NYC97FA062

All positions at LaGuardia Tower were combined to the local control position from 0011 EST until after the accident. At about 0430 EST, ground personnel (gnd psnl) in 'Vehicle 1277' (communicating on ground control (GC) freq), were cleared on runway (rwy) 13/31 to perform 'lighting maintenance.' Later, during repair of centerline lights & while N117FJ was inbound to the airport, Vehicle 1277 stalled on rwy 13/31. Psnl of Vehicle 1277 attempted to restart the vehicle, but were unable, so they shut off all vehicle lights to reduce electrical load, & again attempted to restart the vehicle, but to no avail. At 0507 (during darkness), N117FJ made initial call to the tower for landing. The controller (ctlr) acknowledged the call, scanned rwy 13/31, did not see Vehicle 1277, & cleared N117FJ to land on rwy 31. At 0510, psnl of Vehicle 1277 observed N117FJ in the approach/landing phase & radioed GC that they were stuck on the rwy. The ctlr then radioed, 'go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, seven fox juliet go-around.' Moments later, N117FJ impacted Vehicle 1277. The FAA ATC Handbook stated, 'Ensure that the runway to be used is clear of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before a departing aircraft starts takeoff or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold.'

History of flight

On March 25, 1997, about 0510 eastern standard time, a Grumman American Avn. Corp. G-1159, N117FJ, operated by PAB Aviation Incorporated, was substantially damaged when it collided with an unoccupied maintenance vehicle during the landing roll at the LaGuardia Airport (LGA), Flushing, New York. The two airline transport rated pilots and two dead-heading crew members were not injured. The flight departed Lehigh Valley International Airport, Allentown, Pennsylvania, about 0430, on an instrument flight rules flight plan, destined for LGA. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the positioning flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

During interviews with the crew, they reported that the captain (PIC) was the flying pilot, and the copilot (SIC) was the non-flying pilot. The copilot contacted the LaGuardia air traffic control tower, local controller, about 12 miles from the airport. The controller acknowledged and cleared N117FJ to land on runway 31. The PIC and SIC reported that the visual approach and landing touchdown were uneventful. During the landing roll, while the PIC was applying reverse thrust, the controller instructed the flight to go-around. The SIC then advised the controller that the airplane was on the runway. Shortly thereafter, the PIC observed a vehicle on the centerline of the runway. The PIC's attempts to avoid the vehicle were unsuccessful, and the airplane's right wing and right main landing gear struck the vehicle. When the airplane came to rest, the PIC shut the engines down and the passengers and crew members evacuated. The crew stated that the runway lights were on during the approach and landing, and that they did not observe any lights on the vehicle located on the runway centerline.

A review of the communication tapes and transcript for the LaGuardia air traffic control tower, from 0425 to 0518, revealed that the same controller was working the local and ground control positions. At 0430:23, the controller cleared the accident maintenance vehicle, vehicle 1277, onto runway 13-31 for "lighting maintenance." At 0430:26, vehicle 1277, questioned, "four is still closed, is that correct," to which the controller responded "that's correct." No further transmissions were made to vehicle 1277 from the controller.

At 0506:57, N117FJ contacted the controller and advised that they were inbound. At 0507:03, the controller acknowledged and cleared the airplane to land on runway 31. At 0509:50, another maintenance vehicle, vehicle 51, radioed, "LaGuardia ground, vehicle five one to cross runway three one at the intersection." The controller radioed "five one hold short", and at 0510, vehicle 51 advised, "five one holding." At 0510:27, vehicle 1277 radioed, "uh twelve seven seven we're stuck on the runway, we're stuck on the runway." The controller then radioed at 0510:32, "go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, seven fox juliet go-around." At 0510:37, the crew radioed "fox juliet's on," and at 0510:56, the controller asked the crew if everything was "ok".

The accident occurred during the hours of darkness at 40 degrees, 46minutes north latitude, and 73 degrees, 52 minutes west longitude.

Air traffic control information

In the NTSB air traffic control group chairman's factual report, it stated that all positions at the LaGuardia control tower were combined at the local control position with one controller making all radio communications. The accident maintenance vehicle, vehicle 1277, had communicated over the LaGuardia ground control frequency when they requested, and were given, clearance onto runway 13-31 to perform maintenance to the runway lights. Vehicle 1277 had also communicated over the ground control frequency when they radioed "uh twelve seven seven we're stuck on the runway, we're stuck on the runway." The controller transmitted over the local and ground control frequencies when he radioed "go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, seven fox juliet go-around."

In the NTSB air traffic group chairman's factual report, under controller interviews, there was a summary of interview for the controller that worked the accident airplane and vehicle. The interview summary stated that the controller received a local control position relief briefing and went on duty at 0011. He did not recall the specifics of the briefing other than he believed runway 4-22 was closed. The controller was working combined frequencies which included the local control, ground control and class B airspace south.

During the interviews, the term "memory jogger" was used, which the LGA air traffic manager described as a "vehicle strip."

The report further stated:

"While [the controller] was on the local control position, he saw vehicles on runway 4-22. He could not recall if the yellow lights were lit on the vehicles because 'through the course of the night I worked a lot of vehicles.'"

"[The controller used] memory joggers to remind him that a vehicle is on an active runway during peak hours, busy periods and day time. He would use [memory joggers] during a midnight shift [if] "it's a factor," which would be aircraft or heavy aircraft activity. It is possible he would not use it during light traffic. [According to the controller], there [were] no facility orders, procedures, or teaching, regarding the use of memory joggers; it is a technique. He could not recall if he used any memory jogger when [vehicle] 1277 requested to enter runway 31 the morning of the accident, nor could he recall if he saw lights on the...vehicle."

"When he scanned runway 13-31, the runway was clear. He stated that at the time of the accident, 0510, there was no sun, and could not recall if there was a moon or moonlight."

"[The controller] did not experience any radio or radar problems the night of the accident, and stated that the accident airplane was the first arrival since about 0145."

The factual report also contained an additional response section which included questions from the group chairman and responses from the LGA air traffic manager. One question and response from the report stated the following:

Question: "Does the facility have any requirements regarding the use of 'memory joggers' when placing a vehicle on an active runway? If not, why not? If so, where is the requirement documented and request a copy. How is the information disseminated to the controllers?"

Response: "The use of a vehicle strip has always been part of the training process which is taught and utilized by all controllers at LaGuardia tower. Although there is no requirement for written direction, LaGuardia tower established a written directive detailing the use of the memory jogger. The directive will be incorporated in the revised standard operating procedures. (Note: The NOTICE was dated April 16, 1997 and states in part, "in light of recent events, the following procedures will [be] in effect immediately, and will be incorporated in the LaGuardia tower standard operating procedures order. A. The local and ground control positions shall not be combined prior to 0000. B. All vehicles on active runways will be on the local control frequency. C. Whenever a vehicle is cleared onto an active runway, the "VEHICLE" strip shall be placed in the local control flight strip bay for the affected runway. D. During night operations, when the Port Authority is working on the active runway(s), they will request that the runway edge light be turned off.")

Cockpit voice recorder information

The NTSB cockpit voice recorder (CVR) group chairman's factual report stated the following:

"The recording consisted of four channels of audio information. One channel contained the cockpit area microphone audio information. One other channel contained the first officer outgoing radio transmission only.