20201016019479I

Incident · No damage

FAA incident report · Pilatus PC-12/47 · Portland, OR · October 16, 2020

Date
October 16, 2020 · 14:22 local
Place
Portland, OR
Airport
Portland International
Phase of flight
Cruise/Level Flight
Operating rules
Air taxi and commuter (Part 135)
Operator
2B5A
Damage
No damage
Aircraft
N220JP
Reported as
Pilatus PC-12/47
Reported engine
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67B
People aboard
6
Fatal injuries
0
Other injuries
0

From the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), through its Aviation Safety Information Portal, as reported. The NTSB investigates accidents separately, and its record of an accident is the fuller one. The aircraft is matched to the registry by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

What happened

The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.

The sequence of events that lead to a complete electrical power loss on flight #542 can be summarized as follows:

It started off with the generator 1 gcu failure producing voltage fluctuations which triggered a battery caws caption. In response to that caution, the flight crew initiated a battery reset but the battery was actually never set to on again (as confirmed by the caws recording and other evidences such as propeller not feathering during engine shutdown and post flight inspection found the battery switch to off). With the absence of the battery, generator 1 voltage fluctuations got worse eventually leading to the total disconnection of gen 1. Under these conditions, generator 2 was the only source of electrical power. Moreover, the non essential bus was not automatically load shed (non essential override switch was found in the override position) and high current load like the vccs were still on, leading to the overload of the BAT/GEN2 tie. Once BAT/GEN2 tie opened, being also generator 1 and battery offline, the cockpit went completely dark.

Previous flight #352 underwent to a similar sequence (GEN1 offline, non essential bus not load-shed) with the only difference being that the battery was correctly switched back on after reset. Generator 2 and the battery could support all the electrical loads until landing and since the battery and the gen 2 lie on opposite sides of the BAT/GEN2 tie, the BAT/GEN2 tie did not trip.

As the FAA filed it

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LEAD TO A COMPLETE ELECTRICAL POWER LOSS ON FLIGHT #542 CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

IT STARTED OFF WITH THE GENERATOR 1 GCU FAILURE PRODUCING VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS WHICH TRIGGERED A BATTERY CAWS CAPTION. IN RESPONSE TO THAT CAUTION, THE FLIGHT CREW INITIATED A BATTERY RESET BUT THE BATTERY WAS ACTUALLY NEVER SET TO ON AGAIN (AS CONFIRMED BY THE CAWS RECORDING AND OTHER EVIDENCES SUCH AS PROPELLER NOT FEATHERING DURING ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTION FOUND THE BATTERY SWITCH TO OFF). WITH THE ABSENCE OF THE BATTERY, GENERATOR 1 VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS GOT WORSE EVENTUALLY LEADING TO THE TOTAL DISCONNECTION OF GEN 1. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, GENERATOR 2 WAS THE ONLY SOURCE OF ELECTRICAL POWER. MOREOVER, THE NON ESSENTIAL BUS WAS NOT AUTOMATICALLY LOAD SHED (NON ESSENTIAL OVERRIDE SWITCH WAS FOUND IN THE OVERRIDE POSITION) AND HIGH CURRENT LOAD LIKE THE VCCS WERE STILL ON, LEADING TO THE OVERLOAD OF THE BAT/GEN2 TIE. ONCE BAT/GEN2 TIE OPENED, BEING ALSO GENERATOR 1 AND BATTERY OFFLINE, THE COCKPIT WENT COMPLETELY DARK.

PREVIOUS FLIGHT #352 UNDERWENT TO A SIMILAR SEQUENCE (GEN1 OFFLINE, NON ESSENTIAL BUS NOT LOAD-SHED) WITH THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BEING THAT THE BATTERY WAS CORRECTLY SWITCHED BACK ON AFTER RESET. GENERATOR 2 AND THE BATTERY COULD SUPPORT ALL THE ELECTRICAL LOADS UNTIL LANDING AND SINCE THE BATTERY AND THE GEN 2 LIE ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE BAT/GEN2 TIE, THE BAT/GEN2 TIE DID NOT TRIP.

Other reports on N220JP · 1

Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.