19980409012859I

Incident

FAA incident report · Beech C90 · Hagerstown, MD · April 9, 1998

Date
April 9, 1998 · 10:38 local
Place
Hagerstown, MD
Airport
Washington County Regional
Phase of flight
Final Approach
Operating rules
Air taxi and commuter (Part 135)
Operator
X9MA
Aircraft
N19LW
Reported as
Beech C90
People aboard
1
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
12,000 total600 in this make and model

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

Narrative: king air was cleared for the ILS 27 approach to hgr. Weather factors were IMC in moderate rain. Tailwind of 10KTS, ceiling indefinite of 500 feet with surface visibility 1 mile. Hgr tower was closed. After being given instructions by ATC (zdc ARTCC) on how to cancel IFR and to contact advisory frequency, captain elected to remain on center frequency 134.15 until about 1 mile final, when he switched to CTAF (closed tower) frequency of 120.3 to click on runway 27 lights. Meanwhile, usair express ground crew was preparing to cross runway 27 with BAE-3100 aircrew in tow. After broadcasting in the blind on 120.3, usair express tug crew was preparing to cross runway 27 but held short when they heard the microphone clicks on king air N19LW activating the runway lights. The king air broke out of the overcast and rolled past the waiting tug and aircraft in tow. The pilot was not aware of the possibility of ground collision until he conversed by radio with the usair express ground crew by radio after landing. The pilot stated that due to workload on approach and the assumption that no one else would be on the runway in IMC conditions, he had elected to stay on center frequency un til switching over to conditions, he had elected to stay on center frequency until switching over to 120.3 to activate lights. Pilot did not recall hearing controller advise him to switch to CTAF frequency, and did not hear the usair express crew broadcast their intention to cross runway 27 ahead of him. Pilot was counseled by FAA iic privacy data omitted investigation revealed that the current us government nos terminal procedures chart 97310, amendment 7A for ILS rwy 27 does not bear a note in the bottom "note box" giving procedures to activate approach and runway lights. The only way to discern the means to activate pilot controlled lighting (pcl) for runway 27 is the "l" symbol in the frequency section on the upper left corner, misleadingly the frequency 121.7 followed by the symbol "A5" is also included in the upper left frequency section, which actually applies to runway 9 (not runway 27) approach light activation. In contrast, the "sister" approach to Hagerstown airport, the VOR or GPS runway 9 nos approach chart, number 97310, does have textual notation at the bottom stating that activation of runway 9-27 and runway 2-20 runway lights and approach lights is accomplished on 120.3. privacy data omitted The current system forces the pilot to decode symbols of open or blackened circle "l" and "a" marks. privacy data omitted The pilot was under the impression that he could or should remain on center frequency of 134.15 because he thought that any significant traffic in the hgr area on the ground or in flight would be on center frequency because of the IMC weather conditions; also pilot thought that by staying on 134.15 it would make his cancellation of IFR easier when he broke out. Pilot did not consider the possibility of ground vehicles operating on CTAF 120.3 crossing the runway prior to the tower opening. (Airport has air carrier operations early in the morning which necessitate fuel truck,aircraft tug, and airport maintenance vehicle crossings.) All ground vehicles use rotating beacons, use radio calls on 120.3, and are trained in runway operations by airport management. Pilot was counseled to switch to CTAF when instructed by ATC on approaches.

