabilized power-on flight is 385 +1/-5 rpm and during autorotation the minimum and maximum main rotor rpm is 320 and 424.

The day before the accident an FAA certificated mechanic removed and replaced the front windshields with a one-piece unit in accordance with a Supplemental Type Certificate. The mechanic stated that after the installation he repaired cracks in the canopy at the upper windshield corners. He masked the front windshields and the canopy area aft of the area where he repaired using about 7-8 feet of 3M Hand-Masker Film from a roll he obtained from a cabinet inside the hangar. He then painted the repaired areas and removed the masker film from the windshields and aft of the repaired areas. He reported placing the unused roll of masker film back in the supply cabinet. The helicopter was signed off as being airworthy for return to service by the same mechanic and no other quality control inspections were performed to the helicopter by other maintenance personnel. The Hand-Masker Film used by him for masking was similar to that found by the witness who observed an object fall from the helicopter during the initial climb.

Review of the flight manual found in the wreckage revealed current revisions from the manufacturer were not posted. The current flight manual indicates that three inspections for daily helicopter operation are required. These inspections include the check before the first flight of the day (BFF), the check in conjunction with flight, and the check after the last flight of the day (ALF). None of these checks specifically state to check the area near and forward of the oil cooler inlet for obstructions.

Meteorological information

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. Further meteorological inform