SEA99FA028

History of flight

On January 8, 1999, approximately 1812 Pacific standard time, a Pacific Aviation Composites LC 40-550FG, N141LC, registered to and operated by Pacific Aviation Composites as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, impacted the Columbia River about one mile west of Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon, while on approach to runway 10L. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed and the commercial pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated from Bend, Oregon, about one hour prior to the accident.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) personnel reported that the pilot contacted Portland Approach and reported that he was 28 miles east of Portland International (PDX) for landing. Shortly after the initial contact, the controller notified the pilot that the airport was going to instrument conditions. The pilot then requested and received IFR instructions. The flight was cleared for the ILS runway 10L approach. As the aircraft was turning inbound to intercept the localizer, the controller notified the pilot that it appeared that he was lined up for runway 10R. The tower controller instructed the flight to go around to the north and the pilot was given vectors for the runway 10L approach. Radar data indicates that the aircraft was bracketing the runway 10L localizer and descending, when the aircraft dropped off radar coverage about one mile west of the runway. Shortly after the accident, search and rescue personnel located floating debris in the Columbia River.

Witnesses located at various positions along the Columbia River reported to the Port of Portland Police what they saw or heard at about the time of the accident. One witness reported that she heard a "fast, low flying aircraft," and that the "engines sounded normal." This witness did not see or hear the aircraft crash. Another witness who was aboard a tug in the middle of the Columbia River at about 1815, reported that he heard and saw what appeared to be a little "Cessna" flying directly overhead. This witnesses stated that it sounded like the plane was "sputtering and missing on a continuous basis." The witness stated that the airplane appeared to be quite high in elevation.

Personnel information

At the time of the accident, the pilot held a commercial certificate for single and multi-engine land aircraft, and was rated for instrument flight. The pilot's flight logbooks indicate a total flight time of about 2,315 hours, with about 620 hours in the LC 40-550FG. The logbooks indicate that the pilot had accumulated a total of 11 hours of actual instrument flight time. About 86 hours had been accumulated under simulated conditions. The logbooks indicated that the last logged flight under actual instrument conditions was on February 11, 1992. The last logged simulated flight was on December 8, 1995. There were no other instrument flights logged until November 13, 1998, when the pilot flew with a flight instructor for about one hour and 36 minutes under simulated conditions. The flight consisted of VOR holding, a VOR-DME approach and an ILS approach. On December 22, 1998, the pilot flew another simulated instrument flight for one hour and 40 minutes. This flight consisted of VOR holding, an ILS approach and a VOR approach. On December 24, 1998, the pilot was signed off for an instrument competency flight after completing VOR holding, a VOR approach, and an ILS approach with a DME arc. This flight lasted one hour and 35 minutes. All of these flights were flown in the LC 40-550FG with an instructor on board.

Company personnel reported that the pilot was the test pilot for the company and had been employed since June 1996. All of the flights, except the three flights previously described, were logged under visual conditions.

Meteorological information

At 0959, the pilot contacted McMinnville Flight Service Station (FSS) for a standard weather briefing from Bend, to Aurora, Oregon. The specialist asked if this was for an IFR flight. The pilot responded that he would prefer VFR, but that he could "shoot an approach in Aurora." The specialist reported that VFR was not recommended due to low IFR conditions at Aurora. The specialist asked the pilot for the time of the flight. The pilot responded in the next two hours. The specialist reported that the airmets for IFR were expected to improve by 1100, however, there was not much improvement for the surface reports. The area and terminal forecasts were improving by 1100. The specialist reported that west of the Cascades, there was a flight precaution for icing above 8,000 feet with moderate rime icing. The pilot responded that he would wait a little bit and call back later. The conversation concluded at 1001. There was no further contact between the pilot and McMinnville FSS.

At 1759, the weather at Portland was reported as visibility of three miles and mist. The ceiling was overcast at 300 feet. The temperature was 37 degrees F. The altimeter was 30.49" Hg. The wind was from 170 degrees at five knots.

At 1823, the weather at Portland was reported as visibility of one and one quarter miles, with 10R runway visual range of 4,500 feet, variable to 6,000 feet, with mist. The ceiling was 300 feet overcast. The temperature and dewpoint were 37 degrees F. The wind was from 180 degrees at six knots. The altimeter was 30.49" Hg.

Communications

At 1740, the pilot contacted Portland Approach. The transmission was unreadable and the controller instructed the pilot to try again. At 1742, the pilot's second transmission was readable. The pilot reported that he was about 28 miles east of the airport and descending through 5,000 feet for landing at Portland. The controller gave the pilot a discrete transponder code and instructed the pilot to remain in visual conditions.

At 1743, the controller informed the pilot that Portland was going to go to instrument conditions and asked the pilot if he was capable of instrument flight. The pilot acknowledged that he was. The controller instructed the pilot to remain in visual conditions and to proceed southwest bound. At 1744, the controller asked the pilot if he was requesting an instrument clearance at this time. The pilot responded that he would want a clearance only if visual conditions were not possible.

At 1748, the pilot was cleared to the Portland Airport via radar vectors to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) runway 10L approach. The pilot was instructed to turn to a heading of 270 degrees and to climb to and maintain 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged by repeating that he was cleared via radar vectors to 10L approach and 4,000 feet.

At 1749, the controller notified the pilot that Portland's weather was below basic VFR. The winds were from 170 degrees at nine knots. The altimeter was 30.49" Hg. The visibility was four miles and the ceiling was broken at 300 feet. The pilot acknowledged this information.

At 1750, the pilot was instructed that he was to follow an MD-80 at his 12 o'clock position at three miles and descending out of 7,500 feet. The pilot acknowledged that he had the traffic in sight. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain visual separation from the traffic and to turn right to a heading of 280 degrees. The pilot acknowledged this instruction.

At 1751, the pilot was instructed to reduce his speed to 130 knots. The pilot acknowledged this instruction.

At 1753, the pilot continued to receive radar vectors and was requested to descend and maintain 3,000 feet.

At 1757, a Cessna 182 reported to the controller that he needed runway 10R as runway 10L was below minimums. (location unknown)

At 1758, the pilot was instructed to maintain 150 knots, and to descend to 2,500 feet.

At 1759, the Portland Approach controller announced the current weather to all aircraft. The visibi