Subject: AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEMS AND APPLICATIONS Date: 09/16/2005 Initiated By: AFS-400 AC No: 120-86 Change:
1. PURPOSE. This joint Flight Standards Service (AFS) and Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) advisory circular (AC) provides general information and acceptable methods of compliance for the certification, airworthiness, and operational approval of certain aircraft surveillance systems and selected associated aviation applications. Specific guidance for obtaining Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval /authorization for the installation and operation of these technologies is also addressed by this AC. Guidance for continued airworthiness and operational approval is included.
This guidance material does not constitute a regulation and is not mandatory. It provides one means of compliance with applicable requirements and will provide the applicant with knowledge required to help in implementing these technologies.
2. APPLICABILITY.
• Aircraft manufacturers, businesses and others applying for installation approval under 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27 and 29;
• Repair stations conducting alterations under 14 CFR part 43;
• Air carriers operating under 14 CFR parts 121, 125, or 135, foreign air carriers conducting operations in U.S. airspace, and U.S.-registered aircraft operated solely outside the United States in common carriage by a foreign person or foreign air carrier under 14 CFR part 129;
• General aviation aircraft operating under 14 CFR part 91
• Other organizations conducting training approved in accordance with 14 CFR parts 121, 135, and 141;
3. BACKGROUND. The FAA is implementing a broadcast services ground network that will deliver to the flight deck real-time access to weather, traffic and advisory aeronautical information. The broadcast service will utilize aeronautical digital communications, or data link, that provides high-speed exchange of information between aircraft and ground-based systems or between aircraft. Avionics displays will be used to present this information to the flight crew.
This implementation has begun in Alaska under the Capstone program. Additionally, an East Coast initiative, part of the FAA’s Safe Flight 21 program, is being established between Florida and New Jersey.
The term “broadcast services” encompasses three forms of broadcast information: Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B) and Flight Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B). Figure 1 provides a block diagram and
information flow among the various elements of the ADS-B air and ground infrastructure. A brief description of ADS-B and TIS-B is provided in this AC.
Functional Elements for Transmitting Participants Nav/ Position sensors
(e.g., GPS receiver) Barometric Altitude and Altitude Rate Pilot Inputs & Controls
(e.g., Call sign) Other Inputs (FMS, etc) Data Sources on Transmitting Aircra ft Avionics & Selected ADS-B Broadcast Only Ground Stations * Surveillance Transmit Processing (STP) ADS-B Transmit Subsystem Interfaces ADS-B,
TIS-B, & FIS-B Receiver Subsystem Functional Elements for Receiving Participants Avionics Application Avionics FIS-B Processing FIS-B Display & Control Airborne Surveillance & Separation Assurance Processing (ASSAP) CDTI Display and Control ADS-B Gnd.-to-Air & Air-to-Air Report Interface Display Interface Ground Based Transceiver (GBT) Ground Station Ground-to-Air TIS-B and FIS-B Messages TIS-B and FIS-B Data ** ADS-B Traffic Surveillance Infrastructure and Supporting Ground Automation Interfaces Flight Crew ADS-BAir-to-Grd.
Information Flow: ADS-B Broadcast Services Ground infrastruxcture Avionics including selected ground stations Control Facility** FIS-B data link may not be available through all ADS-B links.
* Ground Stations may include ground vehicles and marked Towers.
Figure 1. ADS-B Information Flow, Air and Ground Infrastructure.
References to RTCA, Inc. Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) documents are made in this AC. RTCA MASPS provide information useful to designers, manufacturers, installers, service providers and users of avionics systems for operational use on an international basis. RTCA MOPS documents are standards for aircraft avionics equipment designs. MOPS may be adopted by the FAA via a Technical Standard Order (TSO).
4. SCOPE. This AC addresses certain aircraft surveillance systems and selected associated aviation applications, including:
• Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA)
• Ground Surveillance Applications (GSA)
• Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Data Link System
• Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B)
• Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and ASA Integration
• Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance Downlink Systems
Guidance includes:
• Design aspects, along with failure effect classifications,
• Risk mitigation strategies,
• Testing criteria,
• Installation approval processes,
• Operational approval processes, and,
• Maintenance and continued airworthiness programs.
