What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
I conducted a CFR part 91 flight in a 1976 Smith Aerostar, privacy data omitted, on 19 September 2026. The purpose of the flight was a pleasure flight to include a scenic lap around Mt. Rainier for my two passengers. The aircraft is based at the auburn municipal airport (S50) in auburn, WA. The weather on the 19th included an overcast layer in the vicinity of S50, so I filed an instrument flight plan with a round-robin routing of vamps raddy whyte wrkhs.
Following a standard preflight inspection and run-up, we obtained our IFR clearance and departed S50 at 12:28 pm local time. Aircraft performance and system operations were normal to the best of my knowledge. On our return to S50 at approximately 12:50 pm, I was cleared for the RNAV 35 approach into auburn (by then the weather had improved to approximately 1,200’ overcast). Approaching glide slope intercept, I lowered the landing gear and immediately noticed that I did not have a green light indication for the nose gear (left and right main gear were “green”). In the Aerostar, the nose gear is visible in the reflection of the propeller spinners, so I was able to immediately confirm that the nose wheel was not extended. Visual inspection confirmed that both main landing gear were extended.
As there was an aircraft waiting for departure on runway 35, I performed a fly-by and asked that aircraft confirm my gear position. He reported “mains are down, nose doors are open but nose wheel is not extended”. I made a left hand VFR traffic pattern and departed the traffic pattern to the south where I knew that the weather was better so I could further assess the situation. I called seattle center and cancelled my IFR flight plan at 1:04 pm.
In the vicinity of orting, I found clear VFR weather. I swapped the landing gear indicator bulbs to no avail. I followed the steps of the emergency gear extension procedure to no avail. Since I had cell phone coverage, I called jim christy of Aerostar aircraft in Idaho and discussed the situation. He recommend steep turns to increase the load on the gear – this also was unsuccessful. We discussed the best procedures to minimize damage on landing.
I made the decision to divert to Tacoma Narrows Airport where I knew that emergency services, aircraft recovery and repair facilities would be available. Nearing the port of Tacoma, I contacted tiw tower, advised them of my situation and declared an emergency. They immediately cleared me into the class delta and set the wheels in motion for emergency equipment.
I made an extended straight approach and landed on runway 17. In the flare, with landing assured, I closed the throttles, feathered the propellers, moved the mixtures to idle cutoff, selected all magnetos off and shut off both fuel selectors. I held the airplane off as long as possible to minimize speed. Initial rollout was normal and I held the nose off the runway until I began to lose elevator authority. I lowered the nose to the runway and maintained centerline with rudder and differential braking. We came to a rest very near the center of the airport, adjacent to taxiway A2, and very near the runway centerline.
My passengers and I deplaned the aircraft uneventfully at approximately 1:40 pm
As the FAA filed it
I CONDUCTED A CFR PART 91 FLIGHT IN A 1976 SMITH AEROSTAR, ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^, ON 19 SEPTEMBER 2026. THE PURPOSE OF THE FLIGHT WAS A PLEASURE FLIGHT TO INCLUDE A SCENIC LAP AROUND MT. RAINIER FOR MY TWO PASSENGERS. THE AIRCRAFT IS BASED AT THE AUBURN MUNICIPAL AIRPORT (S50) IN AUBURN, WA. THE WEATHER ON THE 19TH INCLUDED AN OVERCAST LAYER IN THE VICINITY OF S50, SO I FILED AN INSTRUMENT FLIGHT PLAN WITH A ROUND-ROBIN ROUTING OF VAMPS RADDY WHYTE WRKHS.
