the crew is provided visual and aural RPM warning), and secondary powerplant instruments such as No, oil pressure, and temperature.
(iv) Proper cockpit annunciation is essential for safe operation. SAS and autopilot modes must be properly annunciated. Appropriate annunciator color coding is contained in § 29.1322. There must be no question in regard to the source of navigation information presented to the crew. Where navigation switching is available between individual displays and between pilot positions, the first pilot should have overriding control for his displays.
(9) IMC Evaluation.
As part of the flight test program, new rotorcraft undergoing IFR certification should be flown in the air traffic control system in actual day and night instrument meteorological conditions. Items for consideration during the IMC evaluation include:
(A) Ability of the rotorcraft to safely operate in the National Airspace System, including crew capabilities to cope with probable malfunctions. Examples of failures imposed during this IMC evaluation on previous programs are shown below:
(1) Hydraulic tailure
(2) Individual COMM, NAV, or intercom failure
(3) Engine failure
(4) Loss of any power input
(5) SAS failure (G) Trim failure (Z) Individual failure of each vertical and directional gyro (B) Visibility during low approach conditions in precipitation.
(C) Glare and reflections at night in clouds.
(D) Workload demands on the minimum flight crew including the failures in Paragraph (9)(A)(1) above.
(E) Handling qualities in turbulence throughout the IFR approved envelope including typical FR flight maneuvers, 1182 Par 775
(1) With reasonably anticipated stability augmentation system failures,
(2) With reasonably probable control system failures (hydraulics, force trim, basic ship systems, etc.),
(3) With the typical workload conditions associated with operating in high density traffic areas, and
(4) With other reasonable, probable failures.
(F) Cockpit leaks in precipitation which affect pilot efficiency, safety, or rotorcraft airworthiness.
Rotorcraft that are an improved, modified, or later model of previously approved type that have no significant changes in the fuselage and windshield configuration, the aircraft lighting system, and the rain removal systems do not need to be flown in clouds. They may need to be evaluated in clouds if, in the judgment of the flight test personnel, there is some doubt as to the similarity of the configuration.
However, a previously approved rotorcraft undergoing IFR certification tests for a different Stability Augmentation System should not require a series of actual IFR flights just to determine pilot workload, or whether it can be flown in clouds.
(10) Static Position Error. The static position error should be reevaluated to determine altimeter error during instrument approach conditions. This is particularly important when high angle approaches (above 3°) are approved. Static position error for 3° approaches can typically be approximated by the level flight error. Level flight error is constrained by the requirements of § 29.1325(f). The direction of error is important. If the indicated value is lower than actual value, the error is in a conservative direction and further investigation may not be required. The direction and magnitude of static position error should be determined for steep angle approach conditions and additional information provided when necessary in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual. An investigation of static system response during the go-around transition should be investigated.
(11) Cross Coupling. IF handling qualities are enhanced by providing low levels of coupling between axes. During the flight evaluation, pilots should be alert for strong cross coupling tendencies between yaw and pitch, heave (collective) and pitch, heave and roll, or roll and pitch. Any strong coupling effects between these motions may produce unacceptable handling qualities for IF flight. The rotorcraft must be able to make a smooth transition from any flight condition. As an example, large rolling or pitching moments with collective application would represent questionable handling characteristics for the FR missed approach condition.
Par 775 1183
АС 29-2B 7/30/97
(12) Electrical, Avionics, and Instruments. Some aircraft have been certified with different equipment from that suggested in this subparagraph because the certification criteria for IFR has evolved in several stages. The following guidance refers to the latest certification requirements:
Additional Avionics/Instruments. The avionics/instrument required for IFR certification beyond those required for VFR certification should be as follows:
(A) Standby Attitude Indicator in place of a rate of turn indicator required by § 29.1303(g). Power for operation and lighting must be independent from the rotorcraft electrical generating/starting system. Operation must be maintained for 30 minutes after total aircraft electrical power generating system failure.
