- Date
- January 24, 2006, 06:40 local (14:40 UTC)
- Place
- Carlsbad, CA
- Injuries
- 4 fatal
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Phase of flight
- Landing
- Aircraft
- N86CECessna 560
- Weather
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Status
- Completed · report December 20, 2007
- Report
- Approved by Office Director
- Parties
- FAA, AAI-100, Cessna Aircraft Company, Pratt & Whitney Canada, FAA, Los Angeles FSDO
- FAA report
- 20060124000669A
- Case key
- 63149
From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.
On this page
Probable cause
The NTSB’s determination of the probable cause, and any contributing factors.
The captain's delayed decision to execute a balked landing (go-around) during the landing roll. Factors contributing to the accident include the captain's improper decision to land with a tailwind, his excessive airspeed on final approach, and his failure to attain a proper touchdown point during landing.
Analysis
Air traffic control cleared the flightcrew for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 24, which was 4,897 feet long. The flightcrew then reported that they had the runway in sight, cancelled their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and executed a visual flight rules (VFR) approach in VFR conditions to the airport. The reported winds favored a landing toward the east, onto the opposite runway (runway 6). During the approach, after a query from the first officer, the captain indicated to the first officer that he was going to "...land to the east," consistent with the reported winds. However, the final approach and subsequent landing were made to runway 24, which produced a six-knot tailwind. During the approach sequence the captain maintained an airspeed that was approximately 30 knots higher than the correct airspeed for the aircraft's weight, resulting in the aircraft touching down about 1,500 feet further down the runway than normal, and much faster than normal. The captain then delayed the initiation of a go-around until the first officer asked if they were going around. Although the aircraft lifted off the runway surface prior to departing the paved overrun during the delayed go-around it impacted a localizer antenna platform, whose highest non-frangible structure was located approximately 304 feet past the end of the runway, and approximately two feet lower than the terrain at the departure end of the runway. The aircraft continued airborne as it flew over downsloping terrain for about 400 more feet before colliding with the terrain and a commercial storage building that was located at an elevation approximately 80 feet lower than the terrain at the end of the runway. The localizer antenna platform was located outside of the designated runway safety area, and met all applicable FAA siting requirements. The captain had type 2 diabetes, for which he took oral medication and monitored blood sugar levels. He did not reveal his history of diabetes to the FAA. The captain's post-accident toxicology testing was consistent with an elevated average blood sugar level over the previous several months; however, no medical records of the captain's treatment were available, and the investigation could not determine if the captain's diabetes or treatment were potentially factors in the accident. The captain of the accident flight was the sole owner of a corporation that was asked by the two owners of the accident airplane to manage the airplane for them under a Part 91 business flight operation. The two owners were not pilots and had no professional aviation experience, but they desired to be flown to major domestic airports so that they could transfer and travel internationally via commercial airlines. One of the two owners stated that the purpose of the accident flight was to fly a businessman to a meeting, and to also transport one of the owner's wives to visit family at the same destination. According to one of the owners, the businessman was interested in being a third owner in the accident airplane, so the owner permitted the businessman to fly. The owner also stated that the accident pilot told him that the passenger would pay for expenses directly related to the operation of the airplane for the flight (permitted under FAA Part 91 rules), and an "hourly fee" (prohibited under FAA Part 91 rules); however, no documentation was found to corroborate this statement for the accident flight or previous flights.
Factual narrative
The factual narrative1,302 words
*** This report was modified on December 18, 2007 **
History of flight
On January 24, 2006, approximately 0640 Pacific standard time, a Cessna Citation 560, N86CE, impacted the localizer antenna platform during an aborted landing (go-around) on runway 24 at McClellan-Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California. The two airline transport pilots and their two passengers received fatal injuries, and the aircraft, which was owned by GOSHIP AIR, LLC, of Ketchum, Idaho, was destroyed by the impact sequence and the post crash fire. The flight, which was carried out under 14 CFR Part 91, departed Friedman Memorial Airport, Hailey, Idaho, at 0600 mountain standard time (MST), and was being operated under an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. At the time of the accident, the crew had canceled their IFR flight plan, and were executing a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) approach to runway 24 in visual meteorological conditions.
