What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) On February 15, 2005 at 0931 EST, a Grumman G-21A aircraft bearing registration number N327 and registered to jetcraft corporation of north caroline, departed runway 19 at the Penn Yan airport (peo) in Penn Yan, NY on a local instructional flight. According to the pilot/instructor who was seated in the right seat, just as the aircraft passed through 600 feet in the climb on the crosswind leg, he retarded the right throttle to simulate failure of the right engine. Shortly following the simulated engine failure, the multiengine applicant seated in the left seat stated that he was at blue line speed but unable to maintain altitude. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft impacted terrain in a nearly level attitude, slid several hundred feet through a plowed field before coming to rest at the edge of a road. Both occupants evacuated the aircraft and sustained only minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by the post-crash fire. According to statements made by the flight instructor and the multiengine applicant in writing and during an interview conducted by the national transportation safety board and FAA, the flight was intended to be a routine training flight in the pattern at the peo airport. The pilot and instructor had completed an uneventful preflight of the aircraft followed by a preflight briefing of the proposed instructional flight. The pilot had received training on both multiengine theory and the systems and procedures applicable to the Grumman goose aircraft. The instructor was using a training syllabus that had been created specifically for the Grumman amphibious aircraft. The instructor noted that this flight represented a "prep" flight for the pilot in anticipation of the FAA practical test for his multiengine seaplane rating scheduled for the following week. According to the pilot and instructor, following the retraction of the landing gear and flaps. The instructor had reduced power on the right engine by retarding the throttle during the climb phase to simulate a failure of the right engine. He then stated he looked out the right side of the aircraft to scan for potential traffic. He then recalled hearing the pilot say that he could not maintain altitude at the blue line speed. The instructor subsequently advanced the right throttle to end the simulation. However, he did not recall power being restored as the aircraft continued to descend andimpacted a field southeast of the peo airport. Both the pilot and the instructor did not exhibit a clear recollection of events that occurred between the commencement of the emergency and the evacuation of the aircraft. FAA investigators found the left engine mixture near the idle cut-off position. Also. The left engine throttle was in the 2/3 advanced (forward) position. The right engine mixture was in the full rich position and the right engine throttle position was full forward. The mixture handles were secured in place by a locking mechanism that incorporates "locking teeth" to prevent slipping and requires positive action on the part of the flight crew to squeeze the mixture handle before making adjustments in the mixture control. Neither the instructor nor the pilot could recall manipulating the engine controls into the position in which they were found. The aircraft records were examined. There was no evidence of non-compliance with applicable regulations. The aircraft had recently undergone an annual type inspection that was satisfactory. Both engines had recently been overhauled and had just over 80 hours of accumulated time since overhaul. FAA inspectors established control continuity to the elevator and rudder as well as the right wing aileron controls. There was no evidence of an airworthiness defect or failure. The instructor held an FAA ATP certificate, with commercial privileges in airplane multiengine land and sea. The instructor held a current first class medical certificate. The flight instructor's pilot logbook was examined. The instructor had logged 17,572 hours of flight time. The logbook indicated the instructor had recently begun flying the Grumman goose aircraft. It further indicated that he had logged 39 hours flight time in type. Also, the record indicates that within the last 12 years, the instructor has only given 26.7 hours of instruction. At the scene of the accident, the instructor indicated to investigators that he was suffering from a cold, but had not taken any medication. The pilot was the holder of a private pilot certificate with a single engine land rating. The pilot was not multiengine rated and was not seaplane rated. The pilot was the holder of a current third class medical certificate. The pilot's pilot logbook was examined. The pilot had logged approximately 1,305 hours of flight time. The logbook indicated the pilot had recently begun taking instruction in the Grumman goose aircraft for the purpose of obtaining multiengine and seaplane ratings. It further indicated that he had logged approximately 55 hours of total multiengine time and 23.5 hours flight time in type.
As the FAA filed it