(B) Alternate Static Source. An alternate static source with a means of selecting this source must be provided for single pilot configurations.
(C) Thunder Storm Lights. Thunder storm lights are high intensity white lighting that flood the instrument panel area containing the basic flight instruments.
(D) Direction Indication, Gyro Stabilized. Magnetic in place of non-magnetic required by § 29.1303(h).
(E) Navigational Systems. Navigational systems required by the applicable operational rules must be provided.
(F) Communication Systems. Communication systems required by the applicable operational rules must be provided.
(G) Other electrical/electronic equipment. Other electrical/electronic equipment required by the applicable operational rules must be provided.
(¡ї) Electrical Power Availability for Avionic and Instrument Systems.
Minimum avionic and instrument systems should remain operative after electrical power failures in relation to IFR operation. The lists that follow suggest the minimum Avionic and Instrument Systems that should remain operational after a single failure of the generating system and after failure of all but the emergency power source. These lists do not address the basic equipment required for non-IFR related operation. These basic equipment requirements are addressed by the appropriate paragraph of this AC.
Where a time-limited power source is provided for compliance with FAR 29.1351(d)(2), in determining the endurance it should be assumed that flight under instrument flight rules will be continued for a period of not less than 30 minutes following the failure of the normal electrical power generating system.
1184 Par 775
7130/97 AC 29-2B (A) Avionic and instrument systems that should remain operational, for IF approved rotorcraft, after a single failure of the electrical generating system.
The rotorcraft must be capable of IF flight for one-half the maximum cruise duration.
The suggested minimum avionic and instrument systems are as follows:
(1) Flight Instruments. Same as § 29.1303 requirements, except as defined by Subparagraphs 775(12)(i)(A) and (D).
(≤) Communications. One VHF radio.
(3) Navigation System. One navigation system, including necessary sensor inputs such as directional gyros.
(4) Transponder.
(5) ICS System. Required for two pilot approval.
(Q) Instrument Lights (or equivalent).
(B) Avionic and instrument systems that should remain operational, for IER approved rotorcraft, after total failure of the electrical generating system. The rotorcraft must be capable of flight for a minimum of 30 minutes. The suggested minimum equipment is as follows:
(1) Magnetic Compass.
(2) Airspeed-Altitude-Attitude Presentation.
(3) Communications One VHF System.
(4) Instrument Lights (or equivalent).
(2) ICS System-For Two Pilot Approval.
(C) Additional requirements for Category A rotorcraft. Where a timelimited power source is provided for compliance with FAR 29.1351(d) (2), in determining the endurance it should be assumed that flight under instrument flight rules will be continued for a period of not less than 30 minutes following the failure of the normal electrical power generating system.
Directional Instruments. A magnetic, gyro stabilized direction indicator is specified because navigation in instrument flight must be precise. In rotorcraft, the nonstabilized magnetic indicator is subject to many errors, particularly in turbulence. Therefore, it is inappropriate as the primary source of directional information, but it is adequate as an emergency source. A nonslaved directional gyro is Par 775 1185
also inappropriate as the primary source of directional information because of drift and the requirement to set it to some other precise reference.
(A) As a minimum for single pilot FR, a nonstabilized magnetic indicator (such as a "whiskey compass") and a magnetic gyroscopically stabilized direction indicator system (slaved) are required.
(B) The minimum for dual pilot certification includes the instruments required for single pilot, and an additional independent gyroscopically stabilized directional indicator system (slaved or unslaved).
(13) FR Electrical System.
General.
(A) The entire electrical system, both AC and DC portions, must be reviewed with IF operation in mind. This review is necessary since most of the rotorcraft presently certificated do not include IF operation as part of their certification.
Many aspects of normal operation and results of failure conditions may be entirely acceptable for VFR operation, but unacceptable for IFR operation.
