MIA99FA230

The first leg of the flight was uneventful; fueling of the airplane was not performed after landing as indicated in the route procedure. No adverse weather existed while the flight was on the ground. The pilot flew in a multi-engine airplane for a 1.8 hours; 1.5 hours of which were as a flight instructor after the first leg. The second and third flight legs were uneventful; fueling was not performed after those landings. The pilot twice requested to land on runway 36R; he was advised to follow company traffic landing runway 18L. A witness heard the engine sputtering and after being cleared to land, the pilot declared an emergency. The airplane collided with power lines, a dust bin, and remained suspended on the dust bin. No more than 10 ounces of fuel were drained from the airplane; no fuel leakage was noted. No engine, flight control, or fuel indicating system preimpact failure or malfunction was noted. Impact damage to the right fuel gauge prevented needle movement during postaccident testing. The airplane had been operated for 4 hours 54 minutes since fueling by the accident pilot. Instructions required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-12-08, was not incorporated into the aircraft records.

History of flight

On August 19, 1999, about 0317 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 210L, N640AJ, registered to and operated by Flight Express, Inc., as flight 812, collided with a building approximately 3/4 mile north of the approach end of runway 18L, at the Tampa International Airport, Tampa, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 non-scheduled, domestic, cargo flight. The airplane was destroyed and the airline transport-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated about 0208 from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

After takeoff, air traffic control (ATC) communications were transferred from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Air Traffic Control Tower to Miami Approach Control. The flight remained in contact with that facility from 0209 to 0215, when ATC communications were transferred to the Miami Air Route Traffic Control. The flight remained in contact with that facility until 0256, when ATC communications were transferred to Tampa Approach Control.

According to a transcription of communications with Tampa Air Traffic Control Tower, at 0257:21, the pilot contacted the facility and advised the controller that then flight was at 6,000 feet with Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) "delta." The controller advised the pilot to proceed direct "tampa" and descend at pilot's discretion to 3,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the transmission, the flight continued and at 0307:03, the pilot advised the controller that the field was in sight. At 0307:37, the pilot advised the controller "and for express eight twelve we're expecting three six right." The controller advised the pilot, "well expect one eight left you'll be following company uh north of the airport." The pilot repeated the instructions from the controller to expect runway 18L. At 0307:54, the pilot stated, "express eight twelve any chance we can (unintelligible) three six right." The controller advised the pilot to fly heading 350 and, "...you're tied with company landen [sic] eighteen." The pilot acknowledged the heading to fly. At 0311:57, the controller advised the pilot that the company traffic was located at his ten o'clock position and about 3 miles. The pilot advised the controller that the traffic was in sight and the controller advised the pilot to follow the company traffic and cleared for a visual approach to runway 18L, and also cleared to land. The pilot repeated the instructions that the flight was number 2, cleared to land runway 18L. At 0316:32, the pilot stated, "tampa flight express eight twelve is declaring an emergency." The controller responded, "flight express eight twelve go ahead", the pilot responded, "flight express eight twelve uh." There were no further recorded transmissions from the accident pilot.

A witness reported hearing what sounded like a car was backfiring. He observed a small airplane and heard the engine sputtering then stop sputtering which continued for five to eight times before the airplane was out of sight. A copy of the witness statement is an attachment to this report.

According to the pilot of the company airplane that was flying ahead of the accident pilot, after landing she looked back and observed the accident airplane to be 1-2 miles out with all lights on; she expected the airplane would be closer than observed. She reported turning onto taxiway "Hotel", and heard the accident pilot report an emergency. She reported turning onto the taxiway, looked to the left and did not see the aircraft's lights but did see a bright flash. She reported that the initial time from the emergency declaration by the pilot to seeing the bright flash was approximately 30 seconds.

The airplane collided with power lines then a structure, and remained supported on top of the structure.

Personnel information

Review of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records revealed that the pilot was issued an airline transport pilot certificate with the rating airplane multi-engine land, on May 16, 1999. He was also the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with the rating airplane single engine land. He was issued a flight instructor certificate with the ratings airplane single and multiengine, instrument airplane. The flight instructor certificate was scheduled to expire September 30, 1999. He was issued a first class medical certificate on March 19, 1999, with no limitations.

The pilot's date of hire with the operator as a full-time pilot was August 31, 1998; he was initially qualified to act as pilot-in-command in Cessna 210 airplanes. He completed his ground training and training specific to the Cessna 210, on August 31, 1998. On November 10, 1998, he received a checkride in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 135.293, 135.297, and 135.299, which qualified him to act as pilot-in-command in IFR and VFR conditions. According to the Director of Operations, the pilot's last day as a full-time pilot was July 30, 1999; he was a part-time pilot for the company at the time of the accident.

Review of the pilot's pilot logbook revealed that he had logged approximately 2,219 hours total time, of which approximately 2,022 hours were logged in single-engine airplanes.

Aircraft information

Review of the airplane maintenance records revealed that on April 5, 1995, the fuel tanks were drained and the fuel gauges were calibrated to zero in accordance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-12-08, which had an effective date of July 22, 1994. According to a FAA airworthiness inspector, postaccident examination of the aircraft and the aircraft's records revealed the procedures required in part by the AD pertaining to incorporating information into the airplane flight manual or airplane records could not be located. A copy of the statement from the FAA inspector is an attachment to this report.

Review of the airplane maintenance records revealed the last recorded discrepancy pertaining to the fuel gauges was dated January 13, 1999. That entry indicated, "left fuel gauge inop [sic]." The corrective action for the discrepancy states, "written in error op's [sic] [check] good." There were no further entries pertaining to the discrepancies of the fuel gauges. Copies of the maintenance records are an attachment to this report.

The last annual inspection to the airplane was performed on June 1, 1999. The airplane had accumulated approximately 231 hours since inspection at the time of the accident. The airplane was inspected in accordance with a Phase 1 inspection on August 9, 1999; the airplane had accumulated approximately 37 hours since then at the time of the accident. The phase 1 inspection is a company aircraft status check performed between required annual inspections.

Review of the airplane type certificate data sheet indicates that the unusable fuel quantity is 6 pounds, which equates to 1 gallon of fuel.

Meteorological information

A special METAR weather observation taken at the Tampa International Airport, at 0327, indicates that the wind was variable at 3 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, few clouds at 1,200 feet, scattered clouds at 25,000 feet, the temperature and dew point were 75 and 73 degrees Fahrenheit respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.96 inHg. The Tampa International Airport was located 186 degrees and 1.59 nautical miles from the accident site.

Communications

The pilot was in contact with Tampa Air Traffic Control Tower (Tampa ATCT), a transcription of communications is an attachment to this report.

Wreckage and impact information

The airplane crashed into property located at 5110 W. Clifton Street. That location was determined using a portable global positioning system (GPS) receiver to be located at 28 degrees 00.074 minutes North Latitude and 0