WPR24LA174

NTSB accident investigation · Beech 35-C33A · San Diego, CA · June 1, 2024

Accident · No injuriesClass 3 · LimitedFinal report
Date
June 1, 2024, 13:55 local (20:55 UTC)
Place
San Diego, CA
Injuries
3 uninjured
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Approach
Aircraft
N1259MBeech 35-C33A
Defining event
Approach-VFR pattern final: Fuel contamination
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report April 29, 2026
Report
Approved by Office Director
Investigation class
Class 3
NTSB office
Western Pacific Region
Parties
Beech (textron), Federal Aviation Administration, Continental Aerospace Technologies
FAA report
20240601007129A
Case key
194392

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

A partial loss of engine power due to water contamination of the fuel system.

Findings · 1

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Fluids: fuelAircraft › Fluids/misc hardware · Fluid conditionBeech 35-C33A: 3 casesAll aircraft: 1,695 casesProbable cause

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

The pilot reported that, while approaching the destination airport at the conclusion of a cross-country flight with the fuel selector set to the fullest tank, the engine began to run rough and lost partial power. Unable to reach the runway, the airplane landed hard short of the runway, resulting in substantial damage. A postaccident examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure. Fuel system continuity was confirmed, and a test run of the engine revealed no anomalies. The fuel strainer screen was removed and exhibited areas of corrosion. A water-detecting paste revealed the presence of water in the fuel. The fuel manifold was disassembled. The rubber diaphragm inside was brittle and exhibited peeling, and there were numerous rubber flakes found, but it could not be determined if the contaminants would have affected the operation of the unit. There was evidence of rust on the screen and in the cavity. The fuel strainer screen and the fuel cap (filler) receptacles also contained rust consistent with water in the fuel system. Although the investigation was unable to determine when the water was introduced into the fuel system, the presence of rust was consistent with long-term water exposure. Given the successful engine test run and the lack of anomalies of the fuel system, and the corrosion observed on some fuel system components, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of water contamination of the fuel system.

