AC NO: 107-1 DATE . . 19 May 1972.
ADVISORY
CIRCULAR DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SUBJECT: AVIATION SECURITY - AIRPORTS
1. PURPOSE. This document furnishes guidance to those individuals and organizations having responsibilities under Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. It also provides recommendations for establishing and improving security for restricted or critical facilities and areas the security of which is not dealt with by Part 107. The information is provided regarding the preparation of an airport security program.
This Circular describes minimum acceptable standards for (a) preparation of a master security plan, (b) establishing and maintaining a suitable authorized persons identification program, and (c) establishing and maintaining an adequate identification system for certain ground vehicles.
It also makes reconanendations concerning conducting an airport security survey, establishing security committees, security education for airport personnel, the proper use of law enforcement personnel and liaison with appropriate law enforcement agencies and FAA Air Transportation Security Field Offices.
2. OBJECTIVE. To improve the overall security of airports in the interest fl of aviation safety.
Security initiated by: SE-320
107-l 19 May 1972
i..
3. BACKGROUND. The safety and security of civil aviation and its ground ,facilities are endangered by an ever increasing variety of unlawful acts.
There were 123 hijacking incidents involving U. S. carrier aircraft during the period from 1 May 1961 to 16 March 1972. Most have occurred since 1968. Bomb threats against U. S. air carrier aircraft averaged approximately 500 annually from 1966 through 1970. There were 1,145 bomb threats made against U. S. carrier aircraft in 1971.
The number of bomb threats and extortion attempts increased dramatically in early 1972. Live bombs were discovered on three air carrier aircraft. One bomb exploded aboard an air carrier aircraft on the ground causing extensive damage to the aircraft. In this specific instance it appears the bomb had been placed on the aircraft prior to its departure but fortunately did not explode until several hours after it had landed.
President Nixon, on 9 March 1972, ordered the Secretary of Transportation to make effective immediately a Federal Aviation Regulation requiring certain air carriers and commercial operators operating large aircraft (other than helicopters) to institute certain security measures, The President also ordered that final rulemaking action be expeditied regarding a proposed Part 107, Airport Security, of the Federal Aviation Regulations.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES. Part 107 assigns the responsibility for airport security to the airport operators. Part 107 defines "airport operators" as "operators of airports regularly serving scheduled air carriers holding certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board and sommercjal operators engaging in intrastate common carriage covered by Lsectiog/ 121.7...., operating aircraft other than helicopters." Certain air carriers and commercial operators have the responsibility for controlling access to their own aircraft as required under FAR 121.538. Air carriers and airport operators should coordinate plans as necessary to achieve the desired security goals. Under Part 107, airport operators are required to establish master security plans for all air operations areas except those which are occupied or controlled exclusively by a certificate holder required to have a security program under FAR 121,538 (or is an "adjacent" area as described in paragraph 7 below). Security in these instances is the responsibility of the carrier.
Page 2 Par 3
19 May 1972 107-l
5. GENERAL. A sound airport security program will be the result of detailed advance planning. All facilities have varying degrees of vulnerability to identified security hazards. The degree of risk from each specific hazard depends upon such variables as the type of facility or area involved, value or criticality, physical layout and protective measures which have been established. It does not appear that it is economically feasible or physically possible to establish the same degree of protection for all facilities. The degree of protection warranted is dictated by its criticality and relative vulnerability, and qualified by the effect of the protective measures on its operational efEectiveness.
The first step toward achievement of adequate protection is a detailed physical inspection of all areas, facilities and operat-ions existing at the airport. The inspection, which is more appropriately called a security survey, should assess the existing safeguards and procedures for adequacy as well as indicating potential or actual security deficiencies or hazards. The security survey is the recommended basis from which to develop a plan to provide for adequate safeguards which can deny unauthorized personnel access to restricted or critical facilities and areas, Further discussion of the security survey may be found in paragraph 13 of this Circular.