(B) Provisions should be made for a capability to continue flight for one-half the maximum cruise duration in the event of a single failure in the electrical system. Paragraph 652 contains the definition of a "single failure." The evaluation of the system under failure conditions should consider not only the failure itself, but also the recommended cockpit procedure to respond to any failure.
(C) The fault analyses of the electrical system and the results of the system testing to validate that analysis serves as a good starting place for the electrical system review. Failure of each generator, each battery, and each component, such as switches and relays, should be accounted for first since failure of equipment and components are the most probable.
(D) System failure such as tripped circuit breakers, blown fuses, loss of busses, loss of feeders, loss of ground terminals, and failure of electrical disconnect plugs should also be considered.
(E) Routing of all wiring from each power source throughout the distribution system should be reviewed. In all instances feeder wires should be routed separately from small gage control wiring. Also, wiring for each power system should be separated to the maximum extent practical from the wiring associated with other required power systems.
(F) A single electrical disconnect plug should not contain wiring for more than one generating system. Many systems incorporate automatic feeder fault 1186 Par 775
protection that disables a power source experiencing a short circuit on its feeder, and in some instances passive protection has been provided for the feeders.
(G) There may be other failures that should be considered that are peculiar to the specific design being evaluated, and if so, an appropriate accounting of these failures should also be made.
(ii) Review of Regulations. The airworthiness regulations concerning electrical systems begin with § 29.1301 (reference Subpart F - Equipment) and continue up to § 29.1411. Other rules may also concern the electrical system;
however, compliance with these sections should have been assured as part of the original VFR approval.
(iii) Specific Emphasis Areas. In some previous installations, changes have been necessary in the areas listed below. Future installations should be checked carefully in these areas and other areas that indicate a need for attention.
(A) Systems Affected by Icing. Gross inaccuracies in altitude and airspeed indicators resulting from icing could be disastrous in IF flight. For rotorcraft not equipped with approved alternate static sources, static ports should be carefully evaluated and should either be heated or an analysis verified by flight test data submitted to substantiate leaving them unheated. Static line routing should be carefully evaluated for low spots. Also, if static ports are on the side of the rotorcraft, the lines should be initially routed upward just behind the static ports, then down to a drain. If the lines are initially routed upward, the lines will not fill with water when the rotorcraft is flown through rain or is washed.
(B) Overvoltage Protection. If the rotorcraft is certificated under Part 29, Category A, it is required to have overvoltage protection. Other rotorcraft may have this protection, but many do not. Since overvoltage protection is specifically required for IFR operation, the rotorcraft's basic electrical system should be very carefully reviewed for this capability.
(C) Power Adequacy Indication. Most flight instruments that use a power supply have a visual means integral with the instrument to indicate the adequacy of the power being supplied. For those required flight instruments that are not provided with a visual means, the following must be accounted for:
(1) The visual means provided must be at least adjacent to the instrument.
(2) The visual means must be adequately placarded.
(3) The power must be measured at or near the point where it enters the instrument.
Par 775 1187
(4) For electrical instruments, the power is considered to be adequate when the voltage is within approved limits. The source of power for the visual means of indication must be independent of the source of power for the instrument itself. Independent in this case means a separate circuit protective device and a separate distribution system bus.
(D) Multiple System Separation. Multiple systems performing the same function are required in certain instances because it is probable that a single system will fail. Separation of such systems would preclude a single fault from causing a multiple system failure. The following should be considered:
(1) When possible, cable routing should be accomplished to assure the maximum separation; for example, one system routed on one side of the rotorcraft and the other system on the opposite side. Some areas, such as pedestals, junction boxes, and equipment racks bring systems close together, and in these areas physical separation may be minimal.
(2) Systems that are required to be duplicated should not be routed through one electrical disconnect plug.
(3) System grounds should be evaluated to assure wiring for two required systems are not grounded to the same terminal. If a terminal strip contains grounds for multiple systems, it should be grounded to the rotorcraft's airframe in two places from two separate terminals.