Factual narrative

Airplane maintenance records were not available. The pilot reported that the most recent annual inspection occurred in March 2024, about 26 flight hours before the accident. The airplane was not equipped with an engine monitor. The pilot estimated landing with 14 gallons usable in the left tank and 24 gallons usable in the right tank. Fuel System The fuel system is designed for operation with 100 low lead aviation gasoline. The system includes a rubber fuel cell (bladder) in each wing leading edge with a flush-type filler cap. The airplane had an 80-gallon total fuel capacity (74 gallons usable). Each filler port had a visual measuring tab within the filler neck to estimate usable fuel with the wings level: 27 gallons at the bottom of the tab and 32 gallons at the detent. From the wing bladders, fuel is plumbed to a fuel selector, containing the Off, Left and Right positions. Fuel continues through a strainer, then through an electric auxiliary fuel pump before passing through the firewall and continuing to the engine-driven injector pump to a metering control unit and fuel manifold to the cylinder nozzles. The fuel manifold valve body contains a fuel inlet, a diaphragm chamber, and outlet ports for fuel lines to the individual nozzles. The spring-loaded diaphragm includes a plunger in the central bore of the manifold body. The diaphragm is enclosed by a vented cover that retains the diaphragm loading spring. When the plunger is down in the body bore, fuel passages to the nozzles are closed off. The plunger is drilled to allow fuel to pass from the diaphragm chamber to its base and to the valve within the plunger. As fuel flow increases, pressure overcomes the diaphragm spring tension, causing the plunger to move to the open position, and fuel then flows from the manifold valve outlets through the fuel lines to the fuel nozzle assemblies. During engine operation, approximately 10 gallons per hour of excess fuel returns to the selected tank. A check valve permits bypass of the engine-driven pump during starts or pump failures. A screen is installed at the tank outlet to trap large debris, and another screen is located at the inlet of the electric auxiliary pump to prevent contamination from entering downstream components. The fuel tanks are vented through lines that terminate in open ports on the bottom surface of each wing. These vents ensure continuous atmospheric pressure balance and prevent vacuum formation during fuel withdrawal. On June 1, 2024, at 1355 Pacific daylight time, a Beech 35-C33A airplane, N1259M, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near San Diego, California. The pilot and two passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot stated that the airplane’s fuel tanks were full when he departed on the approximate 330 nautical mile cross-country flight. He departed with the fuel selector positioned on the left tank andswitched to the right fuel tank about 200 nm into the flight. During the landing approach, the pilot did not subsequently change the position of the fuel selector, and noted that, during the approach to the destination airport, the fuel quantity gauges indicated that the right tank contained more fuel than the left. The auxiliary fuel pump was off as required by the checklist. The pilot stated that, about one mile from the runway on final approach, he fully extended the wing flaps. Shortly thereafter, the engine lost partial power and was “running rough.” The pilot enriched the mixture, but was unable to restore engine power. The pilot determined that the airplane was too low to reach the runway and prepared to make a forced landing short of the runway. The airplane landed hard, resulting in a nose gear collapse. During the accident sequence, the left wing sustained substantial damage. Fuel System The wings were previously removed for recovery purposes and stored outside. To test fuel system continuity, a small fuel tank containing new, clean fuel was connected to the left tank inlet and return. The electric fuel pump was disconnected at the splice adjacent to the unit. The fuel selector was tested and functioned correctly. Fuel flowed when selected to the left tank. When the selector was moved to the Right position, fuel flow ceased, consistent with the expected function. The fuel strainer screen was removed and found to contain areas of corrosion. The throttle and mixture control valve screen assembly was found free and clear of debris. The fuel manifold was disassembled. The rubber diaphragm inside was found to be brittle, inflexible, and exhibited peeling on its upper surface. There were numerous flakes from the rubber found during the removal, but it could not be determined if the contaminants would have prohibited the venting of the unit. The vent hole was free of debris and there was no evidence of fuel leakage from the vent. The fuel manifold screen was clean, but rust-colored. The manifold cavity displayed trace amounts of rust. The fuel strainer screen was removed and exhibited areas of corrosion. Fuel lines to each cylinder were disconnected and jars were placed under each line. Fuel flowed from each line at similar flow rates. The fuel injectors were removed and found clear of debris. Continuity of the vent system was verified by blowing air pressure through the system. The vent line at the outboard section of the left wing was removed and air was introduced, resulting in fluid discharge consistent with water. The right wing vent system was similarly tested; pressurized air introduced at the inlet resulted in airflow out of the vent system and trace amounts of fluid exiting the lines. A water-detecting paste turned deep magenta when exposed to liquid recovered from the system, consistent with the presence of water. There was visible corrosion on the bottom of the fuel cap (filler) and receptacle screens. Engine Examination revealedno external damage to the engine crankcase. All six top spark plugs were removed and displayed gray coloration consistent with normal operation. Magneto-to-engine timing was confirmed with an engine timing light and was within normal operational range. The cylinders’ combustion chambers were examined through the upper spark plug holes using a lighted borescope. The combustion chambers were mechanically undamaged, and there was no evidence of foreign object ingestion or detonation. There was no evidence of valve-to-piston face contact. The gas path and combustion signatures observed at the spark plugs, combustion chambers, and exhaust system components displayed coloration consistent with normal operation. There was no oil residue observed in the exhaust system gas path. With the fuel still plumbed directly into the left wing root, an engine test run was performed. The engine operated for approximately five minutes between 1,200 and 1,700 rpm. A magneto check was conducted at 1,700 and 2,000 rpm. The engine operated normally during the test run.

Aircraft

Registration
N1259M
Reported as
Beech 35-C33A
Category
Airplane
Serial number
CE-175
Built
1967
Airframe hours
4,522.1
Engine
TCM IO-520-B, 285 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Operator
L A M Capital Management LLC
Registered owner
L A M Capital Management LLC
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Last inspection
Annual · March 1, 2024 · 26 hours before
Departed
CVH · Hollister, CA
Destination
MYF · San Diego, CA
Airport
MYF · Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport, runway 28R, 4,598 × 150 ft, asphalt
Equipment
Electronic flight bag or handheld device, ADS-B

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
60
Injuries
None
Certificate
Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 2, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
October 17, 2023
Seat
Left
Restraint
4-point
Flight hours
2,630 total · 37 in this make and model · 2,563 as pilot in command · 85 in the last 90 days · 27 in the last 30 days · 2 in the last 24 hours

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
250° at 11 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
68 °F, dew point 54 °F
Altimeter
29.92 inHg
Observed at
KMYF
METAR
KMYF 012053Z 25011KT 210V290 10SM CLR 20/12 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP128 T02000122 58006

Docket · 4

The files NTSB released with the investigation on April 22, 2026, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 4.2 MB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.