Of great importance to the security of any airport is the selective application, from a variety of protective measures, of those necessary to achieve "security-in-depth." Security lighting systems, alarms, locks, gates, fences, guards, access controls, and badge systems are but a few of the measures which can be utilized to increase the security of an area.
6. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS. Under Part 107 each airport operator is required to immediately adopt and put into use facilities and procedures designed to prevent or deter persons and vehicles from unauthorized access to air operations areas. A threat to aviation safety exists now. Every reasonable attempt should, therefore, be made to limit access to air operations areas to authorized persons only. At least the following measures should be instituted immediately.
.
:.
Designate Air Operations Areas.
Post signs or notices which read "Authorized Persons Only" or similar language.
C. Lock or control all doors and entrances to the air operations areas as fire or safety regulations permit.
d. Concentrate law enforcement activities on airport security matters to the extent possible.
Par 5 Page 3
107-l 19 May 1972
e. Illuminate air operations areas during the hours of darkness to the degree possible with existing lighting.
f. Preclude unauthorized vehicles from entering air operations areas.
g* .Challenge all persons in air operational areas who appear to have gained unauthorized access.
h. Provide escorts for visitors to air operations areas. . I. Advise affected personnel of their security responsibilities.
j. Implement other security measures as appropriate and practical.
AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM. Under Part 107 each airport operator is required to prepare in writing and submit to the Regional Director for the region in which the airport is located a security program for approval by the Administrator. Section 107.3(a)(2) requires that the program include a master security plan which "identifies separately each air operations area and each other area of the airport, including those areas .exclusively occupied or controlled by another person under a lease or other contractual arrangement with the airport operator or owner;" and designates each identified area of the airport "that has no protection or inadequate protection against unauthorized access to air operations areas;" and (except as to access from a non-air operations area to an air operations area where both areas are adjacent and exclusively occupied or controlled by a certificate holder that is required to have a security program under !? 121.538); "sets forth a plan for improving or establishing protection against unauthorized access to air operations areas showing a time schedule" for each designated area. Under section 107.3(a)(2) the security program must also include means and procedures for the identification of authorized persons and ground vehicles.
a. Master Security Plan. Airport operators are requested to submit clear and comprehensive plans. The following items should be covered as a minimum.
(1) Description of Airport. Describe to include location, acreage, wooded areas, water areas, parking lots, buildings, etc.
Particular attention should be given to all air operations areas. Maps, plats, schematics, photos, etc., should be provided which show the airport as a whole and the surrounding areas.
(2) Airport Activity. Identify all air carriers that serve the airport. Indicate scope of the airports operation, such as Page 4 Par 6
19 May 1972 107-l number of flights and passengers, amount of cargo handled, normal peak and slack periods of operation and other pertinent details,
(3) Security Responsibilties. List names of airport operator and person responsible for airport security. Also indicate the security responsibilities of other officials involved in the security program.
(4) Air Operations Areas. This section should describe and identify separately each air operations area and each other area of the airport, including those areas exclusively occupied or controlled by another person under a lease or other contractual arrangement with the airport operator or owner.
The security posture of each should be described as having no protection or inadequate protection against unauthorized access to air operations areas. Specific reference should be made to the following:
(a) Physical Security Measures. Describe physical security measures that are intended to protect against unauthorized access, to include barriers, lighting, locks, alarms and guards,
(b) Identification of Persons. Describe the existing personnel identification system.
(c) Identification of Ground Vehicles, Describe the existing vehicle identification system in use.
(5) Planned Improvements. Under Part 107 each airport operator is required (except as to access from a non-air operations area to an air operations area where both areas are adjacent and exclusively occupied or controlled by a certificate holder that is required to have a security program under 2 121.538) to set forth "a plan for improving or establishing protection against unauthorized access to air operations areas showing a time schedule for each area designated...." Significant progress should be planned to be achieved within reasonable time limits.
