SEA06FA055

Prior to departing on the first leg of the night cross-country cargo flight, the pilot obtained a weather briefing which included an AIRMET that indicated mountains could be obscured by clouds, and that precipitation, mist and fog might be encountered over the route of flight. The pilot filed a VFR flight plan with a cruise altitude of 6,500 feet, departing at 1950 Pacific standard time. As the flight progressed, radar data indicated the following: at 2036:09 the airplane was 20 nm north of the accident site proceeding south at an altitude of 6,400 feet; at 2046:17 the airplane was 1.16 nm from the accident site and continued to proceed south at an altitude of 6,300 feet; from 2046:17 to 2046:53, when the last encoded altitude was received, the airplane had descended from 6,300 feet to 5,500 feet on a southerly heading; radar contact was lost at 2048. The airplane impacted trees in mountainous terrain at an elevation of 5,099 feet. Search and rescue personnel who reached the accident site 5 hours after the accident, reported hard blowing snow, winds from the west at 30 miles per hours, and from 3 to 4 feet of fresh snow covering the area. One search and rescue volunteer, who resides 12 miles south of the accident site, at an elevation of 1,678 feet, revealed that between 2100 and 2200 on the evening of the accident, there was a light rain falling and that the temperature was 34 degrees F. A post-accident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any mechanical anomalies which would have prevented normal operation.

History of flight

On February 22, 2006, approximately 2050 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 182P, N888SR, was destroyed when it collided with terrain while maneuvering near Goldendale, Washington. The instrument rated commercial pilot and pilot-rated passenger received fatal injuries. The aircraft was being operated by Wings of Wenatchee, Inc., Wenatchee, Washington, as a non-scheduled domestic cross-country cargo flight under 14 CFR Part 135. Night visual flight rule (VFR) conditions prevailed at the time of takeoff, and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed from the Pangborn Memorial Airport (EAT), Wenatchee, Washington, to the Portland International Airport (PDX), Portland, Oregon. The flight departed EAT approximately 1950.

In a statement provided by the operator to the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the flight was scheduled to transport cancelled bank documents for another cargo operator. The operator stated that the accident pilot had conducted the same flight the previous night, which had been the pilot's first Part 135 flight. The operator revealed that he had asked the pilot if he had checked the weather, to which the pilot replied that it was much better than the night before, and that he didn't think there would be any weather problems. The operator stated, "I did not personally check the weather for the flight. I confirmed that he had filed a VFR flight plan and reminded him to get flight following."

At 1844, the pilot contacted the Dyncorp Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS) for a weather briefing over the route of flight, and at 1906 he filed a DUATS VFR flight plan from EAT to PDX via the Ellensburg (ELN), Yakima (YKM), and Klickitat (LTJ) very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) navigational facilities, all located in the state of Washington. The pilot listed a flight plan altitude of 7,500 feet, an estimated time en route of 2 hours, and fuel on board as 6 hours.

At 2012, the pilot reported that he was 5 nautical miles east of the ELN VOR navigational facility at 6,500 feet. Air traffic control then gave the pilot the current altimeter setting and instructed him to contact Chinook approach control.

At 2035, air traffic control switched the flight back from Chinook approach control to the original controller. The flight was observed to be continuing southbound, and subsequently the pilot was advised by air traffic control of turbulent conditions at 8,000 feet along his route of flight. The pilot was instructed to contact Seattle Center on 119.65, which the pilot acknowledged. There was no further contact with Seattle Center and radar contact was lost with the flight at 2048.

