WPR15FA204

NTSB accident investigation · Hughes 269C · Asotin, WA · July 1, 2015

Accident · FatalField investigationFinal report
Date
July 1, 2015, 10:00 local (17:00 UTC)
Place
Asotin, WA
Injuries
2 fatal
Damage
Destroyed
Phase of flight
Maneuvering
Aircraft
N9490FHughes 269C
Defining event
Maneuvering-low-alt flying: Low altitude operation/event
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report July 12, 2016
Report
Approved by Office Director
NTSB office
Western Pacific Region
Parties
Sikorsky, Federal Aviation Administration
FAA report
20150701009599A
Case key
91480

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate clearance from power lines while maneuvering in a canyon.

Findings · 3

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Object/animal/substance: wireEnvironmental issues › Physical environment · Awareness of conditionHughes 269C: 2 casesAll aircraft: 588 casesProbable cause
Performance/control parameters: altitudeAircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintainedHughes 269C: 3 casesAll aircraft: 1,310 casesProbable cause

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

**This report was modified on September 30, 2016. Please refer to the public docket for this accident to view the original report.** The private pilot and passenger were on a local area flight. While maneuvering in a canyon, the helicopter impacted power lines and descended to the canyon's wall. A fire ensued and burned the surrounding area. The power lines were located 350 ft south of the wreckage with two 35-ft support structures (wood poles) on either side of the canyon about 1,452 ft apart. The two 5/16-inch diameter power lines were oriented east-west and ran horizontally parallel to one another. Ground scar analysis and wreckage fragmentation revealed that the helicopter contacted the power lines in the area of the swashplate. According to the helicopter manufacturer, if the helicopter were in level flight at cruise speed, 0.11 seconds would transpire between the contact with the first wire (canopy) and the second wire (slat and mast). Given the damage and rub marks, it is likely that, after the second wire impact, the helicopter pitched up and yawed left. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The private pilot had about 55 hours total time, most of which was accumulated around the accident area.

Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHT **This report was modified on September 30, 2016. Please refer to the public docket for this accident to view the original report.** On July 01, 2015, about 1000 Pacific daylight time, a Hughes 269C, N9490F, collided with powerlines while flying in a canyon in the vicinity of Asotin, Washington. Following the collision, the helicopter was consumed by fire and destroyed. The pilot was operating the helicopter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The personal local flight originated from the Lewiston-Nez Perce County Airport, Lewiston, Idaho about 0930. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed. The pilot communicated with his father earlier in the morning telling him that he was planning on flying the helicopter around 0930 with the passenger, his cousin. Several people in the area of the accident reported observing a helicopter flying in an adjacent canyon. A fire was reported just before 1000, and during the suppression efforts a firefighter discovered the wreckage. The postimpact fire spread predominately south consuming numerous acres of the canyon terrain and fields. Following the accident, a Clear Water Power Co. employee reported that there had been a temporary disruption of service in the powerline. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 17, held a private pilot certificate issued in December 2014, with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopters. He held a third-class airman medical certificate issued in December 2013, with no limitations. According to the pilot's personal flight logbook, he had amassed 55.5 hours total time, all of which was in rotorcraft, and all in relatively the same make and model as the accident helicopter. He had accumulated about 22 hours in the capacity of pilot-in-command. Based on the airport identifiers listed in the logbook for flight origin and destination points, the pilot accumulated a majority of his flying hours around the Lewiston area. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident helicopter, a Hughes 269C, serial number 1030243, was manufactured in 1973. According to maintenance records, the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 12,725 hours. The most recent annual inspection was signed by a mechanic, as completed in February 2015. The maintenance records disclosed that the Lycoming HIO-360-D1A engine underwent an annual inspection on the same date at an engine total time of about 435 hours. METEOROLOGICAL A routine aviation weather report (METAR) for the Lewiston-Nez Perce County Airport was issued a few minutes before the accident. It stated: sky clear; visibility 10 miles; wind calm; temperature 86 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 50 degrees Fahrenheit; and altimeter 29.98 inHg. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The accident site was located in a small canyon, Ayres Gulch Canyon, which is about 6 nautical miles in length, and oriented north-south, with the accident sitelocated midway. The canyon was one of a series of canyons. It was surrounded by wheat fields and a large barn, which was located about 1.7 nm south of the accident site. The elevation at the accident site was about 2,225 feet mean seal level (msl), with the surrounding hills about 2,660 feet msl. The main wreckage, which consisted of the fuselage and engine, came to rest on a flat dirt area on the east wall of the canyon. Powerlines were located 350 ft south of the wreckage with two 35-foot support structures (wood poles) on either side of the canyon, a distance of 1,452 ft apart. The two 5/16-inch diameter guy wires were oriented east-west and ran horizontally parallel to one another. There were powerlines that additionally ran north-south bordering the west canyon wall. Located under the powerlines was a portion of the canopy frame, which consisted of the mid-left horizontal portion and the center vertical portion. On the vertical portion of the frame there was a bend which would have been oriented directly where the top of the panel was situated in the cockpit. There were additionally red rub marks found on the frame, consistent with contact of the tail rotor blades. A portion of the mid-right horizontal canopy was located near that area. There were numerous pieces of shaded (tinted) and clear plexiglass observed around the area. The headset holder, portions of the upper canopy slat, frames of both headsets, and the upper tail boom light-clip were located on the hill in between the wires and the main wreckage. A detailed wreckage and impact report with accompanying pictures is contained in the public docket for this accident. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL The Spokane County Office of the Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on the pilot and passenger. The FAA Toxicology Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing; the findings were positive for ethanol (alcohol). The toxicology report additionally noted evidence of putrefaction in the specimens received. TESTS AND RESEARCH The wreckage had sustained significant thermal damage. Examination of the airframe revealed that most of the control push-pull tubes and fuselage structure were consumed by fire, with thermally damaged remnants of the bellcranks, cyclic, collective, and anti torque pedals remaining. Both the right and left skids were separated near midspan. The drag strut signatures, coupled with the forward skid fractures on both sides, is consistent with the helicopter in forward motion at the time of impact. The toes of the skids were oriented to be the first contact, which would result in the skid deforming upward and placing a concentrated load on the forward support strut below the damper. The drag struts were relatively straight with little bending, and primarily exhibited crushing from contacting the frame at the forward end. The bowed deformation and numerous fractures of the main frame steel tubing was consistent with a nose-down verticalattitude. The stationary scissors link which holds the non-rotating portion of the swashplate was fractured. The blue main rotor blade exhibited a significant amount of arcing spatter on its bottom inboard end surface; the other two blades had minor amounts of arcing splatter. The rotating scissors links were intact and remained attached to the swashplate and the lug portion of the scissors support. Given orientation of the damage, it is likely that the powerlines made contact with the helicopter in the area of the swashplate with electrical arcing and mechanically contacted and fractured the stationary scissors and non-rotating swashplate. The tail boom came to rest in front of the helicopter cabin. The tail rotor assembly was resting in the dirt with the blue main rotor blade's leading edge position near the vertical fin. The tail boom exhibited a fracture just aft of the vertical fin attachment on the left side; there were no main rotor blade strike indications on the boom. There was a red rub mark indent located on the tail, consistent and oriented with the tail rotor blades coming into contact with the boom while in rotation. The vertical fin exhibited signatures of a main rotor blade strike on the right side of the boom, consistent with a blade contacting the right side of the vertical fin after the boom was on the ground, with enough energy to fracture the boom tube at the vertical fin attach area. The tail rotor blades exhibited arcing marks, as did the horizontal stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizer also exhibited bending of the forward inboard sheet metal and spar. It is likely that the electrical transmission wires contacted the tail rotor blades and stabilizer. According to the helicopter manufacturer, if in level flight, the helicopter is about 18° nose-down (depending on airspeed). Given this scenario, the manufacturer furth stated, that with the accident conditions (estimating the wires were spaced about 6 feet apart), the angle would orient both the wires on top of each other at cabin impact. Assuming the helicopter was maneuvering at 60 mph, 0.11 seconds would transpire between the contact with the first wire (canopy) and the second wire (slat and mast). Given the damage and rub marks, it is likely that after the second wire impact, the helicopter likely pitched up and yawed to the left (wire impact on right side of mast). There was contact at the horizontal stabilizer where the helicopter likely exited the wires and continued in a right rotation with the nose-low descent. The tail boom was likely partially separated at the wire contact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A detailed examination report is contained in the public docket for this accident.

Aircraft

Registration
N9490F
Reported as
Hughes 269C
Category
Helicopter
Serial number
1030243
Built
1973
Airframe hours
12,733.4
Engine
Lycoming HIO-360-D1A, 180 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Destroyed
Fire
On-Ground
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Airworthiness certificate
Special, Restricted (Special); Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Annual · February 16, 2015
Departed
KLWS · Lewiston, ID
Destination
KLWS · Lewiston, ID
Equipment
None

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
17
Injuries
Fatal
Certificate
Private
Medical
Class 3, Without waivers/limitations
Last flight review
December 6, 2014
Seat
Left
Restraint
5-point
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
55 total · 55 in this make and model · 22 as pilot in command · 4 in the last 90 days

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
Calm
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
86 °F, dew point 50 °F
Altimeter
29.97 inHg
Observed at
KLWS, 8 nm away

Docket · 7

The files NTSB released with the investigation on June 24, 2016, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 4.1 MB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.