(a) Designation of Air Operations Areas. Air operations areas should be designated by the posting of signs which provide notification to all concerned that entrance into these areas must be authorized. The signs or notice should be of sufficient size and clarity to be readily Par 7 Page 5
107-l 19 May 1972 observed and understood. The signs should be positioned at locations and in such numbers that all persons will be aware of the perimeters of these areas. Clearly designated and properly secured air operations areas will normally reduce the need for stringent security measures for the airport as a whole. Bilingual signs should be used where appropriate.
(b) Security of Air Operations Areas. Air Operations Areas should be secure to achieve the objectives of this program. The following measures are recommended:
& Identify affected areas.
2 Post signs prohibiting unauthorized access.
2 Utilize natural or artificial barriers as necessary to prevent unauthorized entry.
4 Provide artificial lighting so as to sufficiently illuminate aircraft parking areas during the hours of darkness.
2 Secure or control doors, gates, and other openings in the perimeter of the air operations area to minimize the possibility of unauthorized entry.
& Establish an effective locking and key control system.
1 Install anti-intrusion devices when appropriate.
8 Utilize guard or police services as necessary.
2 Install electronic or other type surveillance equipment.
10 Provide security communications system.
(c) Separation of Air Operations Areas. The air operations area should be separated from non-air operations areas by some medium that is visable and recognizable to the general public, such as a fence, barriers, or signs.
b. Identification of Persons. Under section 107.9 each airport operator after approval of his security program must require all persons authorized access to any air operations area (except as to access from a non-air operations area to an air operations area where both areas are adjacent and exclusively occupied or controlled by a certificate holder that is required to have a security program under 8 121.538) to have identification on them when in that area.
Procedures acceptable to the Administrator must be implemented after approval of the operator's security program.
Page 6 Par 7
19 May 1972 107-l
(1) Identification System. Provisions for identification and control of all authorized persons should be included in a written document that includes the following criteria as applicable:
(4
(b) W (f-1 (d
(h) (i> Designated areas where identification is required.
Type of identification media to be utilized and issuing authority.
Procedure for checking identification of personnel.
Details of where, when, and how identification media should be worn or carried.
Disposition of lost or damaged media.
Termination of access authorization (transfers, terminations or suspensions, etc.).
Production and control of identification media.
Designated points of entry to controlled areas.
Job title of individuals who have authority to issue identification media and/or grant access to controlled areas. (These individuals should be strictly limited.)
In addition to providing for identification as required by section 107.9, it is recommended that appropriate limitations be placed on the bearer, such as escort privileges, areas of access, etc., and that procedures be established for escorting visitors whose identification media require an escort and for disciplining airport personnel who violate access controls.
(2) Identification Media Standards. IdentiEication cards and badges should meet the following standards as a minimum:
(a>
(b)
(c)
(d) I$ (0 0) (k) (1)
h) At least credit card size.
Tamper-resistant (plastic or laminated equivalent).
Wearable (by pouch, holder, chain or removable clip).
Color photograph as an integral part of the card (photo should cover at least 509. of front of card).
Individual's name.
Individual's signature.
Employer's name and/or insignia or emblem.
Issuing authority's signature.
Date of expiration.
Height, weight, color of eyes and hair.
Date of birth.
Preprinted serial number on each identification card for accounting and security control purposes.
All information except signatures should be typewritten;
no erasures or alterations are permitted.
Par 7 Page 7
107-l 19 May 1972 Identification cards should contain only a minimum of information on the front side so as to make it simple for guards and others to match the card with the person quickly.
Usually, a photo, the individual's name and the employer's name or insignia is adequate. Color coding or other indications of access authority should also be displayed on the front of the card. The more detailed information should be contained on the reverse side where it can be reviewed as necessary.
(3) Accountability of Identification Cards. Identification cards and badges must be accounted for and safeguarded so as to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining them. Inadequate control of active cards and blank forms can necessitate the complete reissuance of new cards, Airport operators will be expected to institute strick accountability procedures for all such cards and badges.
(4) Lost or Stolen Cards. Employees should be required to report the loss of a card or badge immediately to the issuing office.
A "Stop List" of missing cards should be made available to responsible personnel, This list must be kept current in order to be effective.