Appendix A of this AC provides a list of acronyms, Appendix B provides definitions/glossary, and Appendix C provides a list of airworthiness and operational regulations. The following definitions are included in the main body as they apply to all aspects of the AC. The use of "should", "must", "will" and "may" are defined below:
Must The word MUST in the text is used for legislative or regulatory requirements
(e.g., health and safety) and shall be complied with. It is not used to express a requirement of the document.
Should The word SHOULD in the text denotes a recommendation or advice on implementing such a requirement of the document. Such recommendations or advice is expected to be followed unless good reasons are stated for not doing so.
Will The word WILL in the text denotes a provision or service or an intention in connection with a requirement of the document.
May The word MAY in the text denotes a permissible practice or action. It does not express a requirement of the document.
4.1. Surveillance Systems And Associated Aviation Applications. There are many proposed air and surface applications for ADS-B. This section describes certain surveillance system functions and section 6.2.1.1.1 describes some of the associated applications.
4.1.1. Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA) function. As described in RTCA/DO-289, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA), the ASA system comprises a number of flight deck based aircraft Page 3
surveillance and separation assurance capabilities including guidance and alerts. ADS-B and/or TIS-B surveillance Information for the ASA function is received on ADS-B data links. Refer to Appendix D of this AC for additional information.
4.1.2. Airborne Surveillance and Separation Assurance Processing (ASSAP) function.
ASSAP is the subsystem that receives surveillance inputs from data links and performs processing for reports, tracks and other message set elements. Surveillance reports, tracks and any application specific alerts or guidance are output by ASSAP to a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). The CDTI function may be a dedicated display or integrated into a multiple function display (MFD). Refer to Appendix D of this AC for additional information.
4.1.3. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) data link systems. This AC provides guidance for the following two FAA approved data links:
(1) Mode-S 1090 megahertz (MHz) extended squitter.
(2) Universal Access Transceiver (UAT).
As described in RTCA/DO-242A, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), the ADS-B data link is a function on an aircraft or surface vehicle that periodically broadcasts surveillance information (e.g., state vector horizontal/vertical position and velocity). A description of each ADS-B data link is contained in Appendix E of this AC.
4.1.4. Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) data link systems. As described in RTCA/DO-286, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) For Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B), the TIS-B data link broadcasts traffic information derived from one or more ground surveillance sources to suitably equipped aircraft or surface vehicles. TIS-B augments ADS-B by providing additional traffic information in situations where not all aircraft are equipped with ADS-B. Refer to Appendix F of this AC for additional information.
4.1.5. Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) and ASA Integration. ACAS and ASA integration is the correlation of ACAS and ADS-B targets. Such integration should consider all aspects of the ACAS display (e.g., target color, shape, own-ship and target position, TA / RA functionality and alerting). The FAA Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II, Change 7, are considered equivalent to the Joint Airworthiness Authorities (JAA) ACAS. Refer to Appendix G of this AC for additional information.
4.1.6. Human Factors Considerations for the Display of Traffic Surveillance Information.
Appendix H of this AC provides human factors guidance for the display of traffic surveillance information. In addition, human factors guidance that addresses specific technologies can be found in other appendices.
4.1.7. Mode A, C, S and Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance Systems.
Appendix I of this AC provides guidance material for the initial and follow-on certification of Mode A, C, S and Mode S elementary and enhanced surveillance downlink systems.
5. The Certification Approval Process. This section provides guidance in the following areas:
5.1. Design considerations for aircraft systems.
5.2. Equipment installation guidelines.
5.2.1. Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment.
5.2.2. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) equipment integration.
5.2.3. Communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) integration.
5.2.4. Transponder and data link installation.
5.2.5. Required Surveillance Performance (RSP).
5.2.6. Safety, performance and interoperability requirements.
5.3. Safety assessment considerations.
5.3.1. Software and hardware development assurance guidance.
5.4. Verification and validation of safety, performance and interoperability requirements.
5.4.1. Airplane Flight Manual.
5.4.2. Aircraft Certification Flight and Ground Test.
5.4.3. Certification summary.
5.1. Design considerations for aircraft systems. The airborne surveillance intended function is based, in part, on aircraft installed equipment design and performance, crew workload, the operational environment, and the air-ground infrastructure. Specific guidelines for the design considerations of aircraft surveillance systems are contained in Appendices D through I of this AC.
