AD 2026-20-01

This AD is effective November 2, 2026.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 2, 2026.

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-1330; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Material Incorporated by Reference:

• For Boeing material identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; website myboeingfleet.com.

• You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-1330.

Julie Linn, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3584; email: julie.linn@faa.gov.

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 20, 2026 (91 FR 8147). The NPRM was prompted by a report indicating that Boeing Material Specification (BMS) 5-146 cargo liner joint sealing tape could be missing outboard of the left side and right side monuments forward of Door 1. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a detailed inspection of the area located between the monuments, forward of Door 1 left side and right side, and the outer walls, for missing BMS5-146 cargo liner joint sealing tape, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address any missing cargo liner joint sealing tape.

The FAA received comments from four commenters, including Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), United Airlines (United), and two individuals, who supported the NPRM without change.

The FAA received additional comments from two commenters, including Qantas Airways and The Foundation for Aviation Safety. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Qantas presented a potential scenario where an airplane is delivered with the cargo liner joint sealing tape, and after a period of time in service the tape goes missing due to adhesion failure or other causes. To account for this scenario, Qantas reviewed the Boeing 787 Task Card Manual, Aircraft Maintenance Manual, and Maintenance Planning Document, but was unable to locate procedures for identifying missing tape on an in-service airplane. Qantas, therefore, asked whether the FAA had considered if the unsafe condition could be caused by other factors such as adhesion failure and if the existing 787 maintenance data is adequate.

The FAA determined that the unsafe condition of this AD was caused by a quality escape during airplane production, which was limited at most to the airplane serial numbers identified in the required Boeing service information. At this time, the FAA has not received any reports of loss of cargo liner joint sealing tape on in-service Boeing Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes due to adhesion failure or other causes. If the FAA receives any such reports in the future, the FAA will evaluate the data to determine what corrective actions should be taken to address that potential scenario, as well as evaluate the adequacy of the 787 maintenance documents. No change was made to this AD as a result of this comment.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety asked whether the root cause of the unsafe condition could be related to the removal of inspections and, if not, how the affected airplanes were identified.

The FAA determined that the unsafe condition of this AD was caused by a quality escape during airplane production. Boeing has since addressed the installation instruction issue that primarily contributed to the quality escape. Additionally, the Boeing quality system was able to identify the airplane serial numbers that may potentially be missing the cargo liner joint sealing tape. No change was made to this AD as a result of this comment.

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

The FAA reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin B787-81205-SB530108-00 RB, Issue 001, dated November 5, 2025. This material specifies procedures for a detailed inspection of the area located between the monuments, forward of Door 1 left side and right side, and the outer walls, for missing BMS5-146 cargo liner joint sealing tape, and applicable on-condition actions. On-condition actions include installing cargo liner joint sealing tape on each affected location.

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 87 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary repairs that would be required based on the results of the required inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need this repair:

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive: