19960219003889A

Accident · Substantial damage

FAA accident report · Doug DC-9-32 · Houston, TX · February 19, 1996

Date
February 19, 1996 · 09:02 local
Place
Houston, TX
Airport
Houston Intercontinental Airport
Phase of flight
Level Off Touchdown
Operating rules
Air carrier (Part 121)
Operator
CALA
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N10556
NTSB investigation
NTSBFTW96FA118
Reported as
Doug DC932
Reported engine
Pratt & Whitney JT8D9A
People aboard
75
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
17,500 total220 in this make and model87 in the last 90 days

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

(.4)The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15 deg. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental airlines' (coa) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of coa. Coa was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.

As the FAA filed it

(.4)THE AIRPLANE LANDED WHEELS UP AND SLID 6,850 FEET BEFORE COMING TO REST IN GRASS ABOUT 140 FEET LEFT OF THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE. THE CABIN BEGAN TO FILL WITH SMOKE, AND THE AIRPLANE WAS EVACUATED. INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT BECAUSE THE CAPTAIN HAD OMITTED THE 'HYDRAULICS' ITEM ON THE IN-RANGE CHECKLIST AND THE FIRST OFFICER FAILED TO DETECT THE THE ERROR, HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO LOWER THE LANDING GEAR AND DEPLOY THE FLAPS. BOTH THE CAPTAIN AND THE FIRST OFFICER RECOGNIZED THAT THE FLAPS HAD NOT EXTENDED AFTER THE FLAPS WERE SELECTED TO 15 DEG. THE PILOTS THEN FAILED TO PERFORM THE LANDING CHECKLIST AND TO DETECT THE NUMEROUS CUES ALERTING THEM TO THE STATUS OF THE LANDING GEAR BECAUSE OF THEIR FOCUS ON COPING WITH THE FLAP EXTENSION PROBLEM AND THE HIGH LEVEL OF WORKLOAD AS A RESULT OF THE RAPID SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE FINAL MINUTE OF FLIGHT. THE FIRST OFFICER ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE EXCESSIVE SPEED OF THE APPROACH TO THE CAPTAIN. THERE WERE DEFICIENCIES IN CONTINENTAL AIRLINES' (COA) OVERSIGHT OF ITS PILOTS AND THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTOR'S OVERSIGHT OF COA. COA WAS AWARE OF INCONSISTENCIES IN FLIGHTCREW ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES WITHIN THE AIRLINE; HOWEVER, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BEFORE THE ACCIDENT HAD NOT RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM.

NTSB investigation

The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.