AC 29-2B 7/3097 SECTION 38. SAFETY EQUIPMENT
689. § 29.1411 GENERAL
a. Explanation.
(1) This section contains requirements for the accessibility and stowage of required safety equipment. Compliance with this section should assure that:
(i> Locations for stowage of all required safety equipment have been provided.
(ii) Safety equipment is readily accessible to both crewmembers and passengers, as appropriate, during any reasonably probable emergency situation.
Stowage locations for all required safety equipment will adequately protect such equipment from inadvertent damage during normal operations.
(iv) Safety equipment stowage provisions will protect the equipment from damage during emergency landings when subjected to the inertia loads specified in § 29.561.
(2) It is a frequent practice for the rotorcraft manufacturer to provide the substantiation for only those portions of the ditching requirements relating to aircraft flotation and ditching emergency exits. Completion of the ditching certification to include the safety equipment installation and stowage provisions is then left to the affected operator so that those aspects can best be adopted to the selected cabin interior. In such cases, the "Limitations" section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual should identify the substantiations yet to be accomplished in order to justify the full ditching approval. The operator (or modifier) performing these final installations is then concerned directly with the details of this paragraph. Any aspects of the basic rotorcraft flotation and emergency exits approval that are not compatible with the modifier's proposed safety equipment provisions should be resolved between the type certificate holder and the modifier prior to FAA/AUTHORITY approval for ditching.
(See Paragraphs 337a(9) and 691a(3).)
b. Procedures.
(1) A cockpit evaluation should be conducted to demonstrate that all required emergency safety equipment to be used by the crew will be readily accessible during any probable emergency situation. This evaluation should include, for example, emergency flotation equipment actuation devices, remote liferaft releases, hand fire extinguishers, and protective breathing equipment.
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(2) Stowage provisions for safety equipment shown to be compatible with the vehicle configuration presented for certification should be provided and identified so that:
(i> Equipment is readily accessible regardless of operational configuration.
(i¡) Stored equipment is free from inadvertent damage from passengers and handling.
Stored equipment is adequately restrained to withstand the inertia forces specified in § 29.561(b)(3) without sustaining damage.
(3) For rotorcraft required to have an emergency descent slide or rope according to § 29.809(f), the stowage provisions for these devices must be located at the exits where they are intended to be used.
(4) Liferaft stowage provisions should be sufficient to accommodate rafts for the maximum number of occupants for which certification for ditching is requested.
(i) Liferafts stowed inside the rotorcraft should be located near the ditching emergency exits so that:
(A) Liferafts are readily accessible and deployment through ditching emergency exits by passengers and crew may be accomplished without unreasonable effort and training.
(B) Deployment of liferafts can be accomplished without damage
(l.e., punctures, tears, etc.).
(il) Liferafts stowed outside of the rotorcraft should have-- (A) A readily accessible deployment device; and (B) A secondary method of deployment near the stowed area.
(ili) Rotorcraft fuselage attachments for the liferaft static lines required by § 29.1415(b)(2) must be provided.
(A) Static line fuselage attachments should not be susceptible to damage when the rotorcraft is subjected to the maximum emergency ditching water entry loads established by § 29.801. (See Paragraph 337b(1).)
(B) Static line fuselage attachments should be structurally adequate to restrain a fully loaded raft of the maximum capacity required for ditching certification.
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AC 29-2B 7/3097 (C) Literafts that are remotely or automatically deployed must be attached to the rotorcraft by the required static line after deployment without further action from the crew or passengers.
(5) Stowage provisions for the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) required by § 29.1415 must be located near a designated ditching emergency exit. The TSO under which most liferafts are approved and the operating regulations (e.g., 135.167(b)) require that the ELT be actually attached to an approved liferaft. Configurations supplying an ELT as a part of an approved liferaft package have been accepted as meeting the intent of § 29.1411(e).
(6) If stowage provisions for life preservers are included in an interior configuration, each life preserver when stowed must be within easy reach of each occupant while seated.
690. § 29,1413 (Amendment 29-16) SAFETY BELTS: PASSENGER WARNING DEVICE.
a. Explanation. A safety belt design feature and a design feature for the belt warning or signal device are stated in the standard.
(1) Belts must have metal-to-metal latches (Amendment 29-16).
Section 29.785(c), (f), and (g) of Amendment 29-24 concern design and installation standards for belts.
(2) Whenever a "fasten" seat belt sign or equivalent symbol is used, each pilot shall be able to control or operate the sign.
(3) Section 29.853(c) of Amendment 29-18 concerns illuminated "no smoking" information signs which are typically adjacent to any seat belt information sign.
Whenever the crew and passenger compartments are separated, illuminated signs are required. However, a placard may be used to prohibit any smoking.
(4) TSO-C22, Safety Belts, contains acceptable aircraft belt standards. Also, TSO-C114, Torso Restraint Systems, dated March 27, 1987, contains acceptable aircraft standards, provided there is compliance with § 29.785.
b. Procedures.
(1) A TSO-C22 or TSO-C114 approved seat belt or seat belt/harness should be used. The rated load shall not be exceeded. During an interior compliance inspection, the belt shall be checked for proper label, rating, and metal-to-metal latches. Other features are required by § 29.785(c) and (g) of Amendment 29-24.
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(2) A placard, legible to each passenger seated in the cabin, stating "fasten seat belts" (and harness if appropriate) may be used. This is similar to the "no smokingi placard standard.
(3) If an illuminated "fasten seat belt" sign or symbol is used, it should be legible to each seated passenger and must be controllable from each pilot seat.
691. § 29.1415 (Amendment 29-30) DITCHING EQUIPMENT.
a. Explanation.
(1) Emergency flotation and signaling equipment is not required for all rotorcraft overwater operations. However, if such equipment is required by an operating rule
(e.g., § 135.167), the equipment supplied for compliance with the operating rule must meet the requirements of this section.
(2) Compliance with the provisions of § 29.801 for rotorcraft ditching requires compliance with the safety equipment stowage requirements and ditching equipment requirements of §§ 29.1411 and 29.1415, respectively.
Emergency flotation and signaling equipment installed to complete certification for ditching or required by any operating rule must be compatible with the basic rotorcraft configuration presented for ditching certification. It is satisfactory if operating equipment is not incorporated at the time of original type certification of the rotorcraft provided suitable information is included in the "Limitations" section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual to identify the extent of ditching certification not yet completed.
(ii) When the ditching equipment required by § 29.1415 is being installed by a person other than the applicant who provided the rotorcraft flotation system and ditching emergency exits, special care must be taken to avoid degrading the functioning of the aircraft devices and to make the ditching equipment compatible with them. (See Paragraphs 337a(9) and 689a(2).)
b. Procedures.
(1) Liferafts and life preservers used to show compliance with the ditching requirements must be of an approved type. Compliance with the requirements of TSO-C12 for liferafts and TSO-C13 for life preservers will satisfy regulatory requirements for approval of this equipment.
(i) Lite preservers.
(A) Life preservers should comply with the requirements of the applicable operating regulations (FAR Parts 91, 135, 121, etc.). For extended Par 690 1047
AC 29-2B 7/3097 overwater operations each life preserver is required to have an approved survivor locator light by the operating rules.
(B) Protective covers for life preservers should be compatible with the TSO requirements under which the basic life preserver was approved.
(ii) Liferafts.
(A) Liferafts are rated during their approval to the number of people that can be carried under normal conditions and the number that can be accommodated in an overload condition. Only the normal rating may be used in relationship to the number of occupants permitted to fly in the rotorcraft.
(B) The liferaft configuration (i.e., number of liferafts and capacity of each raft) presented for ditching certification must be adequate to accommodate all rotorcraft occupants using the overload rating of the remaining rafts) after the loss of one raft of the largest rated capacity. Thus, at least two rafts are required for any transport category rotorcraft extended overwater operation.
(C) Each liferaft must be equipped with both a trailing line and a static line to be used for securing the liferaft close to the rotorcraft for occupant egress.
The static line should be of adequate strength to restrain the literaft under any reasonably probable sea state condition but must be designed to release before submerging the empty raft to which it is attached if the rotorcraft sinks.
(iii) Survival Equipment. Approved survival equipment if required by any operating rule must be attached to each liferaft. Provisions for the attachment and stowage of the appropriate survival equipment should be addressed during the ditching equipment segment of the basic ditching certification.
(2) One emergency locator transmitter (ELT) meeting the applicable requirements of TSO-C91 must be provided for use in one liferaft. The ELT provided for this purpose should be attached to one of the rafts or included in the survival equipment which is attached to one of the liferafts. If not attached to a liferaft, the ELT must be located near an emergency ditching exit for compliance with § 29.1411(e).
(See Paragraph 689b(5).)
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692. RESERVED.
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AC 29-2B 7/3097
693. § 29.1419 (Amendment 29-21) ICE PROTECTION.
a. Background.
(1) In March 1984, the FAA/AUTHORITY for the first time certificated a rotorcraft for flight into known icing conditions. Several other manufacturers are pursuing designs for icing flight capability.
(2) Most rotorcraft icing technology has been developed for military rotorcraft.