C. Identification of Ground Vehicles. The numbers of ground vehicles permitted in the air operations areas should be held to a minimum consistent with operational needs. Vehicle control at airports can prevent or deter crimes against air transportation.
(1) Vehicle Identification Standards. All authorized vehicles should display visual identification in such a manner as to make them readily recognizable. Regularly assigned vehicles should normally have permanent type markings, either painted on or affixed by some other means insuring a similar degree of permanence. Company paint designs, insignias, and other such markings which are clearly visible would be acceptable. Other authorized vehicles should be provided with temporary identification such as a large decal, a magnetic numbered sign, or other conspicuous devices or markings. An exception to the display requirement is provided in section 107.11(b)(l) under which any "emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency situation while escorted by a vehicle, authorized by the airport operator, that has two-way contact with the control tower or established emergency control unit at that airport" need not display visual identification.
Page 8 Par 7
19 May 1972 107-l
(2) Accountability and Control. The accountability and control of vehicular identification media should be consistent with the procedure as recommended for personnel identification cards and badges.
d. Fencing. Security fencing can vary in design, height and type depending on local security needs. Generally, however, the following standards are acceptable:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7) Par 7 Fencing of number 10 gauge , galvanized steel, chain link fabric, which is installed to a height of no less than eight feet and which is topped with a three stand (12 gauge) barbed wire overhand with a minimum of six inch separation between strands. The overhang installed at a forty-five degree angle from the horizontal and extending outward. Installation of a double apron barbed wire overhang, and fencing in excess of eight feet, is considered highly desirable when an area to be protected is located in a high risk area.
Fence posts installed at ten foot intervals on-center.
Top and bottom selvages of the fence having a twisted and barbed finish. The bottom of the fence installed to within two inches of hard surfacing or stabilized soil; however, in areas where unstable soil conditions are prevalent, the fabric installed to extend at least two inches below the surface or imbedded in concrete curbing.
All fencing grounded. Care should be taken that metallic fencing is not installed when it will interfere with the operation of navigation aids.
Where traverse culverts, troughs, or other openings larger than ninety-six square inches in the perimeter are unavoidable, the openings protected by fencing, iron grills, or other suitable barriers to preclude unauthorized access into the area. These barriers should be of materials at least equal in strength and durability to the fence and should be 2nstalled in a manner so as to deter unauthorized removal and not deter drainage.
Fencing installed to within two inches of an>; wall that forms a part of the perimeter.
, If practical, where property lines, location of facility buildings, and adjacent structures permit, the fence located not less than fifty feet from any interior structures.
Page 9 -.- . . ., .^,, ,,) ,“..‘,_. ,. ..,...I *aa, ^..-.
107-l 19 May 1972 At least twenty feet clearance allowed between the perimeter fence and interior-parking lots, or natural or aesthetic features. Such fnstallations restrict ease of access and minimize the means of concealment in the inrnediate vicinity of the fence. Where property lines or other limiting factors restrict installation in accordance with these reconrnendations, the height of the fence should, therefore, be increased to compensate for these conditions.
Clear zones can be provided around a facility through installation of perimeter fencing ten to twenty feet inside the property line. Care should be taken to insure that such a fence installation does not come closer than a minimum of twenty feet to interior structures and that prior to such an installation legal advice pertaining to local statutes with regard to retention of property rights is obtained. Local conditions will in most cases dictate the feasibility of such an installation.
(9) Fencing alarmed in areas considered as high risk areas in order to provide early warning of an attempt by an intruder to enter the area.
(10) Perimeter fencing should be inspected on a daily basis by the facility guard force or operational personnel at manned facilities.
e. Gates. The number of gates should be limited to the minimum required for the safe and efficient operation of the facility.
