This AC paragraph is final and will be included in the upcoming Change 2 update.
AC 29.1333. § 29.1333 (Amendment 29-24) INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS.
a. Explanation.
(1) Electromechanical Displays. Prior to Amendment 29-24, this requirement was titled “Duplicate Instrument Systems,” and its provisions were intended to apply when duplicate flight instruments were required by any operating rule. Due to the increased complexity of instrumentation that was available and being used, it was considered appropriate to amend the provisions of this requirement by adopting §
29.1333 in Amendment 29-24 to more appropriately consider the extreme range of operational environments to which rotorcraft were being routinely exposed. It is the intent of § 29.1333 to prevent degrading the first pilot’s instrument system, or the only pilot’s instrument system in a single-pilot-approved rotorcraft, by not permitting peripheral systems to be connected to it. In addition, equipment must not be connected to operating systems for the second pilot’s required instruments unless it is extremely improbable that failure of such additional equipment would affect that operating system.
Similar provisions are also included in VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) of Appendix B to Part 29, Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument Flight.
(2) Advanced Display Systems. The increased use of microprocessor technology in avionic systems has resulted in the use of computer-generated graphics to replace conventional electromechanical instruments. These displays may replace individual instruments or may integrate several flight critical parameters into single displays. For display of redundant information, “crosstalk” between the pilot and copilot displays and supporting systems has been allowed to provide detection and annunciation of faults or “miscompare” of critical flight information. A level of safety finding equivalent to that level of safety provided by § 29.1333 may be possible through the implementation of integration technology that will assure that failure of one system does not and can not adversely affect the other system.
b. Procedures.
* * * * *
(4) For those installation designs that employ integration technology and seek to obtain approval of those designs through an equivalent level of safety finding, applicants should perform adequate system testing and any analysis necessary to assure that failure of one system will not adversely affect the other system in order to demonstrate that the design meets or exceeds the minimum safety level established by § 29.1333 and VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) of Appendix B to Part 29, Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument Flight.
This AC paragraph is final and will be included in the upcoming Change 2 update.
AC 29.1351. § 29.1351 (Amendment 29-40) ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT -GENERAL.
a. Explanation. * * * * *
b. Procedures. * * * * *
c. * * * * *
(3) Category A rotorcraft (See FAR 29.1351(d)(2) Amendment 29-40).
(i) FAR 29.1351(d)(2) is applicable to Category A rotorcraft and requires that provision be made to ensure adequate electrical supplies to those systems which are necessary for continued safe flight and landing in the event of a failure of all normal generated electrical power. All components and wiring of the alternate supplies should be physically and electrically segregated from the normal system and should be such that no single failure, including the effects of fire, the cutting of a cable bundle, or the loss of a junction box or control panel will affect both normal and alternate supplies.
(ii) * * * * *
(iii) The systems required by FAR 29.1351(d)(2) may differ between rotorcraft types and roles and should be agreed with the Authority. They should normally include:
(A) Attitude information;
(B) Radio communication and flight crew intercommunication;
(C) Navigation;
(D) Cockpit and instrument lighting;
(E) Heading, airspeed and altitude information, including appropriate pitot head and static vent heating;
Note: Where the aircraft is to be approved for IFR, pitot heat and, where appropriate, static vent heating specified in paragraph (E) above (relating to required air data for airspeed information while operating in an emergency configuration) should be provided for the complete duration (at least 30 minutes) while operating on emergency power. A minimum 5-minute “landing” time for the landing light operation specified in paragraph (3)(i) above should be provided.
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This AC paragraph is final and will be included in the upcoming Change 2 update.
AC 29.1585. § 29.1585 (Amendment 29-24) OPERATING PROCEDURES.
a. * * * * *
b. Procedures. Procedural information should be presented in substantial accord with the categories described below:
(1) Normal Procedures. Normal procedures are concerned with peculiarities of the rotorcraft design and operating features encountered in connection with routine operations, including malfunction cases not considered in the other procedures section
(i.e., not considered to degrade safety). Material conforming to the above should be presented for each phase of flight, following in sequence from preflight through engine shutdown, and should include, but not be limited to, systems operation (including fuel system information prescribed in § 29.1585(b)), missed approaches, etc.