(-23) ON FEBRUARY 15, 2005 AT 0931 EST, A GRUMMAN G-21A AIRCRAFT BEARING REGISTRATION NUMBER N327 AND REGISTERED TO JETCRAFT CORPORATION OF NORTH CAROLINE, DEPARTED RUNWAY 19 AT THE PENN YAN AIRPORT (PEO) IN PENN YAN, NY ON A LOCAL INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT/INSTRUCTOR WHO WAS SEATED IN THE RIGHT SEAT, JUST AS THE AIRCRAFT PASSED THROUGH 600 FEET IN THE CLIMB ON THE CROSSWIND LEG, HE RETARDED THE RIGHT THROTTLE TO SIMULATE FAILURE OF THE RIGHT ENGINE. SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE SIMULATED ENGINE FAILURE, THE MULTIENGINE APPLICANT SEATED IN THE LEFT SEAT STATED THAT HE WAS AT BLUE LINE SPEED BUT UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALTITUDE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED TERRAIN IN A NEARLY LEVEL ATTITUDE, SLID SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET THROUGH A PLOWED FIELD BEFORE COMING TO REST AT THE EDGE OF A ROAD. BOTH OCCUPANTS EVACUATED THE AIRCRAFT AND SUSTAINED ONLY MINOR INJURIES. THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED BY THE POST-CRASH FIRE. ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS MADE BY THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR AND THE MULTIENGINE APPLICANT IN WRITING AND DURING AN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND FAA, THE FLIGHT WAS INTENDED TO BE A ROUTINE TRAINING FLIGHT IN THE PATTERN AT THE PEO AIRPORT. THE PILOT AND INSTRUCTOR HAD COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL PREFLIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT FOLLOWED BY A PREFLIGHT BRIEFING OF THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONAL FLIGHT. THE PILOT HAD RECEIVED TRAINING ON BOTH MULTIENGINE THEORY AND THE SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE GRUMMAN GOOSE AIRCRAFT. THE INSTRUCTOR WAS USING A TRAINING SYLLABUS THAT HAD BEEN CREATED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE GRUMMAN AMPHIBIOUS AIRCRAFT. THE INSTRUCTOR NOTED THAT THIS FLIGHT REPRESENTED A "PREP" FLIGHT FOR THE PILOT IN ANTICIPATION OF THE FAA PRACTICAL TEST FOR HIS MULTIENGINE SEAPLANE RATING SCHEDULED FOR THE FOLLOWING WEEK. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT AND INSTRUCTOR, FOLLOWING THE RETRACTION OF THE LANDING GEAR AND FLAPS. THE INSTRUCTOR HAD REDUCED POWER ON THE RIGHT ENGINE BY RETARDING THE THROTTLE DURING THE CLIMB PHASE TO SIMULATE A FAILURE OF THE RIGHT ENGINE. HE THEN STATED HE LOOKED OUT THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT TO SCAN FOR POTENTIAL TRAFFIC. HE THEN RECALLED HEARING THE PILOT SAY THAT HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALTITUDE AT THE BLUE LINE SPEED. THE INSTRUCTOR SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED THE RIGHT THROTTLE TO END THE SIMULATION. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT RECALL POWER BEING RESTORED AS THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESCEND ANDIMPACTED A FIELD SOUTHEAST OF THE PEO AIRPORT. BOTH THE PILOT AND THE INSTRUCTOR DID NOT EXHIBIT A CLEAR RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY AND THE EVACUATION OF THE AIRCRAFT. FAA INVESTIGATORS FOUND THE LEFT ENGINE MIXTURE NEAR THE IDLE CUT-OFF POSITION. ALSO. THE LEFT ENGINE THROTTLE WAS IN THE 2/3 ADVANCED (FORWARD) POSITION. THE RIGHT ENGINE MIXTURE WAS IN THE FULL RICH POSITION AND THE RIGHT ENGINE THROTTLE POSITION WAS FULL FORWARD. THE MIXTURE HANDLES WERE SECURED IN PLACE BY A LOCKING MECHANISM THAT INCORPORATES "LOCKING TEETH" TO PREVENT SLIPPING AND REQUIRES POSITIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE FLIGHT CREW TO SQUEEZE THE MIXTURE HANDLE BEFORE MAKING ADJUSTMENTS IN THE MIXTURE CONTROL. NEITHER THE INSTRUCTOR NOR THE PILOT COULD RECALL MANIPULATING THE ENGINE CONTROLS INTO THE POSITION IN WHICH THEY WERE FOUND. THE AIRCRAFT RECORDS WERE EXAMINED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS. THE AIRCRAFT HAD RECENTLY UNDERGONE AN ANNUAL TYPE INSPECTION THAT WAS SATISFACTORY. BOTH ENGINES HAD RECENTLY BEEN OVERHAULED AND HAD JUST OVER 80 HOURS OF ACCUMULATED TIME SINCE OVERHAUL. FAA INSPECTORS ESTABLISHED CONTROL CONTINUITY TO THE ELEVATOR AND RUDDER AS WELL AS THE RIGHT WING AILERON CONTROLS. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN AIRWORTHINESS DEFECT OR FAILURE. THE INSTRUCTOR HELD AN FAA ATP CERTIFICATE, WITH COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES IN AIRPLANE MULTIENGINE LAND AND SEA. THE INSTRUCTOR HELD A CURRENT FIRST CLASS MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR'S PILOT LOGBOOK WAS EXAMINED. THE INSTRUCTOR HAD LOGGED 17,572 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME. THE LOGBOOK INDICATED THE INSTRUCTOR HAD RECENTLY BEGUN FLYING THE GRUMMAN GOOSE AIRCRAFT. IT FURTHER INDICATED THAT HE HAD LOGGED 39 HOURS FLIGHT TIME IN TYPE. ALSO, THE RECORD INDICATES THAT WITHIN THE LAST 12 YEARS, THE INSTRUCTOR HAS ONLY GIVEN 26.7 HOURS OF INSTRUCTION. AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE INSTRUCTOR INDICATED TO INVESTIGATORS THAT HE WAS SUFFERING FROM A COLD, BUT HAD NOT TAKEN ANY MEDICATION. THE PILOT WAS THE HOLDER OF A PRIVATE PILOT CERTIFICATE WITH A SINGLE ENGINE LAND RATING. THE PILOT WAS NOT MULTIENGINE RATED AND WAS NOT SEAPLANE RATED. THE PILOT WAS THE HOLDER OF A CURRENT THIRD CLASS MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. THE PILOT'S PILOT LOGBOOK WAS EXAMINED. THE PILOT HAD LOGGED APPROXIMATELY 1,305 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME. THE LOGBOOK INDICATED THE PILOT HAD RECENTLY BEGUN TAKING INSTRUCTION IN THE GRUMMAN GOOSE AIRCRAFT FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING MULTIENGINE AND SEAPLANE RATINGS. IT FURTHER INDICATED THAT HE HAD LOGGED APPROXIMATELY 55 HOURS OF TOTAL MULTIENGINE TIME AND 23.5 HOURS FLIGHT TIME IN TYPE.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.
Other reports on N327 · 3
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.