NYC08FA261

During landing at its home airport, the airplane overran the runway and traveled down a 40-foot embankment before coming to rest against trees and sustaining substantial damage. According to the pilot, his speed on approach was a little fast but he thought it was manageable. Recorded data from the accident airplane revealed that 20 seconds before touchdown, when the pilot selected flaps 30 (landing flaps) the airspeed was approximately 27 knots above the maximum flap extension speed, and as the airplane touched down its airspeed was approximately 14 knots higher than specified for landing. The runway had a displaced threshold with 3,097 feet of runway length available. Skid marks from the accident airplane began approximately 868 feet beyond the displaced threshold, and continued for about 2,229 feet until they left the paved portion of the runway.

History of flight

On July 30, 2008, about 1832 eastern daylight time, an Eclipse Aviation Corporation EA500, N333MY, sustained substantial damage during a runway overrun while landing at Brandywine Airport (OQN), West Chester, Pennsylvania. The certificated airline transport pilot, and passenger were not injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that departed Wings Field Airport (LOM), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. No flight plan was filed for the flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

According to the pilot's written statement, He had the airplane "topped off" prior to departing for OQN.

During a visual approach for runway 27 at OQN, He "set up for a normal approach" and "dropped gear" and "one notch of flaps." A little while later when the airplane had slowed sufficiently he then selected landing flaps. He believed that he was "a little high" on the approach so he "dipped down." As he passed the runway threshold his speed was "a little high," but he thought it was manageable. After touchdown, he "got on the brakes" and felt the airplane skid, but decided not to "go around" due to the "distance left." At this point he was "pumping" the wheel brakes "continuously," and then applied "full brakes." The airplane then began to skid to the right and went off the end of the runway.

After leaving the runway, the airplane traveled down a 40-foot embankment and crossed a service road. The airplane came to rest against trees and a chain link fence approximately 184 feet beyond the departure end of runway 27, on a magnetic heading of 265 degrees.

Personnel information

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple ratings, including airplane multi-engine land, and type ratings for the Eclipse 500, Hawker Siddeley 125, and Learjet. He reported 6,300 total hours of flight experience on his most recent application for an FAA first-class medical certificate, dated July 2, 2008.

According to the pilot in addition to flying the Eclipse 500 for the airplane owners, he also flew charter under 14 CFR Part 135 for a flight department in a Hawker 850.

Aircraft information

The Eclipse 500 was a low-wing, T-tail airplane powered by twin tail-mounted Pratt & Whitney Canada PW610F turbofan engines. It was one of a new class of part 23 airplanes, with highly integrated avionics systems commonly referred to as very light jets (VLJs).

The airplane was certificated under 14 CFR Part 23 by the FAA for single pilot operation and was capable of carrying up to six occupants.

According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2007. At the time of the accident, it had accumulated 76.2 total hours of operation. The airplane was based at OQN.

Meteorological information

The reported weather at OQN, at 1830, included: calm winds, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 7,000 feet, temperature 28 degrees Celsius, dew point 18 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 29.75 inches of mercury.

Airport information

According to the Airport Facility Directory, OQN had one runway oriented in a 09/27 configuration. Runway 27 was asphalt, and in good condition. The total length of the runway was 3,347 feet, and its width was 50 feet.

Multiple obstructions existed on the approach end of runway 27. These included trees 12 feet in height, which displaced the threshold by 250 feet. The trees were located 659 feet from the approach end of the runway pavement, and 131 feet right of the centerline. A 38:1 slope was required to clear the trees.

A 50:1 approach slope to the displaced threshold was published for the runway, and the available landing length was 3,097 feet. The runway sloped downward 1.0%. A Precision Approach Path Indicator was installed, but was inoperative at the time of the accident.

Flight recorders

Federal regulations regarding the carriage requirements of Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) on aircraft can be found in 14 CFR Part 91.609. The accident airplane was not operating in commercial service and was not required by the CFRs to be equipped with an FDR. The airplane was however, equipped with a Diagnostic Storage Unit (DSU).

On August 4, 2008, the Safety Board's Vehicle Recorder Division was provided a set of electronic files retrieved from the DSU in a proprietary data format which was used by Eclipse Aviation. A list of available parameters was provided to the Safety Board's Vehicle Recorder Division along with decoded flight data from the DSU.

The DSU collected aircraft-related data but was not designed to function as a flight data recorder. It did not meet any crash-survivability requirements and did not record all of the flight parameters as would be required on a flight data recorder per federal regulations. The DSU was also not required to be operational for flight, as it was not required equipment under the Eclipse 500 Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL). However, an operational DSU does collect aircraft-related data in its solid state memory. Some of the collected data was used as part of Eclipse's FAA-approved flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) program; additionally the collected data was also used to diagnose anomalous behavior of some individual avionics boxes on the airplane.

Much of the data was collected at 1 second intervals, although some individual parameters were collected more frequently and some were collected less frequently.

The data file received from Eclipse Aviation contained approximately 10 minutes of data and did contain the data from the accident flight.

Review of the Data

Review of the Data by the Safety Board revealed that the entire flight lasted approximately 5.8 minutes from takeoff at LOM to landing at OQN.

The airplane lifted off at 18:26:30. At 18:31:10 the landing gear handle was extended (selected to the gear down position at 1,521 feet above mean sea level (msl) at approximately 194 knots. Flaps 10 (T/O) was selected at 1,507 feet msl at approximately 193 knots.

Twenty seconds before touchdown, flaps 30 (LDG) was then selected at 694 feet msl at approximately 147 knots which was about 27 knots above the maximum flap extension speed for the airplane.

As the airplane approached the runway threshold the airplane's airspeed was at 123 knots. It crossed the threshold at approximately 108 knots which was approximately 14 knots higher than the specified approach reference speed.

The airplane touched down at 18:32:16 at approximately 92 knots which was about 14 knots higher than specified.

Wreckage and impact information

Examination of runway 27 revealed, skid marks which matched the landing gear geometry of the accident airplane. The skid marks began approximately 868 feet west of the displaced threshold, and continued for about 2,229 feet till they left the paved portion of the runway where ground scars were present and two broken runway threshold lights were discovered.

During examination of the airplane no preimpact mechanical failures of the flight control system, brake system, engine control systems, or engines were discovered.

Examination of the airplane revealed multiple fractures and areas of crush and compression damage to the airframe and flight controls.

The nose landing gear had separated from its mounting location and the airplane had slid over the nose landing gear components, damaging the belly skin, the underlying structure from the nose landing gear well to approximately the forward edge of the entry door, the rudder quadrant, portions of the under floor electrical wiring, and both Byteflight data bus cables. The outboard right wing was bent upwards beginning about 5-feet inboard of the wing tip. The wing skin was deformed and the fuel tank was breached.

Both main gear had sheared off at the forward spar fitting and had penetrated the lower and up