(2) Malfunction or Abnormal Procedures (Optional). Malfunction or abnormal procedures are included in many flight manuals to provide corrective crew actions that are not as urgent as those in the Emergency Procedures sections. These procedures are concerned with foreseeable situations, usually entailing a failure condition, in which the use of special systems, or the alternate use of regular systems, may be expected to maintain an acceptable level of safety. Typical examples of events considered to entail abnormal procedures are engine failure and or conditions that require an engine shutdown (under flight conditions where the failure is not critical), stopping and restarting engines in flight, extending landing gear or flaps by alternate means, approach in multiengine aircraft with inoperative engine(s), etc.
(3) Emergency Procedures. Emergency procedures are concerned with foreseeable but unusual situations in which immediate and precise action by the crew, as detailed in the recommended procedures, may be expected to reduce substantially the risk of disaster. Typical examples of incidents considered to be emergencies are fire, ditching, loss of tail rotor thrust or control, etc. It is expected that, in the case of tail rotor failure, the emergency procedures will have been validated by analysis, simulation, or any relevant service experience. The analysis or simulation of the tail rotor control failure procedures may be validated where practical by limited flight test.
(4) * * * * *
This AC paragraph is final and will be included in the upcoming Change 2 update.
(AC 29-2C, Appendix A, A29.3(b)(2), Instructions for Continued Airworthiness)
(MANUAL IDENTIFICATION)
REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
13. WORK RECOMMENDED
* * * * *
14. APPLICABLE WEAR TOLERANCES
* * * * *
15. TROUBLESHOOTING
Troubleshooting information describing:
a. Probable malfunctions.
b. How to recognize those malfunctions. (Probable Cause). Some malfunctions could be identified on the basis of a baseline vibration signature provided as follows in the maintenance manual:
The baseline vibration characteristics of the basic aircraft configuration to be used for maintenance or trouble shooting purposes should be provided as the vibratory aircraft reference in the maintenance manual. These characteristics should be given for specified loading and flight conditions (speed, altitude) with vibration pickups at specified airframe locations decided by the manufacturer. The characteristics should be given as a typical range of vibration levels at these locations and for the most representative frequencies and directions for the rotorcraft concerned (N omega main rotor and n omega tail rotor...). The manufacturers and operators should keep the basic vibration data updated from field/service experience.
REVISION: ( PAGE NUMBER) Revision 3 ( )-00-00 Page 5 Page 16
This AC paragraph is final and will be included in the upcoming Change 2 update.
AC 29 APPENDIX B. AIRWORTHINESS GUIDANCE FOR ROTORCRAFT
INSTRUMENT FLIGHT
* * * * *
b. Procedures.
* * * * *
(8) Cockpit Arrangement.
* * * * *
( v) Electromechanical Displays. The requirements of Appendix B to Part 29 in sections, VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) are the same requirements as those found in § 29.1333. Prior to Amendment 29-24 and § 29.1333, this requirement was titled “Duplicate Instrument Systems,” and its provisions were intended to apply when duplicate flight instruments were required by any operating rule. Due to the increased complexity of instrumentation that was available and being used, it was considered appropriate to amend the provisions of this requirement to more appropriately consider the extreme range of operational environments to which rotorcraft were being routinely exposed. It is the intent of Part 29, Appendix B, VIII.(b)(5) to prevent degrading of the first pilot’s instrument system, or the only pilot’s instrument system in a single-pilot-approved rotorcraft, by not permitting peripheral systems to be connected to it. In addition, equipment must not be connected to operating systems for the second pilot’s required instruments unless it is extremely improbable that failure of such additional equipment would affect that operating system. Similar provisions are also included in § 29.1333.
( vi) Advanced Display Systems. The increased use of microprocessor technology in avionic systems has resulted in the use of computer-generated graphics to replace conventional electromechanical instruments. These displays may replace individual instruments or may integrate several flight critical parameters into single displays. For display of redundant information, “crosstalk” between the pilot and copilot displays and supporting systems has been allowed to provide detection and annunciation of faults or “miscompare” of critical flight information. A level of safety finding equivalent to that level of safety provided by Part 29, Appendix B, VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) may be possible through the implementation of integration technology that will assure that failure of one system does not and can not adversely affect the other system. For those installation designs that employ integration technology, adequate system testing and any analysis necessary must be conducted to assure that failure of one system will not adversely affect the other system when demonstrating compliance to the minimum safety level established by Part 29, Appendix B, VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) and § 29.1333.
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