FOLLOWING A STANDARD PREFLIGHT INSPECTION AND RUN-UP, WE OBTAINED OUR IFR CLEARANCE AND DEPARTED S50 AT 12:28 PM LOCAL TIME. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM OPERATIONS WERE NORMAL TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. ON OUR RETURN TO S50 AT APPROXIMATELY 12:50 PM, I WAS CLEARED FOR THE RNAV 35 APPROACH INTO AUBURN (BY THEN THE WEATHER HAD IMPROVED TO APPROXIMATELY 1,200’ OVERCAST). APPROACHING GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPT, I LOWERED THE LANDING GEAR AND IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THAT I DID NOT HAVE A GREEN LIGHT INDICATION FOR THE NOSE GEAR (LEFT AND RIGHT MAIN GEAR WERE “GREEN”). IN THE AEROSTAR, THE NOSE GEAR IS VISIBLE IN THE REFLECTION OF THE PROPELLER SPINNERS, SO I WAS ABLE TO IMMEDIATELY CONFIRM THAT THE NOSE WHEEL WAS NOT EXTENDED. VISUAL INSPECTION CONFIRMED THAT BOTH MAIN LANDING GEAR WERE EXTENDED.
AS THERE WAS AN AIRCRAFT WAITING FOR DEPARTURE ON RUNWAY 35, I PERFORMED A FLY-BY AND ASKED THAT AIRCRAFT CONFIRM MY GEAR POSITION. HE REPORTED “MAINS ARE DOWN, NOSE DOORS ARE OPEN BUT NOSE WHEEL IS NOT EXTENDED”. I MADE A LEFT HAND VFR TRAFFIC PATTERN AND DEPARTED THE TRAFFIC PATTERN TO THE SOUTH WHERE I KNEW THAT THE WEATHER WAS BETTER SO I COULD FURTHER ASSESS THE SITUATION. I CALLED SEATTLE CENTER AND CANCELLED MY IFR FLIGHT PLAN AT 1:04 PM.
IN THE VICINITY OF ORTING, I FOUND CLEAR VFR WEATHER. I SWAPPED THE LANDING GEAR INDICATOR BULBS TO NO AVAIL. I FOLLOWED THE STEPS OF THE EMERGENCY GEAR EXTENSION PROCEDURE TO NO AVAIL. SINCE I HAD CELL PHONE COVERAGE, I CALLED JIM CHRISTY OF AEROSTAR AIRCRAFT IN IDAHO AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION. HE RECOMMEND STEEP TURNS TO INCREASE THE LOAD ON THE GEAR – THIS ALSO WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. WE DISCUSSED THE BEST PROCEDURES TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE ON LANDING.
I MADE THE DECISION TO DIVERT TO TACOMA NARROWS AIRPORT WHERE I KNEW THAT EMERGENCY SERVICES, AIRCRAFT RECOVERY AND REPAIR FACILITIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE. NEARING THE PORT OF TACOMA, I CONTACTED TIW TOWER, ADVISED THEM OF MY SITUATION AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY. THEY IMMEDIATELY CLEARED ME INTO THE CLASS DELTA AND SET THE WHEELS IN MOTION FOR EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT.
I MADE AN EXTENDED STRAIGHT APPROACH AND LANDED ON RUNWAY 17. IN THE FLARE, WITH LANDING ASSURED, I CLOSED THE THROTTLES, FEATHERED THE PROPELLERS, MOVED THE MIXTURES TO IDLE CUTOFF, SELECTED ALL MAGNETOS OFF AND SHUT OFF BOTH FUEL SELECTORS. I HELD THE AIRPLANE OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE SPEED. INITIAL ROLLOUT WAS NORMAL AND I HELD THE NOSE OFF THE RUNWAY UNTIL I BEGAN TO LOSE ELEVATOR AUTHORITY. I LOWERED THE NOSE TO THE RUNWAY AND MAINTAINED CENTERLINE WITH RUDDER AND DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. WE CAME TO A REST VERY NEAR THE CENTER OF THE AIRPORT, ADJACENT TO TAXIWAY A2, AND VERY NEAR THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE.
MY PASSENGERS AND I DEPLANED THE AIRCRAFT UNEVENTFULLY AT APPROXIMATELY 1:40 PM