What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
The flight departed pasc at 2002UTC, according to the flight log. This corresponds with ads-b/radar data showing the aircraft airborne at 2003UTC. Departure weather at pasc at 2000UTC was 3/4SM visibility. C057 allows takeoff as low as lowest category I straight in landing mins.
The aircraft flew the RNAV (GPS) rwy 5 special instrument approach procedure into paad, which includes LPV minimums and da of 306'MSL (250AGL). The required visibility is 3/4SM.
The ads-b/radar flight path data show the aircraft at 170KT groundspeed and -384FPM descent approximately 5NM from the iaf.
The ads-b/radar flight path data show the aircraft at 173KT groundspeed and -1472FPM inside of the iaf and approximately 2NM before the faf.
Winds were 060-050 5-6KTS on the ground at paad.
The ads-b/radar flight data show significant deviation left and right of the final approach course. Inside of the faf, this is approximately 0.4NM from course at the most significant deviation.
According to a statement from the PIC, prior to reaching da, they looked outside to see if they could pick up approach lights or airport environment, due to the white-out conditions, they spent too long looking outside and descended below the da. Upon looking back at the instruments, they became disorientated and were unable to immediately intrepret the instruments. As they started a go-around, they contacted the ground. The PIC said they were not able to get stabilized during the approach.
The paad weather observer made contact with the aircraft by radio 4NM outside of the faf, informing the weather was 1 and 1/4SM visibility. The aircraft responded. As the aircraft progressed on the approach, the visibility decreased. The weather observer called out that the weather had dropped to 1/2SM at 2022UTC, but no reply was recieved from the aircraft.
Further investigation and interview with the PIC and company revealed the 5000 cruising altitude as excessively high for the length of this leg and contributed to being high/fast/unstabilized on approach. The PIC stated they did this to ensure they would be clear of possible ice. The pilot present in the r/h seat was not performing pilot duties according to the company. This person was put there due to a customer requirement for "two pilots". Due to this being unclear as to the exact role, the SIC information will be retained.
The aircraft flew an unstabilized approach into paad and did not execute a missed approach procedure properly prior to, or at da.
As the FAA filed it
THE FLIGHT DEPARTED PASC AT 2002UTC, ACCORDING TO THE FLIGHT LOG. THIS CORRESPONDS WITH ADS-B/RADAR DATA SHOWING THE AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE AT 2003UTC. DEPARTURE WEATHER AT PASC AT 2000UTC WAS 3/4SM VISIBILITY. C057 ALLOWS TAKEOFF AS LOW AS LOWEST CATEGORY I STRAIGHT IN LANDING MINS.
THE AIRCRAFT FLEW THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 5 SPECIAL INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURE INTO PAAD, WHICH INCLUDES LPV MINIMUMS AND DA OF 306'MSL (250AGL). THE REQUIRED VISIBILITY IS 3/4SM.
THE ADS-B/RADAR FLIGHT PATH DATA SHOW THE AIRCRAFT AT 170KT GROUNDSPEED AND -384FPM DESCENT APPROXIMATELY 5NM FROM THE IAF.
THE ADS-B/RADAR FLIGHT PATH DATA SHOW THE AIRCRAFT AT 173KT GROUNDSPEED AND -1472FPM INSIDE OF THE IAF AND APPROXIMATELY 2NM BEFORE THE FAF.
WINDS WERE 060-050 5-6KTS ON THE GROUND AT PAAD.
THE ADS-B/RADAR FLIGHT DATA SHOW SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION LEFT AND RIGHT OF THE FINAL APPROACH COURSE. INSIDE OF THE FAF, THIS IS APPROXIMATELY 0.4NM FROM COURSE AT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION.
ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT FROM THE PIC, PRIOR TO REACHING DA, THEY LOOKED OUTSIDE TO SEE IF THEY COULD PICK UP APPROACH LIGHTS OR AIRPORT ENVIRONMENT, DUE TO THE WHITE-OUT CONDITIONS, THEY SPENT TOO LONG LOOKING OUTSIDE AND DESCENDED BELOW THE DA. UPON LOOKING BACK AT THE INSTRUMENTS, THEY BECAME DISORIENTATED AND WERE UNABLE TO IMMEDIATELY INTREPRET THE INSTRUMENTS. AS THEY STARTED A GO-AROUND, THEY CONTACTED THE GROUND. THE PIC SAID THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO GET STABILIZED DURING THE APPROACH.
THE PAAD WEATHER OBSERVER MADE CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT BY RADIO 4NM OUTSIDE OF THE FAF, INFORMING THE WEATHER WAS 1 AND 1/4SM VISIBILITY. THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. AS THE AIRCRAFT PROGRESSED ON THE APPROACH, THE VISIBILITY DECREASED. THE WEATHER OBSERVER CALLED OUT THAT THE WEATHER HAD DROPPED TO 1/2SM AT 2022UTC, BUT NO REPLY WAS RECIEVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT.
FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEW WITH THE PIC AND COMPANY REVEALED THE 5000 CRUISING ALTITUDE AS EXCESSIVELY HIGH FOR THE LENGTH OF THIS LEG AND CONTRIBUTED TO BEING HIGH/FAST/UNSTABILIZED ON APPROACH. THE PIC STATED THEY DID THIS TO ENSURE THEY WOULD BE CLEAR OF POSSIBLE ICE. THE PILOT PRESENT IN THE R/H SEAT WAS NOT PERFORMING PILOT DUTIES ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY. THIS PERSON WAS PUT THERE DUE TO A CUSTOMER REQUIREMENT FOR "TWO PILOTS". DUE TO THIS BEING UNCLEAR AS TO THE EXACT ROLE, THE SIC INFORMATION WILL BE RETAINED.
THE AIRCRAFT FLEW AN UNSTABILIZED APPROACH INTO PAAD AND DID NOT EXECUTE A MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURE PROPERLY PRIOR TO, OR AT DA.
NTSB investigation
The NTSB’s investigation of this event, with its probable cause and findings. Matched to this report by N-number and date.