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CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE 1 ROND POINT MAURICE BELLONTE 31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX FRANCE TELEPHONE + 33 (0)5 61 93 33 33
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT ref: A27N010-17 Rev 01 Page 1 of 4 Date: 17-OCT-2017 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2017. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT SUBJECT: ATA 27 – Inspection of THSA lower attachment AIRCRAFT TYPE: A318,A319,A320,A321 OUR REF.: A27N010-17 Rev 01 dated 17-OCT-2017.
OUR PREVIOUS REF.: A27N010-17 Rev 00 dated 27-MAR-2017.
0. REASON FOR REVISION:
The aim of Revision 01 of this AOT is to provide the operators with the repair instructions which must be performed on the THSA in shop in case of positive finding.
The revised paragraphs are indicated between **BEG. REV** and **END REV**.
1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED All A320 family aircraft on which THSA have been replaced since aircraft delivery from production.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION
2.1 APPENDIX **BEG. REV** AOT Appendix_A27N010-17 AOT Appendix_Repair Instructions **END REV**
2.2 REFERENCES Ref.1: MPD task 274451-05-1 “Detailed inspection of the upper and lower THS actuator attachment (primary and secondary)” Ref.2: Bush (I.P.C. 27-44-04-03 Item 420) Ref.3: AMM TASK 27-44-51-220-002-A “Detailed Visual Inspection of the Upper and the Lower Attachments (Primary and Secondary) of the THS-Actuator” Ref.4: Tab washer (IPC 27-44-04-03 item 340) Ref.5: AMM TASK 27-44-51-000-001-A “Removal of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) Actuator” and AMM TASK 27-44-51-400-001-A “Installation of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) Actuator” Ref.6: SB 27-1164 “FLIGHT CONTROLS - TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR -
INSPECT INTEGRITY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOAD PATH AT THE UPPER AND LOWER ATTACHMENT”
3. REASON
3.1 FACTS
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT ref: A27N010-17 Rev 01 Page 2 of 4 Date: 17-OCT-2017 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2017. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT During visual inspection of THSA as per Ref. 1 MPD task, one operator reported that the THSA was found with Ref. 2 bush missing. Due to the missing bush the THSA lower attachment primary bolt was torqued against the THSA lug which resulted in the application of a transverse force on the lug.
Following this finding, other aircraft in the same airline fleet have been inspected and 2 other THSA were found with similar mis-installation.
For all the 3 cases, the involved THSA’s were recently replaced.
3.2 CONSEQUENCES Following this report, a study has been launched to assess the consequence of mis-installation on THSA structural integrity. Preliminary results indicate the transverse force on THSA lug has a significant impact on the structural fatigue and static margin.
The A320 THSA lower attachment is made of 8 attachment plates which are paired by 2 to make 4 structural lugs. Each structural lug is therefore composed of 2 attachment plates which constitute 2 independent load paths (dual load path lug).
Potential consequence of attachment plate rupture has been assessed:
- In the event of single attachment plate rupture the loads will be fully taken through the paired attachment plate with no effect at aircraft level.
- In the event of double failure of paired attachment plates the effect may ultimately be a disconnection of THSA attachment to THS.
3.3 AIM The aim of this AOT is to provide instructions for a one time inspection of THSA lower attachment to ensure that no bushes are missing.
4. SHORT TERM ACTION
4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER
4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE Inspection of THSA lower attachment is required within 6 months from AOT issuance for all A320 family aircraft on which THSA has been replaced by operators since aircraft delivery from production.
4.1.2 MANPOWER The estimated time to perform the work is 0.55 MH which is split as follows:
- 0.15 MH to get access to the THSA area
- 0.25 MH to do the clearance check
- 0.15 MH for close up
4.2 DESCRIPTION
4.2.1 ACCESS Get access to inspection area as per paragraph 3 ”job setup” of Ref 3. AMM task.
After inspection do the close up procedure as per paragraph 5 “Close up” of Ref 3. AMM task.
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT ref: A27N010-17 Rev 01 Page 3 of 4 Date: 17-OCT-2017 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2017. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4.2.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS Using a feeler gage of 0.5 mm (0.02 inches) check that the gap “A” between THSA Tab washer Ref 4.
and THSA attachment plates is more than or equal to 0.5 mm (0.02 inches). Refer to Appendix:
Appendix_A27N010-17.
This check should be performed on both LH and RH attachment sides.
4.2.3 FINDINGS **BEG. REV**
- If the gap “A” is more than or equal to 0.5 mm: no further action is needed.
- If the gap “A” is less than 0.5 mm: THSA must be replaced as per Ref 5. AMM tasks before next flight.
During replacement of THSA as per Ref 5. AMM, inspect THSA parts to confirm missing bushing. If no part is missing please contact Airbus for assessment.
In case of confirmed mis-installation, THSA must be repaired in shop by applying the repair instructions attached in Appendix: Appendix_Repair Instructions.
Note: THSA repair can only be performed in shop. THSA repair instructions in attachment must be provided to the repair shop.
**END REV**
4.3 SPARES AND TOOLING Reference QTY DESIGNATION No specific AR ACCESS PLATFORM 6M (20 FT) - ADJUSTABLE No specific AR FLASHLIGHT No specific AR WARNING NOTICE(S) No specific 1 FEELER GAGE 0.5 mm (0.02 inches)
5. FURTHER INFORMATION
5.1 FOLLOW-UP PLAN None.
5.2 IMPACTED DOCUMENTATION **BEG. REV** Ref. 5 AMM tasks correctly document bush Ref. 2 installation. This AMM task has been amended in the AMM May 2017 revision to include the check of this AOT in the paragraph M “Final inspection” which is performed after THSA installation as an additional mean to avoid mis-installation.
**END REV**
6. AOT APPROVAL The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.031.
It is anticipated that this AOT will be rendered mandatory by an EASA AD.
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT ref: A27N010-17 Rev 01 Page 4 of 4 Date: 17-OCT-2017 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2017. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
7. REPORTING Questions about this AOT are to be addressed to Airbus Customer Services through TechRequest on Airbus World, selecting Maintenance & Engineering Domain, Engineering Support section and ATA 27-
40.
As per latest reporting policy (Ref to OIT 999.0018/16), inspection results (with or without findings) are to be addressed to Airbus Customer Services through the generic e-mail address:
inspection.results@airbus.com.
Best Regards, Jean-Luc MOUYSSET
VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING SUPPORT
CUSTOMER SERVICES Jean-Pierre GOMEZ VICE PRESIDENT A320 FAMILY
PROGRAMME
AOT Appendix_A27N010-17
Using a feeler gage of 0.5 mm (0.02 inches) check that the gap “A” between THSA Tab washer (IPC 27-44-04-03 item 340) and THSA attachment plates is more or equal to 0.5 mm (0.02 inches). This check should be performed on both LR and RH side.
Refer to figure 1 for area to inspect, figure 2 for measurement location. Figure 3 and 4 shows example of normal and abnormal installation.
Figure 1: Area to inspect (looking AFT)
Figure 2: THSA lower attachment (RH shown) A Area to inspect Bush (IPC 27-44-04- 03 item 420) Attachment plates Tab Washer (IPC 27- 44-04-03 item 340)
Figure 3: Normal installation (RH shown)
Figure 4: abnormal installation (RH shown) A No gap