(E) Circuit Protective Devices. All systems that are "required" for IF operation are considered to be necessary for safe IFR operation, and the circuit protective devices for those systems should generally be accessible to the crew in the cockpit so they can be readily reset or replaced in flight. For example, where a capability is provided that is above the minimum certification requirements, accessibility may not be an issue. A tradeoff here, however, is that additional equipment may be required for dispatch in IFR operation.
The location of the generator field protective devices has been a problem in some rotorcraft. The protective devices that can result in the loss of a required power system source should be capable of being reset or replaced in the cockpit while in flight. This position is further supported by the occurrence of nuisance opening of circuit protective devices in rotorcraft. Further discussion on this issue is included in Paragraph 655b(4) of this advisory circular.
(F) Intercommunication System. All audio for the entire rotorcraft comes together at this system. An evaluation should be made to assure that no single failure will result in the loss of all audio for the rotorcraft. Check for common grounds, common connectors, etc. Power inputs should also be disabled.
1188 Par 775
(14) Rotorcraft Flight Manual Material.
In addition to other required information, the limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) or RFM Supplement must include the approved IFR flight envelope, minimum FR crew requirements, the minimum required equipment for dispatch into IF conditions that is not covered by the operating regulations, and the maximum approach gradient which has been approved. If a significant loss of altitude is experienced in any flight regime or maneuver during certification analysis or testing, the emergency operating procedures should include a statement of this altitude loss along with any other appropriate information.
(ii) The limitations section of the RFM should not include restrictions prohibiting external cargo operations. These operations are covered by FAR Parts 91 and 133 and all external load operations conducted under these parts must be approved by the controlling operations inspector. It is the responsibility of the operator to demonstrate and the operations inspector to confirm that any external load operation, including en route IFR, can be safely conducted.
(15) Rotorcraft Flight Below Instrument Flight Minimum Speed.
(i) The advent of steep angle, decelerating precision instrument approach procedures will necessitate flying at airspeeds below the instrument flight minimum speed (VINI) established for most rotorcraft under FAR 29, Appendix B, Paragraph II(c).
(il) Applications for findings of equivalent safety to approve instrument flight below VMINI will be considered for rotorcraft meeting at least the following criteria:
(A) The rotorcraft is certified for IFR flight.
(B) For constant airspeed approach approval: a minimum approach airspeed is specified by the applicant, at which the rotorcraft is demonstrated to be safely controllable and capable of instrument flight without undue pilot effort for the duration of the approach and transition to missed approach, including acceleration to an airspeed above VMINI.
(C) For decelerating approach approval: a two or three cue flight director is provided as required equipment, and the rotorcraft is demonstrated to be safely controllable and capable of instrument flight without undue pilot effort for the duration of the approach and transition to missed approach, including acceleration to an airspeed above VMINI- (D) The rotorcraft is demonstrated to be safely controllable following single failures of aircraft systems not shown to be extremely improbable at the minimum Par 775 1189
approach airspeed specified by the applicant or encountered during a decelerating approach.
(E) The RFMS contains the following information in addition to the requirements of Paragraph IX of Appendix B to FAR 29:
(1) Minimum approach airspeed, if applicable.
(2) Additional aircraft equipment requirements for flight below MINI and/or the minimum approach airspeed, if applicable.
(3) Maximum approach angle.
(4) Maximum allowable surface wind for safe conduct of the approach.
1190 Par 775
Par 775 7/30/97
ACCEPTABLE 20 15 10
UNACCEPTABLE 5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 DAMPING RATIO ( S) 0.05 O.1 0.15 AC 29-2B ' FIGURE 775-1. ROTORCRAFT DYNAMIC STABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR IFR
776. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR ROTORCRAFT AVIONICS EQUIPMENT.
a. Pre-Test Requirements.
