WPR13LA359

The pilot stated that, as he approached the destination airport, he maneuvered the airplane to enter a standard traffic pattern. When on final approach, he fully extended the wing flaps while reducing the engine power. He then temporarily added power to attain adequate clearance from trees located before the runway. During the descent, the stall warning horn intermittently sounded and then continuously sounded. The airplane stalled and, upon touchdown, it bounced hard on the runway surface. The pilot chose to abort the landing and then applied full power. As the engine power increased, the pilot was not able to keep the nose down before the airplane again stalled. The airplane bounced hard and rolled onto its side. The pilot stated that the accident could have been prevented if he had executed a better short-field landing procedure to eliminate the airplane bouncing upon touchdown.

The Camano Island Airfield was a FAR Part 139 certificated facility that had one hard-surfaced asphalt runway (runway 16/34). The runway was 1,750 feet long and 24 feet wide. According to the FAA Airport Facility Directory, the first 1,049 feet of runway 16 has a 3 percent uphill slope to the south and student landings were not recommended unless accompanied by the flight instructor. On August 04, 2013, about 1130 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 182P, N58437, collided with terrain shortly after the pilot aborted the landing at Camano Island Airfield, Stanwood, Washington. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The private pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The local personal flight departed from Boeing Field/King County International Airport, Seattle, Washington about 1100 with a planned destination of Stanwood. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and the pilot had filed a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. Several witnesses observed the accident sequence. They stated that the airplane was landing on runway 16, which slopes upward at the first section. The airplane touched down hard after the mid-field area and bounced. The pilot then appeared to add full engine power in an attempt to abort the landing. The airplane climbed about 40 to 50 feet and stalled, descending into terrain. The pilot stated that as he approached the vicinity of the airport, he observed the windsock indicating a light crosswind for runway 16. He maneuvered the airplane in a standard right-traffic pattern and when on final approach, he extended the flaps fully down while reducing the engine power. In an effort to ensure adequate clearance from trees located at the north end of the runway, he temporarily added power. While descending to the runway, the stall warning would intermittently sound and then there was a continuous stall horn. The airplane stalled and bounced hard on the runway surface. The pilot opted to abort the landing and applied full power. The engine hesitated and he began to retract the flaps. Subsequently the airplane lurched airborne as the engine power increased and the pilot was not able to maneuver the nose down before the airplane again stalled. The airplane bounced hard and rolled onto its side. In the section titled "RECOMMENDATION" in the NTSB Pilot/Operator Report, form 6120.1/2, the pilot stated that the accident could have been prevented if he had executed a better short-field landing procedure to eliminate the airplane bouncing upon touchdown. He thought that because the airplane was loaded with a forward center of gravity, that a short-field landing was inadvisable because of the increased chance of a power-on stall during a go-around. He noted that he hadn't practiced short-field landings in over 10 months and should have considered a different destination. The pilot was certified to operate the accidentairplane in accordance with existing Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). A review of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airman and Medical Records database disclosed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument flight. The pilot's third-class medical certificate was issued in April 2009, with no limitations. The pilot's self-reported flight time indicated he had amassed 270 hours total flight experience, with 100 hours accumulated in Cessna 182 airplanes. The pilot reported that during the preceding 90 days, 30 days, and 24 hours, he had flown in the capacity of pilot-in-command approximately 46, 15, and 0 hours, respectively. The pilot stated that he had purchased the airplane about one year before the accident. He recalled that he had been to the airport on past flights.