The only U.S. military rotorcraft equipped and approved for flight into icing conditions is the UH-60A (Blackhawk). The UH-60A is limited to supercooled cloud conditions where liquid water content (LWC) does not exceed 1.0°gm/m3 and outside air temperature (OAT) is not below -20° C.
(3) Many rotorcraft operators have voiced a high priority on obtaining rotorcraft approved for operation in icing conditions.
(4) The icing characteristics envelope of FAR Part 25, Appendix C, has served as a satisfactory design criteria for fixed-wing operations for two decades. The envelope, as presented, extends to 22,000 feet with possible extension to 30,000 feet but does not present icing severity as a function of altitude. At the time the envelope was derived, it was assumed that all transport category airplanes would operate to at least 22,000 feet. For present state-of-the-art rotorcraft, this assumption is not valid.
As such, an altitude-limited icing envelope based on the same data used to derive the Part 25, Appendix C, and the Part 29, Appendix C, envelopes is presented as an alternate to the full icing envelope.
b. Explanation.
(1) General.
The discussion in this paragraph pertains generally to certifications to the full icing envelope of Part 29, Appendix C, within the altitude limitations of the rotorcraft or to the altitude-limited icing envelope based on a 10,000-foot pressure altitude limit. The actual icing envelope considered may be further restricted based on the actual pressure altitude envelope for which certification is requested. It envisions certification with full ice protection systems (rotor blades, windshields, engine inlets, stabilizer surfaces, etc.). With the exception of pilot controllable variables such as altitude and airspeed, limited certification (either in terms of icing envelope or protection capability) is not envisaged at this time due to the difficulty in forecasting the severity of icing conditions, relating the effects of the forecasted conditions to the type of aircraft, and the effects of reported icing among various types of aircraft, particularly between fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. In addition, with a limited protection capability, viable escape options may not be operationally available if limitations are exceeded.
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7/30/97 АС 29-2B (її) The discussion in this paragraph, regarding rotor blade ice protection, is oriented primarily toward electrothermal rotor deicing systems, since these have the most widespread acceptance and projected use within the industry. Also, most of the testing and research into rotorcraft ice protection to date has been conducted with these types of systems. Research is continuing with other types of systems such as anti-icing fluid systems, and information will be added to address certification of these as necessary. It should also be noted that most of the rotorcraft icing experience accumulated to date has been on rotorcraft with symmetrical airfoil sections. The application of this experience to rotorcraft with asymmetrical airfoils should be carefully evaluated. Limited experience has been gained during development and qualification testing of the Army Blackhawk on asymmetrical airfoil icing characteristics. The most prominent difference appears to be a more rapid degradation of airfoil performance.
Rapidity of performance degradation is also dependent upon severity of the icing condition (primarily a function of liquid water content) and ice shape (primarily a function of OAT and median volumetric droplet diameter (MVD)).
(Ш) The effects of ice can vary considerably from rotorcraft to rotorcraft.
Experience gained for a rotor system with an identical blade profile could provide valuable information but should be used cautiously when applied to another rotorcraft.
Assumptions cannot necessarily be made based on icing test results from another rotorcraft. Particular care should be exercised when drawing from fixed-wing icing experience as the widely different and varying conditions seen by the rotor blades make many comparisons with fixed-wing results invalid. Likewise, icing effects on rotor blades vary significantly from those on other parts of the rotorcraft. This is due to changing blade velocity as compared with the constant velocity of the remaining parts.
(2) Reference Material. Prior to commencement of efforts to design and certify a rotorcraft, the references listed in Paragraph d should be reviewed. FAA Technical Report ADS-4, Engineering Summary of Airframe Icing Technical Data, December 1963, although somewhat dated, is recommended for basic aircraft icing protection system design information.
(3) Objective. The objective of icing certification is to verify that throughout the approved envelope, the rotorcraft can operate safely in icing conditions expected to be encountered in service (i.e., Appendix C of Part 29 or the altitude-limited icing envelope presented herein). This will entail determining that no icing limitations exist or defining what the limitations are, as well as establishing the adequacy of the ice warning means (or system) and the ice protection system. A limiting condition may manitest itself in one of several areas such as handling qualities, performance, autorotation, asymmetric shedding from the rotors, visibility through the windshield, etc. Prior to flight tests in icing conditions, sufficient analyses should have been conducted to determine the design points for the particular item of the rotorcraft being analyzed (windshield, engine inlet, rotor blades, etc.). After the analyses are reviewed and found adequate, tests should be conducted to confirm that the analyses are valid and that the rotorcraft can operate safely in any supercooled cloud icing condition defined by Part 29, Appendix C, Par 693 1051
AC 29-2B 7/3097/ or the altitude-limited icing envelope. References d(1) and (3) may be useful in determining the design points and extrapolation of test data to the desired design points.