The owners (principles) of GOSHIP AIR, LLC, were two businessmen with no professional aviation experience. According to one of the two principals of GOSHIP AIR, LLC, the flight to Carlsbad was scheduled on the day prior to the flight as a result of a phone call from JAXAIR, LLC, which consisted of one individual who was a pilot and was hired to manage the accident airplane for GOSHIP AIR (see the "Additional Data and Information" for detailed information regarding GOSHIP AIR and JAXAIR), According to the GOSHIP AIR principal, during this phone call, he was advised that JAXAIR and a local businessman had discussed the possibility of using the accident airplane to fly that individual to Carlsbad for a scheduled business meeting in San Diego. Permission was granted, and the wife of the GOSHIP AIR principal, who desired to visit family members in Southern California, was added as a second passenger. JAXAIR then advised Sun Valley Aviation, the owners of the hangar where the aircraft was kept, that the aircraft should be made ready for a 0530 departure the next morning.
According to Sun Valley Aviation, on the morning of the accident flight, the co-pilot arrived at the hangar at 0455, and proceeded to preflight the aircraft. The JAXAIR captain arrived at 0520, the business passenger at 0532, and the wife of the GOSHIP AIR principal arrived last at 0545. After the passengers were loaded, the aircraft was started using a ground power unit (GPU), and then it taxied for takeoff at 0555. Discussions with personnel at Sun Valley Aviation, and a review of their security camera videos did not reveal any unusual actions or activities on the part of the flight crew, nor any obvious anomaly associated with the aircraft.
The aircraft departed Hailey at 0600 MST (0500 Pacific standard time), climbed to an en route altitude of flight level 380, and remained there until 0605 Pacific standard time (PST), when it was cleared by Los Angeles Center to descend to flight level 350. At the time the clearance was issued, the aircraft was approximately 170 nautical miles straight-line distance, at a bearing of 026 degrees magnetic from the destination airport (although longer by flight path). Two minutes later, at 0607, the aircraft was cleared down to flight level 310. Approximately six minutes later, at 0613, the crew was given a clearance of direct Thermal (TRM), direct ESCON intersection, direct Carlsbad, and also cleared down to flight level 280. Three minutes later, at 0616, the crew was cleared down to flight level 240, and three minutes after that (0619), they were cleared to descend to 16,000 feet.
The aircraft reached 16,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) just after 0626, and about one minute later the crew was cleared down to 12,000 feet. The aircraft reached 12,000 feet between 0630 and 0631, and at 0631:11, the crew was cleared to fly direct to ESCON intersection, and to descend to 8,000 feet. They were also advised to expect the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 24, and they were told that the ILS glideslope was unusable. Approximately one minute later, at 0632:39, the crew was cleared to descend and maintain 5,200 feet. Thirty seconds later, at 0633:09, the crew was cleared down to 3,500 feet, advised that they were five miles from ESCON intersection, and told to maintain 3,500 feet until they were established on the ILS for runway 24. At 0635:01 the crew was advised that the airport was at their 12 o'clock position at six and one-half miles, and they acknowledged that it was in sight. At 0635:07, the controller at Southern California (SOCAL) Approach Control advised the crew to contact the Palomar tower. About six seconds later, the controller told the crew to disregard the switch to tower, since it did not open for another 25 minutes. He then advised the crew to either cancel their IFR clearance with him (the controller), or to report a cancellation within five minutes after landing. At 0635:22, the crew advised the controller that they were canceling their IFR clearance and switching to frequency 118.6 (Polomar common traffic advisory frequency).