Active perimeter entrances of manned sites should be designated in order to enable guard force personnel the opportunity to maintain full control without unnecessary delay in traffic or reduction of operational efficiency. This largely is a matter of having sufficient entrances to accomodate the peak flow ef both pedestrian and vehicular traffic and adequate lighting for rapid inspection. Unmanned gates should be secured, illuminated during the hours of darkness and should be periodically inspected by guard or assigned operational personnel. Gates should be constructed of materials of equal strength and durability to the fence and should open to at least a ninety degree angle. Hinges of gates should be installed to preclude unauthorized removal. Gates should be topped with a barbed wire overhang meeting the specifications of that for the fence.
Page 10 Par 7
19 May 1972 107-l
f. Security Lighting. Protective lighting provides a means of continuing, during the hours of darkness, a degree of protection approaching that which is maintained during daylight hours. (This safeguard also is a considerable deterrent to thieves, vandals and the potential saboteur.) These security lighting systems should be connected to an emergency power source if available. Requirements for protective lighting of airports will depend upon the local situation and the ereas to be protected. A careful analysis of security lighting requirements should be made on the basis of needs for good visibility and based on the following criteria: employee recognition and badge identification, vehicle inspection, detection of intruders, deterrent to illegal entry, etc. Protective lighting is generally inexpensive to maintain and when properly employed, may provide guard force personnel with added protection from surprise by the determined intruder. Good protective lighting is achieved by adequate, even light upon bordering areas, glaring lights oriented towards avenue of approach of the potential intruder, and relatively little light on the guard personnel. Lighting units for perimeter fences should be located a sufficient distance within the protected area and above the fence so that the light pattern on the ground will include an area on both the inside and the outside of the fence. Generally, the light band should illuminate the fence perimeter barrier and extend as deeply as possible into the approach area. Limiting factors on the orientation of lights and the depth of the light band may be as follows: airport operations and air safety requirements, residences, waterways, roadways, railroads, etc. Type s of protective lighting systems and light sources include the following:
(1) Lighting Systems.
(a) Continuous Lighting. This is the most common protective lighting system. It consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area with overlapping cores on a continuous basis during the hours of darkness. There are two methods of employment of this system:
1 Glare projection lighting where the glare of lights directed across surrounding territory will not be annoying or interfere with adjacent operations;
2 Controlled lighting is the restriction of the width of the Hghted strip to meet a particular need. This method often illuminates'or silhouettes the guards.
Par 7 Page 11 L. .-.- I .,.. .., . . . . -..-. - -.., _. .,~- *-- .,.... 0 .-..- i* -, --
107-l 19 May 1972
(b) Standby Lighting. Lights in this system are either automatically or manually turned on when an interruption of power occurs or when suspicious activity is detected.
(c) Movable Lighting. This type lighting consists of manually operated movable flood lights.
(d) Emergency Lighting. This system may duplicate anyone of the aforementioned systems. Its use is limited to periods of power failure or other emergencies and is dependent upon an alternate power source.
(2) Light Sources.
(a) Incandescent Lamps. These are common glass lights.
Special purpose bulbs are manufactured with interior coatings designed to reflect the light, with built-in lens to direct or diffuse the light or equipped with a shade or fixture designed to accomplish similar results.
(b) Gaseous Discharge Lamps. These are mercury vapor and sodium vapor lamps. When cold these lights require from two to five minutes to illuminate and when hot they require a slightly longer period to relight after a power interruption.
g- Locks and Key Control. One of the basic safeguards used to protect personnel and property is the locking mechanism. Regardless of its quality or cost, however, a lock is nothing more than a delaying device and not a positive bar to entry. Many ingenious methods have been developed t,o open them surreptitiously. Some locks require considerable time and expert manipulation for covert opening but all will succomb to force and the proper tools. Further, many locking devices can be bypassed either because of poor construction of the lock, poor building construction, or improper installation.
(1) Key Control. Of primary importance in maintaining the integrity of a locking system is the establishment of effective key control. Such a system includes control of keys, key codes, key cutting and combination equipment, and key issuance and retrieval. Rigid controls should be established to insure that:
(a) Key cutting codes and equipment, if a system requiring such equipment is in effect, are protected against loss or misuse.
(b) Keys are issued to personnel on the basis of operational needs and not as a convenience.
Page 12 Par 7