(1) General. This test guideline has been prepared as an aid in the evaluation of rotorcraft avionics (aviation electronics) equipment installations. The criteria presented are not to be considered exclusive, but are offered as one method of evaluating design practice and performance. The testing and qualification of an electronic installation should be considered as consisting of three phases:
preinstallation, ground, and flight. The amount of testing necessary during each phase will vary with the amount of testing performed on previous phases. For example, if a system is TSO'd, the preinstallation performance is probably substantiated and therefore the ground and flight testing can be reduced accordingly. Also, a thorough ground testing program should result in reduction in necessary flight testing. When the operating or airworthiness regulations require a system to pertorm its intended function, the use of TSO'd equipment or the submission of data substantiating the equipment performance is strongly recommended.
(2) Regulatory References. Sections 29.1301, 29.1309, 29.1329, 29.1331,
29.1333, 29.1355, 29.1431, 29.1457.
(3) System Design. Systems or equipment presented for installation approval, when not qualified by TSO or other approval means, should be accompanied by sufficient data to substantiate their design acceptability.
Operation of Controls. The operation of controls intended for use during flight, in all possible position combinations and sequences, should not result in a condition that would be detrimental to the continued safe performance of the system.
(!) Electrical Shock. Systems should be designed so that under all probable conditions the risk of dangerous electrical shock is minimized.
(iii) Fire Hazard. The design of the system should be such that all components meet the applicable fire and smoke protection requirements of §$ 29.853 and 29.863. Cables and equipment to be installed in designated fire zones, that are used during emergency procedures should be at least fire resistant.
(IV) Plugs and Cables. Connector pins for sensitive signal circuits should not be adjacent to pins used for AC power circuits. When redundant wiring is used to comply with the systems independence regulations such as §§ 29.1331, 29.1333, or
29.1355, the wires should be routed through separate plugs and/or cables with as much physical separation as practicable. The system should be designed so that incorrect mating of plugs is not possible. Cable grounding and shielding techniques should be used to minimize electromagnetic interference.
1192 Par 776
(4) System Performance. Where the operating or airworthiness regulations require a system to perform its intended function, and when the equipment is not qualified by TSO or other approval means, performance data furnished to the FAA/AUTHORITY can reduce the installed performance testing. The appropriate TSO minimum performance standard may be used as a guide.
Environment. An appropriate means for environmental testing is set forth in Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) document DO-160. The applicant should submit test reports showing that the laboratory tested categories such as temperature, vibration, altitude, etc., are compatible with the environmental demands to be placed on the rotorcraft.
(її) Failure Analysis. Procedures are contained in Paragraph 621, Section c of this advisory circular.
(5) Installation Design Mechanical Installation. Installations should be made to (1) ensure compliance with the airworthiness regulations and (2) comply with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations. The designer should observe good engineering practices in specifying material type, thickness, fastener type, edge distance, and attachment to the equipment rack. By analysis or static tests the mounted equipment should be shown to withstand the inertia forces of §§ 29.561(b)(3) and 29.337. Refer to AC 43.13-2a for static test procedures.
(її) Arrangement and Visibility. The mounting position of all instruments, switches, position labels, and control heads should make them plainly visible to the pilot while in his normal panel-facing position and under all cockpit lighting conditions likely to occur. TSO approval does not assure instruments will be acceptable in a particular cockpit installation or for all lighting conditions. The instruments, switches, and placarding must be free from reflections. Malfunction annunciation devices should be conspicuous and clearly visible to the pilot. (See Advisory Circular 20-69 and §§ 29.1321, 29.771, 29.1381, and 29.1555(a).)
Load Analysis.
(A) Power Sources. It should be determined whether the electrical power source capacity is adequate for the system installation under all foreseeable operating conditions including engine failure on multiengine rotorcraft. System load reductions should be applied or power source capacity increased if necessary to assure compatibility between load and source. Duplicate systems should be powered from separate buses and, in some cases, from independent sources if required by the airworthiness regulations. (Sections 29.1309, 29.1331, 29.1333, 29.1351, or 29.1355.)
Par 776 1193