A review of the descent profile revealed that at the time the crew leveled off at 16,000 feet, the groundspeed of the aircraft was approximately 350 knots. When the crew leveled at 12,000 feet, the groundspeed of the aircraft decreased to about 295 knots, and then increased to about 330 knots for about one minute, before momentarily decreasing to 280 knots. The groundspeed then increased again to about 300 knots, and remained there for about another minute. About 0634:30, as the aircraft was descending through an altitude of about 6,700 feet, the groundspeed began a relatively linear decrease that brought it from about 300 knots to approximately 150 knots in a period of about two minutes. At the beginning of this speed decrease, the aircraft was about 8.5 miles from the end of the runway, and approximately 3,200 feet above the ILS glideslope. At the end of this two-minute period, the aircraft was seven-tenths of a mile from the end of the runway, and according to the NTSB performance data profile, within the glideslope two-dot deviation limit.
About four-tenths of a mile from the end of the runway, the flightcrew went below the two-dot deviation limit, decreased their rate of descent from the 3,000-4,000 feet per minute that they had maintained for the previous minute, to about 1,000 feet per minute, and then crossed the runway threshold at a groundspeed between 130 and 140 knots. This groundspeed equated to a calibrated airspeed of 124 to 134 knots, with a six-knot tailwind. According to the Cessna Aircraft Company, the recommended reference airspeed for the accident airplane under the known landing weight conditions was 101 knots (see the "Airplane Information" section for detailed information regarding the calculation of this recommended reference airspeed).
A review of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the recorded air traffic control communication during the descent revealed that the fight crew acquired both the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) airport information and the Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS) weather information about 0622. At that time, their descent was approaching flight level 220, and the winds at Palomar were reported from 040 degrees at six knots. At 0632:14, the First Officer stated, "I'll be off on one," and the Captain responded with "Okay." From 0632:20 until 0633:49 (about one minute and thirty seconds) the First Officer was communicating with Western Flight Services, primarily about transportation for the passengers, and the Captain was communicating with Approach Control. During that period, approach control advised the crew that they were five miles from ESCON, and instructed them to maintain 3,500 feet until established on the localizer, and that they were cleared for the ILS to runway 24.
Then after a brief pause, the controller added "You gonna be able to get down okay?" The Captain responded to the c
Sequence of events
NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.
Aircraft
- Registration
- N86CE
- Reported as
- Cessna 560
- Category
- Airplane
- Serial number
- 560-0265
- Airframe hours
- 4,720
- Engine
- Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5D, 3,045 lbs thrust, turbo fan
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Fire
- On-Ground
- Flight
- Executive/Corporate · Part 91
- Operator
- Goship Air LLC
- Registered owner
- Goship Air LLC
- Airworthiness certificate
- Standard, Normal
- Last inspection
- Continuous airworthiness · July 1, 2005 · 130 hours before
- Departed
- KSUN · Hailey, ID
- Destination
- KCRQ · Carlsbad, CA
- Flight plan
- IFR
- Airport
- KCRQ · McClellan-Palomar Airport, runway 24, 4,897 × 150 ft, asphalt
Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.
Flight crew · 2
As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.
- Role
- Pilot
- Age
- 59
- Injuries
- Fatal
- Certificate
- Airline transport
- Airplane ratings
- Single-engine land, Multi-engine land, Single-engine sea
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 2, With waivers/limitations
- Seat
- Left
- Toxicology
- Performed
- Flight hours
- 17,000 total
- Role
- Co-pilot
- Age
- 50
- Injuries
- Fatal
- Certificate
- Airline transport
- Airplane ratings
- Multi-engine land, Single-engine land, Single-engine sea
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1, Without waivers/limitations
- Seat
- Right
- Toxicology
- Performed
- Flight hours
- 7,500 total
Weather
- Conditions
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Wind
- 60° at 6 knots
- Visibility
- 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling
- None
- Temperature
- 57 °F, dew point 16 °F
- Altimeter
- 29.93 inHg
- Observed at
- KCRQ, 1 nm away
Docket · 25
The files NTSB released with the investigation on December 5, 2007, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 6.0 MB in all.
FAA reports on this event · 1
The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.