5.2. Equipment installation guidelines. General equipment installation criteria are available in AC 21-40, Application Guide for Obtaining a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC). Additional guidelines for repairs and installation are specified in AC 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices, Aircraft Inspection and Repair, and AC 43.13-2A, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices, Aircraft Alterations. Requirements for specific aircraft surveillance intended function and associated equipment installations are based in part on the requirements of the operational applications.
5.2.1. Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment. New surveillance equipment should be tested by the manufacturer to the appropriate environmental categories as described in RTCA/DO-160D, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment. Legacy surveillance equipment may be tested to earlier versions of RTCA/DO-160(x) based on the original equipment certification basis. The RTCA/DO-160(x) environmental test categories should be based on the aircraft and installed equipment operating environment.
5.2.2. GNSS equipment integration guidelines. GNSS equipment is the recommended ownship position input to the surveillance systems. AC 20-138A, Airworthiness Approval of GNSS Equipment, provides installation guidance for GNSS antennae, sensors, and interface to other systems and should be considered. GNSS minimum operational performance standards are contained in various TSO’s. TSO C145A, Airborne Navigation Sensors Using the Global Positioning System (GPS) Augmented by the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), specifies minimum operational performance standards for GNSS antennas, and equipment compatibility with satellite communications (SATCOM). A complete index of TSO standards is published in the current version of AC 20-110, Index of Aviation Technical Standard Orders.
5.2.2.1. GNSS Performance and Availability Issues. GNSS equipment certified in accordance with TSO-C129a, Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System (GPS), by itself may not be able to provide sufficient aircraft availability to support some surveillance applications. A means to “coast” through receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) outages (either by aircraft avionics equipage and/or operational mitigation) for continued surveillance operations may be required based on the operational requirements. If TSO C129a equipment is used as the only sensor for a given function, then the loss of GNSS will require an operational safety assessment to determine the aircraft failure effect classification. Depending on the WAAS operational infrastructure, aircraft equipped with TSO C145A may not be susceptible to RAIM outages.
5.2.2.2. GNSS Augmentation by Differential Corrections. The intended function of the surveillance applications may require highly accurate position information that may be achieved by GPS augmentation (e.g., TSO-C144/145a GPS Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) or TSO-C162 GPS Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)). The intended function should be used to determine the “failure effect” classification of the surveillance system.
5.2.3. CNS Integration. The design of an aircraft’s surveillance system and its hosted applications should be compatible with the communication and navigation systems on board the aircraft, as well as other aircraft systems’ intended function and failure classification.
In developing the avionics architecture and designing software partitioning, common mode failures between communication, navigation, and surveillance functions must be considered.
Consequences of common mode failures could result in higher failure classifications and RTCA/DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, software levels than failures affecting only one communication, navigation, or surveillance function. For example, AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems, states that "loss of all navigation information must be improbable, ” that “loss of all communication functions must be improbable” (i.e., major failure classification), and that “nonrestorable loss of all navigation and communications functions must be extremely improbable”
(i.e., catastrophic failure classification). AC 23.1309 and AC 23.11 provide additional guidance information for FAR Part 23 airplanes.
5.2.4. Transponder and data links installation. Guidance for installation approval of transponders is contained in AC 20-131A, “Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) and Mode S Transponders,” or AC 20-151, “Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) Version
7.0 and Associated Mode S Transponders”. In both ACs, Appendix I, “Mode A, C, S and Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance Systems” provides airworthiness consideration for initial and follow-on design approval.
5.2.5 Required Surveillance Performance (RSP). RSP is the surveillance capability required to perform a given operation or procedure in a particular airspace or environment. The technical parameters for RSP include latency and update rate, as well as accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability. RSP is a static parameter and is determined prior to a flight operation or procedure.
Actual Surveillance Performance (ASP) is an estimation of the surveillance performance that excludes human error. ASP measures accuracy and integrity of the various monitoring sources. It is a dynamic measure that is affected by the type and availability of position data sources and takes into account all sources of error. The operational application of ASP has not been determined.