As the FAA filed it

NARRATIVE: KING AIR WAS CLEARED FOR THE ILS 27 APPROACH TO HGR. WEATHER FACTORS WERE IMC IN MODERATE RAIN. TAILWIND OF 10KTS, CEILING INDEFINITE OF 500 FEET WITH SURFACE VISIBILITY 1 MILE. HGR TOWER WAS CLOSED. AFTER BEING GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS BY ATC (ZDC ARTCC) ON HOW TO CANCEL IFR AND TO CONTACT ADVISORY FREQUENCY, CAPTAIN ELECTED TO REMAIN ON CENTER FREQUENCY 134.15 UNTIL ABOUT 1 MILE FINAL, WHEN HE SWITCHED TO CTAF (CLOSED TOWER) FREQUENCY OF 120.3 TO CLICK ON RUNWAY 27 LIGHTS. MEANWHILE, USAIR EXPRESS GROUND CREW WAS PREPARING TO CROSS RUNWAY 27 WITH BAE-3100 AIRCREW IN TOW. AFTER BROADCASTING IN THE BLIND ON 120.3, USAIR EXPRESS TUG CREW WAS PREPARING TO CROSS RUNWAY 27 BUT HELD SHORT WHEN THEY HEARD THE MICROPHONE CLICKS ON KING AIR N19LW ACTIVATING THE RUNWAY LIGHTS. THE KING AIR BROKE OUT OF THE OVERCAST AND ROLLED PAST THE WAITING TUG AND AIRCRAFT IN TOW. THE PILOT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GROUND COLLISION UNTIL HE CONVERSED BY RADIO WITH THE USAIR EXPRESS GROUND CREW BY RADIO AFTER LANDING. THE PILOT STATED THAT DUE TO WORKLOAD ON APPROACH AND THE ASSUMPTION THAT NO ONE ELSE WOULD BE ON THE RUNWAY IN IMC CONDITIONS, HE HAD ELECTED TO STAY ON CENTER FREQUENCY UN TIL SWITCHING OVER TO CONDITIONS, HE HAD ELECTED TO STAY ON CENTER FREQUENCY UNTIL SWITCHING OVER TO 120.3 TO ACTIVATE LIGHTS. PILOT DID NOT RECALL HEARING CONTROLLER ADVISE HIM TO SWITCH TO CTAF FREQUENCY, AND DID NOT HEAR THE USAIR EXPRESS CREW BROADCAST THEIR INTENTION TO CROSS RUNWAY 27 AHEAD OF HIM. PILOT WAS COUNSELED BY FAA IIC ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE CURRENT US GOVERNMENT NOS TERMINAL PROCEDURES CHART 97310, AMENDMENT 7A FOR ILS RWY 27 DOES NOT BEAR A NOTE IN THE BOTTOM "NOTE BOX" GIVING PROCEDURES TO ACTIVATE APPROACH AND RUNWAY LIGHTS. THE ONLY WAY TO DISCERN THE MEANS TO ACTIVATE PILOT CONTROLLED LIGHTING (PCL) FOR RUNWAY 27 IS THE "L" SYMBOL IN THE FREQUENCY SECTION ON THE UPPER LEFT CORNER, MISLEADINGLY THE FREQUENCY 121.7 FOLLOWED BY THE SYMBOL "A5" IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE UPPER LEFT FREQUENCY SECTION, WHICH ACTUALLY APPLIES TO RUNWAY 9 (NOT RUNWAY 27) APPROACH LIGHT ACTIVATION. IN CONTRAST, THE "SISTER" APPROACH TO HAGERSTOWN AIRPORT, THE VOR OR GPS RUNWAY 9 NOS APPROACH CHART, NUMBER 97310, DOES HAVE TEXTUAL NOTATION AT THE BOTTOM STATING THAT ACTIVATION OF RUNWAY 9-27 AND RUNWAY 2-20 RUNWAY LIGHTS AND APPROACH LIGHTS IS ACCOMPLISHED ON 120.3. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ THE CURRENT SYSTEM FORCES THE PILOT TO DECODE SYMBOLS OF OPEN OR BLACKENED CIRCLE "L" AND "A" MARKS. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^ THE PILOT WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE COULD OR SHOULD REMAIN ON CENTER FREQUENCY OF 134.15 BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC IN THE HGR AREA ON THE GROUND OR IN FLIGHT WOULD BE ON CENTER FREQUENCY BECAUSE OF THE IMC WEATHER CONDITIONS; ALSO PILOT THOUGHT THAT BY STAYING ON 134.15 IT WOULD MAKE HIS CANCELLATION OF IFR EASIER WHEN HE BROKE OUT. PILOT DID NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF GROUND VEHICLES OPERATING ON CTAF 120.3 CROSSING THE RUNWAY PRIOR TO THE TOWER OPENING. (AIRPORT HAS AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS EARLY IN THE MORNING WHICH NECESSITATE FUEL TRUCK,AIRCRAFT TUG, AND AIRPORT MAINTENANCE VEHICLE CROSSINGS.) ALL GROUND VEHICLES USE ROTATING BEACONS, USE RADIO CALLS ON 120.3, AND ARE TRAINED IN RUNWAY OPERATIONS BY AIRPORT MANAGEMENT. PILOT WAS COUNSELED TO SWITCH TO CTAF WHEN INSTRUCTED BY ATC ON APPROACHES.

Other reports on N19LW · 1

Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.