According to the National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) data, at 2036:09 the accident airplane was proceeding on a southerly heading approximately 14 nautical miles (nm) south of the Yakima Air Terminal/McAllister Field (YKM), and about 20 nm from the accident site at an altitude of 6,400 feet msl. At 2046:17, still progressing on a southerly heading, the airplane was located 32.5 nm south of YKM on a magnetic heading of 182 degrees at an altitude of 6,300 feet msl. From 2046:17 to 2046:53, data revealed that the airplane descended from 6,300 feet msl to 5,500 feet msl on a magnetic heading of approximately 175 degrees; this computes to a rate of descent of approximately 1,333 feet per minute. The aircraft track from the last radar hit with altitude encoding information at 2046:53 to the accident site was on a magnetic heading of about 124 degrees, covering a distance of about 1,137 feet. (Refer to the NTAP data, which is appended to the factual report.)

At 2127, the Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center issued an Alert Notice (ALNOT) after radio and radar contact with the accident aircraft had been lost at 2048. A subsequent emergency locator transmission (ELT) was emitted, however, due to adverse weather conditions search and rescue personnel were not able to access the accident site until the following morning.

At 1119 on February 23rd, personnel from the Klickitat County Search and Rescue division were able to access the accident site. Using a handheld Global Positioning System (GPS), the airplane was located in mountainous terrain on the Yakima Indian Reservation, about 12 nm north of Goldendale, Washington at coordinates 46 degrees 2.422 minutes north latitude and 120 degrees 47.780 minutes west longitude, at an elevation of 5,099 feet msl. The wreckage was approximately 1.25 nautical miles northeast of Castle Rock mountain, elevation 5,009 feet mean sea level (msl), 1.96 nm north-northwest of Simcoe Mountain, elevation 5,440 feet msl, and 3.3 nm north-northeast of Indian Rock peak, elevation 5,821 feet msl. Due to the remote location of the wreckage site and elevated snow depths, recovery and initial on-site examination of the wreckage was postponed until June 13, 2006.

Personnel information

The pilot in command held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate for single-engine airplanes, which was valid until December 31, 2006. The pilot's most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on April 1, 2005, and contained no limitations. According to the pilot's personal logbook records, his total aeronautical experience consisted of 699 hours, of which 36 hours were accrued in the accident airplane make and model. In the preceding 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, the company listed the pilot's flight time as 51 and 30 hours, respectively.

According to the operator's Director of Operations (D.O.), who is also the owner of the company, the pilot approached the owner in the fall of 2004 to receive assistance in obtaining his flight instructor certificate, which was successfully accomplished in December of 2004. The owner then hired the pilot as a part-time flight instructor in January, 2005, and in September of 2005 the operator started the pilot in a VFR Part 135 pilot training program. The pilot successfully completed the program on February 16, 2006.

A review of the pilot's records by the IIC revealed that the pilot had made fifteen flights over the accident route between December 22, 2004 and February 21, 2006; five of the flights were in the accident airplane, which totaled 8.7 hours of flight time. Six of the flights were for dual instructional purposes, in both single and multiengine airplanes. Five were Part 135 cargo flights with the accident pilot accompanying the pilot in command as a non-flying pilot; the accident pilot would log pilot in command time on the return segment, which was consistent with Part 91 when no cargo is being carried for revenue purposes.

In a written report and in a personal interview with the IIC, a certificated private pilot, who worked as a line serviceman for the operator, reported that he accompanied the accident pilot on an on-demand Part 135 cargo flight over the same route on February 21, 2006; this was the accident pilot's first Part 135 revenue flight. The pilot stated that the accident pilot flew the first leg of the flight to PDX, during which a cloud bank was encountered past YKM. The pilot reported, "I advised [the accident pilot] that he might want to climb to get over it. [The accident pilot] took notice of the clouds that were hard to make out due to it being a dark night with no moon and initiated a climb." The pilot stated that the accident pilot climbed from 6,500 feet msl to 7,500 feet msl and proceeded to PDX uneventfully.

The pilot-rated passenger on the accident flight was employed by the operator as a line serviceman, having obtained his private pilot certificate with the operator during March of 2005. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed that his total time was 132.4 hours. The pilot had received an FAA second-class medical certificate during December of 2004. It was n