RSP and ASP are factors in Required Total System Performance (RTSP), which may be necessary for certain procedures or operations in various airspace. Elements of RTSP include Required Navigation Performance (RNP), Required Communication Performance (RCP), and Required Surveillance Performance (RSP), as well as the automation capabilities of Air Traffic Management (ATM) in the determination of separation standards.
Standards for RSP are in development and should be addressed in future versions of this AC.
5.2.6. Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements. During the certification process, the applicant should identify and document any operational environment and service assumptions in the certification plan. System safety, performance, and interoperability requirements should be based, in part, on those assumptions. Interoperability considerations are used to define the operational environment in which the aircraft surveillance system and applications are intended to operate. Specific industry standards and FAA guidance material are in development for clarification of the operational environment and performance requirements.
5.3. Safety Assessment Considerations. The applicant must conduct an aircraft system safety assessment (SSA) to comply with applicable subsections 1301 and 1309 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 23, 25, 27, and 29. If the surveillance display (e.g., CDTI) is to be used to provide guidance and control, the failure condition classification has historically been shown to be at least MAJOR for misleading information. The failure condition classification for loss of function has historically been shown to be at least MINOR. Lower classifications should be substantiated by a safety analysis. More complex or integrated systems such as TCAS II and ADS-B may have higher failure condition classifications based upon the results of the airplane-level functional hazard assessment.
For airborne systems that are developed only for enhanced traffic awareness (e.g., traffic advisories for see and avoid) operations, the failure condition classification for misleading information is considered “minor” and loss of the function has “no safety effect.”
Current versions of AC 23.1309-1C, Equipment, Systems, and Installations in Part 23 Airplanes;
AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis; AC 27-B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft; and AC 29-2C, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft provide aircraft safety assessment guidance for other system safety issues for general aviation, transport category, and rotorcraft.
Acceptable methods for performing a safety assessment are contained in Society of Automotive Engineering (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) 4754/4761, Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems, and SAE ARP 4761, Page 7
Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.
5.3.1. Software and Hardware Development Assurance Guidance.
Software standards. AC 20-115B, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Inc.
Document RTCA/DO-178B, provides an acceptable means for showing compliance to applicable airworthiness regulations for the software aspects of the aircraft airborne avionics systems. Once the aircraft system failure condition classification has been determined and the software level assignment has been substantiated, software design considerations in RTCA/DO-178B should be used to provide a methodology for software design assurance.
Software levels for the transmission of ADS-B own-ship information. Based on existing transponder certification guidance, software for the transmission of data pertaining to one’s ownship information has been historically developed to at least Level C criteria, as defined in RTCA/DO-178B. Appendix E contains additional guidance for the reduction of software levels for certain ADS-B parameters based on operational mitigation. If the ADS-B system is integrated with other aircraft functions, a higher software level may be appropriate, based on the results of the aircraft level safety analysis.
Software levels for the display of traffic information. The software levels for display of traffic information will be determined during the SSA process as described above.
Electronic hardware design assurance. If any functions are implemented using complex electronic hardware whose failure conditions are classified as “major,” “hazardous,” or “catastrophic,” the design of such hardware should be assured by a methodology acceptable to the FAA. Additionally, once the assurance levels are assigned by the safety assessment, it should be verified that the hardware and software design assurance levels are compatible with each other.
5.4. Verification and Validation of Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements.
During the verification and validation of the surveillance system (e.g., analysis, laboratory test, ground and aircraft testing), the applicant must demonstrate that the surveillance system meets its intended function (e.g., xx.1301, xx.1309). The aircraft surveillance system safety, performance and interoperability with a representative ground or target aircraft system should be required during the demonstration process.
5.4.1. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). In accordance with AC 25.1581-1, Airplane Flight Manual, the AFM documents the intended function and identifies tasks and procedures that will be used during aircraft surveillance systems operations, including operator, service provider, and air traffic services interfaces. Any operational limitations associated with flight crew tasks should be addressed in the AFM, AFM Supplement, and Pilot’s Operating Manual. AC 23-8B, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 airplanes provides additional AFM information.
5.4.2. Aircraft Certification Flight and Ground Test. Ground and flight tests should be conducted to show compliance with federal regulations, intended function, and acceptable operation. The applicant should submit aircraft installation ground and flight test plans combined with expected results and pass/fail criteria prior to issuance of the Type Inspection Authorization (TIA). Reference the applicable AC listed below for flight-testing guidance:
• AC 23-8B, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes.
• AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes
• AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems.
• AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft.
• AC 29-2C, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft.
5.4.3. Certification Summary. The applicant should submit a certification summary to the Aircraft Certification Office to provide the results and evidence that they comply with the provisions of the Certification Plan. Any deviation to the Certification Plan should be described in the certification summary together with the rationale needed to substantiate the deviation.
6. Flight Operations And Continuing Airworthiness Approval Guidance. The operational approval process complements the Aircraft Certification approval process. This section describes the processes that need to be followed for operational approval. FAA Orders 8300.10, Airworthiness Inspector's Handbook; 8400.10, Air Transportation Operations Inspector's Handbook; and 8700.10, General Aviation Operations Inspector's Handbook, contain instructions for the completion of a five-step approval process leading to formal operational approval. It is important for operators to coordinate early in the approval process with their principal operations inspector (POI), principal maintenance inspector (PMI), and principal avionics inspector (PAI).
NOTE: The FAA Flight Standards Service is responsible for the operational authorization to use aircraft surveillance systems. Air traffic service providers are responsible for developing operational and system requirements for the ground based components of these systems.
6.1 Approval Criteria.
NOTE: There are no specific criteria for the operational approval of aircraft equipped with aircraft surveillance systems when operating under 14 CFR part 91. However, guidance in this AC on manuals, training, and procedures for operating and using aircraft surveillance systems is pertinent to 14 CFR part 91 operations.
The use of aircraft surveillance systems for 14 CFR parts 121, 125, and 135 operations requires FAA operational and airworthiness approval and for operations under 14 CFR part 129 within the U.S., authorization by the FAA. For operations under 14 CFR part 129 by foreign air carriers conducting operations in U.S. airspace and U.S. registered aircraft operated solely outside the U.S. by a foreign person or by a foreign air carrier, see Appendix K. This requirement includes FAA approval /authorization of the following:
• Operations manuals,
• Training and training manuals,
• Checklists,
• Procedures for operating and using aircraft surveillance systems,
• Maintenance programs, and,
• Minimum Equipment Lists (MEL’s).
6.1.1. Training. Prior to requesting operational approval, applicants should have all training needs identified and all training development completed. The FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) program has been introduced recently due to the recognition that the rapid introduction of new systems and technologies may not fit into existing training programs. The FITS program is focused on the technically advanced small reciprocating and jet-powered aircraft, however, the FITS training syllabus can be used as a guide for developing training for any user of aircraft surveillance systems. More information on FITS, including the FITS TAA Transition Training Master Syllabus Scenario Based Transition Guide, can be found at http://www.faa.gov/avr/afs/fits. Appendix J contains a sample generic lesson plan based on FITS guidance.
6.1.2. Operational Procedures Development. Develop procedures to achieve a specific operational capability. Display of aircraft surveillance systems information does not relieve the flight crew of regulatory responsibilities to “see-and-avoid” other traffic.
6.1.3. Manuals.
6.1.3.1. Flight Operations Manuals. An FAA-approved Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS), or Pilot Operating Handbook (as appropriate) must be carried in the aircraft at all times when aircraft surveillance systems equipment is installed.
Air carriers may use an Airplane Operating Manual (AOM) or Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) instead of an AFM, if authorized.
6.1.3.2. Minimum Equipment Lists (MEL). MELs may be amended to reflect the installation of aircraft surveillance systems equipment. Changes made to MELs must be made in accordance with the approved Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) and FAA Order 8400.10. Aircraft surveillance systems equipment will not be listed as “administrative control items” in the MEL.
6.1.3.3. Aircraft Validation Tests. The evaluation of new aircraft surveillance systems operations may require a validation test in an aircraft. Validation test requirements for the aircraft surveillance system operation proposed should be based on the type of aircraft, crew workload, credit given for previously certified installations, and past simulator or ground testing. Validation test requirements will need to be evaluated for each installation and each application. First-time make and model installations and first-time hosted aircraft surveillance systems will likely require a validation flight test. Subsequent follow-on installations that introduce changes in the conformity of the system, including software upgrades, may require flight-testing if they cannot be adequately evaluated on the ground or in a simulator.
