NYC07FA196

On the morning of the accident, the student pilot and the certificated flight instructor (CFI) flew to a local airport and back, and then conducted several takeoffs and landings. After refueling, the CFI released the student pilot for solo flight to continue practicing takeoffs and landings. The student pilot took off approximately 1/2- hour after his previous taxi-out, and in the intervening period, the wind had increased. The student pilot performed a go-around from a landing to runway 08 following his first landing attempt. According to air traffic control tower personnel, the student pilot's second landing attempt was also unsuccessful, and the student pilot initiated a second go-around. During the go-around, the airplane banked to the left, descended, and impacted the grass approximately 600 feet north of the east-west active runway. The airplane was substantially damaged and the student pilot was seriously injured. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions. Winds about the time of the accident were from 070 degrees at 12 knots. All of the student pilot's flight time (27 total hours) was in the Liberty XL-2 (25 hours dual and 2 hours solo). Subsequent to the accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a “Fact Finding Investigation Report” on the Liberty XL-2 airplane. The investigation was initiated in response to a complaint from a flight school alleging safety deficiencies, and not in response to this accident. The report concluded that “the airplane controls are more sensitive to other training airplanes, but the airplane meets 14 CFR part 23, subpart B [design certification] requirements and is an acceptable airplane for training.” The report also stated that the FAA “did not find any specific safety concerns that have not been addressed.”

(This report was modified on June 19, 2009)

History of flight

On August 19, 2007, about 1212 eastern daylight time, a Liberty Aerospace XL-2, N550XL, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain during an aborted landing at Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (OMN), Ormond Beach, Florida. The student pilot, the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. The flight was operated by Ormond Beach Aviation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight.

The accident occurred during the student pilot's second flight, and his first solo flight of the day. Earlier in the day, the student pilot's certificated flight instructor (CFI) requested that the pilot conduct a "surprise" dual flight from OMN to Flagler County Airport, approximately 11 miles to the north, and back. The CFI stated that the pilot "handled [the flight] very well." Upon their return to OMN, the CFI had the student pilot conduct several circuits of the traffic pattern to practice takeoffs and landings, after which they landed and refueled the airplane. The CFI then released the student pilot for a solo flight to continue practicing takeoffs and landings at OMN.

The CFI stated that he released the student pilot, watched him take off, turn crosswind and then downwind. The CFI lost sight of the airplane on the base leg, but he saw the airplane take off again. At that point, the CFI left the fueling area for personal business. The CFI estimated that it was approximately 6 minutes between the time the student pilot first taxied out for his solo flight, and when the CFI left the fueling area.

The recordings of the communications between the airplane and the OMN air traffic control tower (ATCT) indicated that approximately 8 minutes after he requested clearance to taxi out for his solo traffic pattern work, the student pilot requested "to taxi back to the ramp" because he had "a bit of a problem with low oil pressure" and that he needed to "check it out" prior to conducting the flight. The controller asked the student pilot "did [name unclear] break another one?" The student pilot responded "negative, [I] think its getting a bit low on oil, need to [take] a bit of a look."

According to a written transcript of a January 15, 2008, telephone conversation between the student pilot and his legal representatives, the student pilot taxied to "the hanger" (sic) where he "gave it a little top up." The transcript indicated that the student pilot, without the knowledge or assistance of anyone else, including any flight school personnel, added "maybe a quart" of oil to the engine, secured the oil filler cap, and taxied out again for takeoff. During the same conversation, the student pilot was specifically asked whether he examined the airplane to see if there was an oil leak. He responded that he did check, and that he did not detect any indications of an oil leak.

The ATCT ground control recording indicated that approximately 19 minutes elapsed between the student pilot's request to return to the ramp for the oil pressure problem, and his request for the subsequent taxi-out. When the student pilot contacted ground control for the second taxi-out, he informed the controller that he had automatic terminal information service (ATIS) "Papa." The controller informed the student pilot that ATIS information "Quebec" was current, and that "the winds had changed." The controller then informed the student pilot that the revised winds were from 090 degrees at 8 knots, with gusts to 14 knots. The student pilot acknowledged the updated information, and taxied to runway 8 for departure.

The ATCT local control recording indicated that the student pilot was cleared for takeoff, instructed to "make left traffic," and to advise the controller when he was "midfield" on the left downwind for runway 8. Approximately four minutes later, the student pilot reported that he was midfield left downwind, and that he wanted to conduct a full stop landing, with a taxi-back for another takeoff. The controller cleared the flight to land. The controller did not provide any wind information during any of these communications.

Approximately three minutes after receiving his clearance to land, the student pilot announced that he was executing a go-around. The controller then questioned the student pilot as to whether he intended to remain in the traffic pattern. The student pilot responded in the affirmative, and again requested a full stop landing, with a taxi-back for another takeoff. This time, the controller instructed the student pilot to fly a right-hand traffic pattern. Two minutes later, the controller instructed the student pilot to extend his downwind leg for departing traffic, and informed the student pilot that the controller would notify the student pilot when he should turn his base leg. One minute after the controller's request to extend the downwind leg, the controller instructed the student pilot to begin his base leg. One minute after that, a Cessna Citation 550 was cleared for takeoff. Thirty seconds later, the student pilot was cleared to land, and was advised to exercise caution due to wake turbulence from the departing Cessna Citation business jet airplane.

According to the local controller, just prior to the accident, the student pilot initiated a go-around for undetermined reasons. Both the ground and local controllers stated that the airplane began a climbing left turn, followed by a left roll and left-wing-first, nose-down impact with the ground. The ground controller reported that the airplane "caught fire within seconds of impact."

The ATCT recordings indicate that approximately 2 - 1/2 minutes after the landing clearance was issued, an unidentified individual in the ATCT telephoned the flight school to inform them of an accident with one of their airplanes. Approximately one minute after that, an unidentified individual in the ATCT remarked that it "looks like the pilot got out."

Personnel information

The student pilot was a United Kingdom citizen who was in the United States for flight training purposes. He was obtaining his training from Ormond Beach Aviation ("the flight school") in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61. He held a combination third-class medical/student pilot certificate that was issued on August 8, 2007. The student pilot's flight school records indicated that, excluding the accident flight, he had accumulated 27.4 total hours of flight experience. The student pilot had accumulated 2.0 hours of solo flight experience, and conducted his first three solo flights the day prior to the accident.

Excluding the accident flight, the student pilot had conducted a total of 27 flights, with 6 different flight instructors, within the 35 days preceding the accident. The student pilot flew 25 flights in the 12 days preceding the accident. The student pilot did not fly on two of the twelve days, and three days before the accident, he completed flying seven days in succession. The student pilot flew six flights the day prior to the accident.

Aircraft information

The Liberty Aerospace XL-2 was a two-place, fixed tricycle gear, low-wing monoplane. The airplane was equipped with a Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IOF-240-B5B full authority digital engine control (FADEC) engine, and a two-blade, fixed pitch, wood and composite propeller. The airplane was type certificated in accordance with 14CFR Part 23 in February 2004.

The accident airplane was equipped with a VM1000FX engine management system. The airplane manufacturer stated that the system "is designed to monitor engine sensors and FADEC data streams to display engine performance" on a flat panel display in the cockpit. The system components include a data processing unit (DPU), engine transducers, a FADEC data interface, and the flat panel display. The transducers are mounted "firewall forward" so