MIA98FA250

After takeoff while over the departure end of the runway, deep gray colored smoke was observed by the tower controller trailing the right engine. The pilot was alerted of this and advised the controller the flight was returning. Witnesses reported seeing smoke trailing the right engine and that the airplane rolled to the left, pitched nose down, impacted trees, and then the ground. A fatigue crack was detected in the exhaust aft of the No. 6 cylinder of the right engine; and incomplete fusion of a weld repair was also noted. Heat damaged components from the right engine were replaced and the engine was started and found to operate normally. A foreign object of undetermined origin was found in the intake area of the No. 3 cylinder. Analysis of the voice tape revealed both engines/propellers were operating near full rated rpm when the pilot acknowledged the transmission that smoke was trailing the right engine, one engine/propeller rpm then decreased to about 2,160 rpm. Examination of the flight controls revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Flap positions at impact could not be determined. Calculations indicate that the airplane was approximately 55 pounds over the maximum certificated takeoff weight at takeoff.

History of flight

On September 20, 1998, about 1431 eastern daylight time, a Piper Aerostar 600, N17MT, registered to a private individual, crashed shortly after takeoff from the Grand Strand Airport, North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The commercial-rated pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. An individual on the ground who was injured by fire, subsequently died 6 days after the accident. The flight originated about 3 minutes earlier.

According to a line service person employed by Ramp 66, North Myrtle Beach, the airplane had been hangared since arrival 3 days earlier and before the flight departed, he noted that the pilot was seated in the left front seat and a younger looking person of the three passengers was seated in the right front seat. Both engines started "ok", and the pilot waited on the ground for about 20-25 minutes with the engines idling. During that time he observed the pilot wiping sweat from his face using a cloth; he was doing something on the panel, and he put on his headset and kneeboard. He reported that he drove a golf cart to a corner of the field for the purpose of watching the takeoff, and while there, the airplane arrived at the run-up area. He did not hear an engine run-up, and noted that the engines remained at idle while the airplane was stopped there for about 5-6 minutes. He then positioned his cart to a point about midfield of the runway to observe the takeoff; the airplane departed with no flaps extended. During the climbout, he observed the landing gear retracting and a slight amount of black smoke trailing the airplane.

Review of a transcription of communications with the Grand Strand Airport Air Traffic Control Tower revealed that at 1420:24, the pilot contacted ground control, requested and received his IFR clearance then at 1421:07, the controller cleared the flight to taxi to runway 23. The pilot was provided the wind and barometric setting information. At 1427:34, the pilot radioed the local controller and advised that the flight was ready for departure on runway 23. The controller cleared the flight to takeoff at 1427:39, which was acknowledged by the pilot 6 seconds later. At 1428:32, the local controller advised the controller from the arrival position of Myrtle Beach Approach Control that "aerostar seven mike tango's rolling...." At 1429:19, the local controller radioed the pilot and advised him "seven mike tango appears to have smoke trailing from your right side." The pilot acknowledged the transmission and at 1429:37, the pilot radioed the local controller and stated "seven mike tango we're going to come around and land." The local controller acknowledged the pilot's transmission and asked the pilot if he was declaring an emergency or did he need any assistance. The pilot replied negative. At 1429:58, the local controller cleared the flight to land on runway 23, which was acknowledged by the pilot. Further transmissions from the pilot recorded on the voice tape were unintelligible. At 1430:53, the local controller advised the approach controller that the airplane had crashed and smoke was observed.

The controller who observed the smoke reported in a personnel statement that "...as the aircraft was passing in front of the tower it appeared to be trailing smoke. I picked up the binoculars and confirmed my observation and identified the smoke as coming from the right engine and smoke was beginning to increase in intensity. I advised the pilot (He was crossing the departure end of runway 23) that the right engine appeared to be trailing smoke...." He later stated that the smoke appeared to be deep gray in color with two dark edges that appeared to be 1 to 1.5 feet apart with distinct separation. He did not see any fire or flames.

Numerous witnesses near the accident site reported observing a low flying airplane with smoke trailing from the right engine. They reported seeing the airplane bank to the left and a pilot-rated witness reported, "...the right engine was trailing smoke the aircraft made a turn to the left as if trying to return to the airport possibly due to the south tower he continued to tighten his turn to the left I told my wife 'he's in trouble' He appeared to stall and went below the tree line...." A copy of his statement is attached. Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane pitch nose down, impact trees then the ground followed by an explosion. One witness reported "...planes engines were at high speed, no smoke, no fire", while another witness reported seeing the plane fly over the ocean and "...it sounded like the engine was cutting out...." Copies of the witness statements are attachments to this report.

Personnel information

According to the pilot's second pilot logbook, his total logged flight time was 1,321 hours which included 474 hours in make and model. His first flight in the accident airplane was logged as taking place on March 31, 1998, and he had accumulated a total of 30 hours in the accident airplane. He logged a total of 1,184 hours as pilot-in-command, and 956 hours in multi-engine airplanes. His first pilot logbook was not located. Further information pertaining to the pilot is contained on page 3 of the Factual Report-Aviation.

Aircraft information

Current logbook records for the aircraft and engines were not located after the accident. According to a work order and invoice from Flying Tigers, Inc., a maintenance facility that had maintained the airplane, an annual inspection had been performed on January 29, 1998. The airplane total time, and time since major overhaul of the left and right engines at that time were 3,360 hours, 1,307 and 2,030 hours, respectively. The airplane had accumulated approximately 53 hours since the annual inspection at the time of the accident. According to the engine manufacturer, the recommended time between overhaul for the Lycoming IO-540-K1J5 engine is 2,000 hours; compliance is not mandatory.

Logbooks for the right engine which begin with an entry dated May 22, 1979, and end with an entry dated December 3, 1993, were recovered; no further logbooks for the right engine were located. Review of the logbooks revealed several entries which indicate that the exhaust was repaired. The first entry dated April 2, 1980, indicates that the cracked exhaust stacks were repaired, but it does not indicate which side of the exhaust stack was repaired. The second entry dated August 22, 1980, indicates that the left exhaust assembly was repaired. The third entry dated February 5, 1981, indicates that the aft section of the inboard exhaust stack was repaired. The final entry pertaining to repairs of the exhaust system was dated February 21, 1984. The entry indicates that the cracked exhausts were repaired.

Airworthiness directive (AD) 87-07-09, which was issued on May 15, 1987, and applicable to this make and model airplane, required a one time inspection of the exhaust system. An entry in the engine logbook dated October 31, 1987, indicates compliance with the AD. Additionally, Aerostar Service Bulletin No. 920A, dated September 12, 1991, for this make and model airplane by serial number, indicates that the exhaust system is required to be inspected at the next regularly scheduled inspection not to exceed 10 hours, and thereafter each 25 hours time in service. Review of the right engine logbook from that date to the last entry in the engine logbook revealed no entry which specifically states that the inspection was accomplished. Compliance with the Service Bulletin is not mandatory.

According to the president of Flying Tigers, Inc., where the airplane was maintained, he was aware of Ser