6.2. Operational Approval or Authorizations – Part 91. Most 14 CFR part 91 operations do not require any specific operational approval or authorization as long as aircraft surveillance systems avionics do not replace any system or equipment required by the regulations. U.S.
registered large and turbine-powered multi-engine aircraft operating under 14 CFR part 91, subpart F, will require a Letter of Authorization (LOA) if aircraft surveillance systems avionics are used to replace any system or equipment required by regulations. An LOA will include any conditions or limitations of use.
U.S. operators using aircraft surveillance systems in foreign airspace will need training appropriate to the requirements of the State where these operations are conducted. Consult the AIP for each State prior to conducting aircraft surveillance systems operations in that State’s Page 10
airspace. Oceanic and remote area operations using aircraft surveillance systems require compliance with the appropriate International Civil Aviation Organization documents.
6.2.1. Air Carriers And Commercial Operators. The use of aircraft surveillance systems may be authorized in Operations Specifications (OpSpecs) however, it is not anticipated that every operational use of an aircraft surveillance system will require authorization by OpSpecs. FAA Order 8400.10 contains general policy guidance and requirements for issuing or amending OpSpecs.
6.2.1.1. Operations Specifications.
6.2.1.1.1. OpSpecs may be required for flight operations using ADS-B equipment. OpSpecs paragraph A052 may be used to authorize flight operations using ADS-B equipment. Aircraft used for these operations must be listed in Paragraph A052 by make, model, and series; aircraft registration number; and make, model, and series of the authorized ADS-B system/equipment.
ADS-B operations include, but are not limited to:
• Visual acquisition of proximate aircraft for enhanced “see and avoid”
• Conflict detection and avoidance
• In-trail climb
• In-trail descent
• Station-keeping
• Passing maneuvers
• Long-range conflict management
• Reduced separation standards
Note: See Appendix B for a definition of these terms.
6.2.1.1.2. OpSpecs paragraph A008, Operational Control Authorizations, should be issued or amended if approval to use aircraft surveillance systems for any flight-following or operational control is requested. The POI should evaluate and validate this capability before approval.
6.2.1.1.3. OpSpecs paragraph D095, Minimum Equipment List, may be issued or amended.
6.2.2. Foreign air carriers conducting operations in U.S. airspace, and U.S.-registered aircraft operated solely outside the United States in common carriage by a foreign person or foreign air carrier. Foreign air carriers conducting operations in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) will require FAA authorization. Foreign air carriers operating within the U.S.
must be familiar with the aircraft surveillance systems operational procedures in use. In addition, foreign air carriers or persons operating U.S. registered aircraft anywhere, are required to have the maintenance programs and minimum equipment lists (MEL) approved by the FAA in accordance with 14 CFR 129.14. Appendix K provides detailed guidance information about the authorization/approval process. Additional guidance is under development and will be published Page 11
in the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Manual, part of U.S. Aeronautical Information Publication.
6.2.2.1. Aircraft surveillance systems operations by foreign air carriers, other international operators, and IGA aircraft in international airspace (e.g., within the New York Oceanic area or the West Atlantic Route System) do not require FAA operational approval authorizations.
Aircraft surveillance systems operations that may be authorized for foreign air carriers, other international operators, or IGA aircraft are those listed in paragraph 6.2.1.1.1 of this AC.
6.3. Continuing Airworthiness – General. Certificate holders or operators are responsible for compliance with all regulatory requirements for ongoing maintenance and support of aircraft surveillance systems equipment. Maintenance programs should identify inspection items, establish time-in-service intervals for maintenance and inspections, and provide the details of the proposed methods and procedures. The maintenance program should also include:
• Maintenance manual information,
• Calibration procedures required to ensure continued airworthiness,
• Illustrated parts catalog, and,
• Wiring diagrams
6.3.1. Databases. Databases used in conjunction with aircraft surveillance systems, including airport map databases and navigation databases when used as part of an aircraft surveillance system, must be current and up-to-date. Compliance with Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) publication dates does not guarantee currency. Consequently, an appropriate means needs to be identified to ensure accuracy and data timeliness.
James J. Ballough Director, Flight Standards Service