20250708007759I

The airman was flying as PIC, single-pilot, on an IFR flight plan from Tennessee to Wheeling-Ohio county airport (hlg) in a Cessna 525A CJ2. He planned to fly the ILS 3. The pilot’s EFB reported thunderstorms north of the airport. ATC (center control) cleared him to the final approach fix, ceska. When he switched frequencies, approach control cleared him to boggs, a fix before ceska, at 3,000 feet MSL. The PIC asked instead to go to ceska as previously planned. Approach control cleared him to ceska at 3,000 feet MSL, even though the published altitude at ceska is 2600 feet in order to intercept the glideslope. The PIC accepted this clearance. The PIC stated that at ceska, he momentarily disconnected the auto-pilot to descend to intercept the glideslope, then reengaged it. ADS-B data indicated that, after passing the final approach fix (ceska), the airplane reached an airspeed of 179 knots and a vertical speed of -1,920 feet per minute. These speeds significantly exceed the published flap speed limitation for the airplane as well as the safe tolerances for a stabilized approach. The PIC later stated that his only awareness of his speed was that he could not remember hearing an overspeed warning. He stated that he thought he was at 106 knots at the runway threshold, but ADS-B data from before the threshold does not support this. The pilot said that he saw no standing water on the runway. The skid marks began 3,000 feet after the runway threshold. The skid marks were intermittent for approximately 500 feet, indicating inconsistent pilot brake input. This is consistent with the pilot’s statements. He stated that when he first applied the brakes, he felt them disengage. He did not interpret this as functioning anti-skid. He stated that he had experienced this phenomenon before. He then stated that he “pumped the brakes” to try to “do it faster than the anti-skid”. Then, the skid marks continued for approximately an additional 1,500 feet to the point where the airplane departed the left edge of the runway. The additional 1,500 feet of skid marks indicate constant braking by the pilot with functional anti-skid. This is consistent with the pilot’s statements that he “stood on the brakes” from that point on. The pilot stated that he realized he would not stop before the end of the runway. Since he could see dropping terrain beyond the end of the runway, he steered the airplane to the left to attempt to end up on level terrain. The airplane left the runway and entered the grass to the left of the runway between taxiway b and taxiway d approximately 100 feet before the end of the runway. The left flap struck a taxiway light. The airplane crossed taxiway d. the right flap struck two runway threshold lights. The airplane reentered the grass north of taxiway d. at that point, the nose of the airplane then began to yaw to the left as indicated by the trenches that each landing gear created in the grass. The airplane completed a 180º skid to the left in the grass. Approximately half-way through the 180º skid to the left, the tailcone struck a runway end identifier light (REIL), causing damage in two places. After completing the 180º skid to the left, the airplane came to rest with all three tires still inflated. The pilot then evacuated his three passengers safely.