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20011112037169I

Incident · Substantial damage
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FAA incident report · Amtr SEASTAR · Deland, FL · November 12, 2001

FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal

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Date
November 12, 2001 · 16:00 local
Place
Deland, FL
Airport
Deland Municipal-Sidney H Taylor
Phase of flight
Normal Cruise
Operating rules
General operating rules (Part 91)
Damage
Substantial damage
Aircraft
N601SS
Reported as
Amtr Seastar
Reported engine
WALTER M601D
People aboard
1
Fatal injuries
0
Pilot’s flight hours
3,500 total29 in this make and model66 in the last 90 days
N601SSRegistration cancelled Jun 28, 2019 · Precision Design SEASTARS/N 001 · Built 2000Airframe modelPrecision Design SEASTAREngine modelAmateur-built UNKNOWN ENG

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

(-23) Inspectors statement: on November 15, 2001, Seastar N601SS, an experiemental amphibious composite turbopropeller aircraft, was inspected at the Deland airport, in Deland, Florida. The pilot had declared an emergency after experiencing tail flutter. According to the pilot, he was in cruise flight at a speed of over 200 mph when first felt the the flutter. He added that this was the second time that he had experienced flutter in this aircraft. The inspection of the aircraft revealed that the six foot long elevator trim tab was missing and that the trim tab hinge was ripped off the elevator except for several inches on the right side of the elevator that was still attached. It was noticed that pop rivets had been used to hold the trim tab to the elevator. The rivets edge distance in the base material ranged from an approximate minimum for the diameter of the rivet used, to a zero edge distance. There were approximately 10 to 12 cord wise brakes in the elevator starting from the leading edge radiating aft several inches. The elevator tips could be twisted in opposite directions span wise indicating internal damage to the elevator. The trailing edge of the elevator had completely separated. Closer inspection revealed that the structural adhesive that was used had failed, not the composite skin itself. The trim tab actuator rod-end had failed at the actuator. According to the pilot, this was the second actuator to fail and allow the trim tab to flutter. The trim tab actuator appeared to be made from some type of plastic. There was no other detectable damage noted. It was recommended to the pilot that prior to further flight, the aircraft and especially the flight control system be inspected for hidden damage possibly caused by the elevator and trim tab flutter. In further discussions with the pilot and the builder of the aircraft, it was recommended that flutter analyses should be performed and that recognized design standards as well as recognized standards of workmanship should be observed.

As the FAA filed it

(-23) INSPECTORS STATEMENT: ON NOVEMBER 15, 2001, SEASTAR N601SS, AN EXPERIEMENTAL AMPHIBIOUS COMPOSITE TURBOPROPELLER AIRCRAFT, WAS INSPECTED AT THE DELAND AIRPORT, IN DELAND, FLORIDA. THE PILOT HAD DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AFTER EXPERIENCING TAIL FLUTTER. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, HE WAS IN CRUISE FLIGHT AT A SPEED OF OVER 200 MPH WHEN FIRST FELT THE THE FLUTTER. HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THAT HE HAD EXPERIENCED FLUTTER IN THIS AIRCRAFT. THE INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT REVEALED THAT THE SIX FOOT LONG ELEVATOR TRIM TAB WAS MISSING AND THAT THE TRIM TAB HINGE WAS RIPPED OFF THE ELEVATOR EXCEPT FOR SEVERAL INCHES ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ELEVATOR THAT WAS STILL ATTACHED. IT WAS NOTICED THAT POP RIVETS HAD BEEN USED TO HOLD THE TRIM TAB TO THE ELEVATOR. THE RIVETS EDGE DISTANCE IN THE BASE MATERIAL RANGED FROM AN APPROXIMATE MINIMUM FOR THE DIAMETER OF THE RIVET USED, TO A ZERO EDGE DISTANCE. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 10 TO 12 CORD WISE BRAKES IN THE ELEVATOR STARTING FROM THE LEADING EDGE RADIATING AFT SEVERAL INCHES. THE ELEVATOR TIPS COULD BE TWISTED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS SPAN WISE INDICATING INTERNAL DAMAGE TO THE ELEVATOR. THE TRAILING EDGE OF THE ELEVATOR HAD COMPLETELY SEPARATED. CLOSER INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE STRUCTURAL ADHESIVE THAT WAS USED HAD FAILED, NOT THE COMPOSITE SKIN ITSELF. THE TRIM TAB ACTUATOR ROD-END HAD FAILED AT THE ACTUATOR. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, THIS WAS THE SECOND ACTUATOR TO FAIL AND ALLOW THE TRIM TAB TO FLUTTER. THE TRIM TAB ACTUATOR APPEARED TO BE MADE FROM SOME TYPE OF PLASTIC. THERE WAS NO OTHER DETECTABLE DAMAGE NOTED. IT WAS RECOMMENDED TO THE PILOT THAT PRIOR TO FURTHER FLIGHT, THE AIRCRAFT AND ESPECIALLY THE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM BE INSPECTED FOR HIDDEN DAMAGE POSSIBLY CAUSED BY THE ELEVATOR AND TRIM TAB FLUTTER. IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PILOT AND THE BUILDER OF THE AIRCRAFT, IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT FLUTTER ANALYSES SHOULD BE PERFORMED AND THAT RECOGNIZED DESIGN STANDARDS AS WELL AS RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF WORKMANSHIP SHOULD BE OBSERVED.