(4) Planning. For best utilization of both the applicant's and the FAA/AUTHORITY's resources, the applicant should submit a certification plan at the start of the design and development effort. The certification plan should describe all efforts intended to lead to certification and should include the following basic information:
Rotorcraft and systems description.
Ice protection systems description.
Certification checklist.
Description of analyses or tests planned to demonstrate compliance.
Projected schedules of design, analyses, testing, and reporting efforts.
Methods of test - artificial vs. natural.
Methods of control of variables.
Data acquisition instrumentation.
Data reduction procedures.
(5) Environment.
(i) Definitions.
(A) Supercooled Clouds. Clouds containing water droplets (below 32° F) that have remained in the liquid state. Supercooled water droplets will freeze upon impact with another object. Water droplets have been observed in the liquid state at ambient temperatures as low as -60° F. The rate of ice accretion on an aircraft component is dependent upon many factors such as droplet size, cloud liquid water content, ambient temperature, and component size, shape, and velocity.
(B) Ice Crystal Clouds. Glaciated clouds existing usually at very cold temperatures where moisture has frozen to the solid or crystal state.
(C) Mixed Conditions. Partially glaciated clouds at ambient temperatures below 32° F containing a mixture of ice crystals and supercooled water droplets.
(D) Freezing Rain and Freezing Drizzle. Precipitation existing within clouds or below clouds at ambient temperatures below 32° F where rain droplets remain in the supercooled liquid state.
(E) Sleet. Precipitation of transparent or translucent pellets of ice which have a diameter of 5mm or less.
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Hail. Solid precipitation in the form of balls or pieces of ice (hail stones) with diameters ranging from 5mm to more than 50mm.
(ii) Appendix C of Part 29 defines the supercooled cloud environment necessary for certification of rotorcraft in icing except that the pressure altitude limitation is that of the rotorcraft or that selected by the applicant, provided the remaining altitude envelope is operationally practical. Due to air traffic system compatibility constraints, approval of a maximum altitude less than 10,000 feet pressure altitude should be discouraged. However, there are operations where a lower maximum altitude has no effect on the air traffic system and would still be operationally useful. Figures 3 and 6 of Appendix C, Part 29, relate the variation of average LWC as a function of cloud horizontal extent. These relationships should be used for design assessment of the most critical combinations of conditions as a function of en route distance. This, in combination with a capability to hold in icing conditions for 30 minutes at the destination, is commensurate with policies previously established for fixed-wing aircraft. Figures 3 and 6 should be used in conjunction with the altitude limited criteria of Figures 693-1 through -4 herein. It is emphasized that LWC extremes expressed in Part 29 Appendix C, criteria represent the maximum average values to be anticipated within an exceedance probability of 99.9 percent. Transient, instantaneous peak values of much higher LWC have been observed. These instantaneous peak values appear to be of little significance to the design of protected and unprotected surfaces; however, these high values, if encountered, may induce shedding of ice from some unprotected surfaces. This is due to radical changes in the rate of release of latent heat and resultant changes in the structural properties and adhesion force of ice.
(11) An analysis performed at the FAA Technical Center in 1985 concludes that the aircraft icing environment below 10,000 feet is not as severe in terms of LWC and OAT as that depicted in the Part 29, Appendix C, envelope. This AC presents the altitude-limited envelope that may be employed by those applicants who elect to certify with a 10,000-foot pressure altitude limit. The altitude-limited envelope is based upon the same data that were used to derive the design criteria of Part 29, Appendix C (Figures 693-1 through -4). The data used to derive these limited envelopes cannot be used to further define icing conditions between 10,000 feet and 22,000 feet; hence, above 10,000 feet, the Part 29, Appendix C, envelopes should be used. It should be noted that the engine inlets should still meet the icing requirements of § 29.1093. The limited icing envelopes may be used on an equivalent safety basis to show compliance with the intent of § 29.1093 if the altitude limit established for the rotorcraft is not greater than 10,000 feet.
(iv) Significantly different effects can result from various combinations of parameters. For example, most rapid ice accumulations occur at the high values of liquid water content, although the greatest impingement area occurs at the high values of droplet size. Most critical ice shapes are a function of each of these parameters in addition to airspeed, surface temperature, and surface contour. Care should be taken Par 693 1053
AC 29-2B 7/3097 to explore the entire specified ranges of these parameters during the design, development, and certification efforts.
(V) Mixed conditions (l.e., a combination of ice crystals and supercooled water droplets) and freezing rain or freezing drizzle are not addressed in the Part 29 environmental criteria but can present more severe icing conditions than those defined.
Although the probability of encountering freezing rain is relatively low, mixed conditions commonly occur in supercooled cloud formations. Little data have been gathered on the effects of encountering mixed conditions (see Paragraph 693d(6)). There are no criteria for certification in mixed conditions or freezing rain at present. In addition to the hazards of operating any aircraft in icing, certain aspects of rotorcraft icing (relatively low altitude operation, asymmetric shedding with resulting vibration, and ice damage or ingestion) warrant a caution notice in the RFM advising that the rotorcraft is not certified for operation in freezing rain or freezing drizzle. Avoidance procedures (e.g., climb or descent) may also be useful.
(6) Elight Test Prerequisites.
(i) The prototype rotorcraft should be capable of IF and IMC flight.
(ii) Sufficient analyses should be developed, submitted, and accepted by FAA/AUTHORITY to show that the rotorcraft is capable of safely operating to the selected design points of both the continuous maximum and intermittent maximum conditions of Part 29, Appendix C, or the altitude-limited icing envelope. A detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the ice protection system should be performed.
(i¡i) Specific attention should be given to (1) assuring that the selected design condition(s) of atmospheric and rotorcraft flight envelopes have been identified;
(2) qualification and design of ice protection systems and components; and (3) component installation and ice formation effects upon basic rotorcraft structural properties and handling qualities. These assurances can be established from analyses, bench tests, and/or dry air flight tests or simulated icing tests, as appropriate, prior to flight tests in natural icing.
(iv) The applicant should assess rotor blade stability with ice deposits to assure that dynamic instability will not occur in icing conditions. This assessment may be accomplished by analysis including consideration of failure of the most critical segment of the rotor blade ice protection system. It also may be accomplished by experimental means such as attaching dummy ice shapes to the blades and using a whirl stand or wind tunnel.
c. Procedures.
(1) Compliance.
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in general, compliance can be established when there is reasonable assurance that while operating in the specified icing environment (1) the engine(s) will not flameout or experience significant power losses or damage; (2) stress levels are not reached with ice accumulations that can endanger the rotorcraft or cause serious reductions in component life; (3) the handling qualities, performance, visibility, and systems operation are defined and are not deteriorated unacceptably; (4) inlet, vent, or drain blockage (such as fuel vent, engine, or transmission cooler) is not excessive; and
(5) autorotation characteristics are acceptable with maximum ice accretion between deice cycles. Assessment of performance loss should include not only the drag and weight of the ice itself but electrical or other load demands of the ice protection system and any performance changes resulting from modified rotor blade contours.
(її) It is emphasized that ice formations (shape, weight, etc.) vary significantly under varying conditions of OAT, LWC, MVD, airspeed, attitude, and rotor RPM. The most critical conditions should be defined by means of analyses or test and verified by test. Performance changes under these various conditions should be determined and found acceptable.
(•1) Laboratory, icing tunnel, ground spray rig, and airborne icing tanker tests are all very useful in developing an ice protection capability, but none of these, either individually or collectively, can satisty the full requirements for certification. None can presently duplicate the combinations of liquid water content, droplet size, flow field, and random shedding patterns found in natural icing conditions. Airborne tankers hold considerable promise of being able to fulfill certification requirements (in addition to the advantage of being able to produce an icing environment on demand rather than having to wait for it to occur in nature), but tankers have not been able to generate droplet sizes that cover the complete envelope for certification. Many improvements have been made in some tankers in recent years; however, large droplet sizes have typically been a problem. Also, the size of existing tanker clouds is not of sufficient cross section to immerse the entire rotorcraft. There are also solar radiation and relative humidity effects to be considered and correlated with natural icing when using a tanker. The tanker should be able to immerse the entire rotor system as a minimum and should have a means of controlling and changing the cloud characteristics uniformly and repeatably. Until an artificial method has been successfully demonstrated and accepted, icing certification should include flight tests in natural icing conditions.
(iv) Flight testing in natural icing conditions also has limitations.
Reference 693d(16) contains information that may be useful in planning natural icing flight tests. The key limitation of natural icing flight tests is being able to find the combinations of conditions that comprise critical design points. This is especially true of those points falling near the 99.9 percentile of exceedance probability; e.g., high LWC at low OAT with large MVD. It is emphasized that some more severe design points, however, may exist within the atmospheric icing envelope rather than near the edges or corners of the envelope. This does not mean that natural icing tests must be conducted Par 693 1055