ANC01FA093

The certificated commercial pilot, with five passengers aboard, departed Skagway, Alaska, as the first of two airplanes conducting air tour flights over a national park. The standard route of flight after departure was to proceed southbound, climb over an area of steep mountainous terrain, then descend into an area known as Glacier Bay. The pilot of the second tour airplane said that it was apparent that low clouds, rain, and fog within the pass would not allow them to fly through the pass. He said that he and the other pilot discussed optional flight routes. The accident pilot said that he was going to take a heading of 240 degrees, and fly through to the other side. The pilot of the second airplane said he replied to the accident pilot that he thought that this was a real bad idea, and that he was not going to follow him. The second pilot stated that the accident pilot's final radio transmission was, in part: "...I'm sure that it's clear on the other side. I'll see you on the other side." No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. After being notified of an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal, a search was initiated about 1600. Poor weather conditions hampered rescue crews from reaching the accident site. About 1859, the wreckage was located on an area of steep, snow-covered mountainous terrain. A toxicology examination of the pilot revealed the presence of prescription antidepressant drugs and codeine. The FAA prohibits the use of such drugs by pilots.

History of flight

On July 30, 2001, about 1435 Alaska daylight time, a wheel-equipped Piper PA-32-300 airplane, N39586, was destroyed when it impacted mountainous terrain about 5,500 feet msl, adjacent to the Davidson Glacier, approximately 13 miles southwest of Haines, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) on-demand air tour flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. The airplane was owned and operated by LAB Flying Service, Inc., of Haines. The certificated commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident, and a company VFR flight plan was in effect. The flight departed Skagway, Alaska, about 1400, and was en route to Glacier Bay National Park via the Davidson Glacier.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on July 30, the chief pilot for the operator reported that the accident airplane departed Skagway as the first of two airplanes conducting air tour flights over the Glacier Bay National Park. He added that the standard route of flight, after departing Skagway, would be to proceed southbound along the Taiya Inlet, cross the Chilkat Inlet, climb over the Davidson Glacier, and descend into the Glacier Bay area. He added that when the first of the two airplanes failed to return to Skagway, an aerial search was initiated.

During an interview with the NTSB IIC on August 1, the pilot of the second tour airplane stated that as both airplanes climbed up the Davidson Glacier, it was apparent that low clouds, rain, and fog within the pass would not allow them to fly through the pass. He said that he and the other pilot discussed optional flight routes. The accident pilot said that he was going to take a heading of 240 degrees, and fly through to the other side. The pilot of the second airplane said he replied to the accident pilot that he thought that this was a real bad idea, and that he was not going to follow him. The second pilot stated that the accident pilot's final radio transmission was, in part: "...I'm sure that it's clear on the other side. I'll see you on the other side." No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. The pilot of the second company airplane took an alternate route, completed his tour, and returned to Skagway.

Crew information

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. The most recent first-class medical certificate was issued to the pilot on September 21, 2000, and contained no limitations.

According to the operator, at the time of the accident, the pilot's total aeronautical experience consisted of about 1,788 hours, of which about 1,031 hours were accrued in the accident airplane make and model. In the preceding 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, the operator listed a total of 323.7 and 88.9 hours respectively.

The operator initially hired the pilot on March 9, 2000. At that time, the pilot reported he had accrued 694.4 hours of total aeronautical experience. His pilot-in-command experience consisted of 655.4 hours in single-engine airplanes, 123 hours at night, 56.8 hours of actual instrument flight, and 65.8 hours of simulated instrument flight.

Due to the seasonal nature of the company's business, the accident pilot's employment was terminated on September 28, 2000. He returned to work on February 15, 2001.

The accident pilot's most recent CFR Part 135 check ride, including an instrument proficiency check, was conducted on April 23, in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The company's chief pilot administered the check ride.

Aircraft information

The airplane had accumulated a total time in service of 7,760.0 hours. The airplane is maintained on an Approved Airworthiness Inspection Program (AAIP). The most recent inspection was accomplished on July 18, 2001, 42.0 hours before the accident.

The engine had accrued a total time in service of 4,121.0 hours. The operator reported that a major overhaul was accomplished 954.4 hours before the accident.

Meteorological information

The closest official weather observation station is Haines, Alaska, which is located about 13 nautical miles northeast of the accident site. On July 30, at 1354, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was reporting in part: Wind, 100 degrees at 10 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds, 6,000 feet overcast; temperature, 60 degrees F; dew point, 51 degrees F; altimeter, 29.97 inHg.

Communications

At 1411, the pilot contacted the Juneau Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS), and reported that he had departed Skagway, and then filed a VFR flight plan. The Juneau AFSS specialist reported to the accident pilot, in part: "LAB five eighty six roger, airmets for mountains obscured and moderate turbulence below five thousand, your ah flight plan is active."

Wreckage and impact information

Continuous poor weather conditions prevented the NTSB IIC, along with members from the Juneau Mountain Rescue Team, Alaska State Troopers, and Federal Aviation Administration representatives, from reaching the accident site until August 1. The accident site was located in an area of steep, mountainous, glacial terrain. The main wreckage came to rest about the 4,700 feet msl level, on an area of about 40 degree downsloping, snow-covered terrain.

The area of the mountain that appeared to be the first point of impact was a vertical rock wall. After initial impact, the airplane wreckage fell onto an area of rock-covered terrain, then continued to slide downslope on snow-covered terrain, and finally came to rest about 800 feet below the initial impact point. A postimpact fire burned the fuselage center section of the wreckage.

During the IIC's on-site investigation, portions of airplane wreckage debris, including the accident airplane's propeller assembly, broken Plexiglas, passenger seats, and two of the airplane's occupants, were located about 75 feet below the initial impact point, in an area of large boulders.

The propeller bolts attaching the propeller to the engine crankshaft remained attached to the crankshaft flange, but the propeller hub-mounting surface was fractured. Both propeller blades were loose in the propeller hub, but remained attached to the propeller hub assembly. Both of the propeller blades displayed multiple leading edge gouges, substantial torsional "S" twisting, and chordwise scratching.

Scattered downslope, in a line between the initial impact point, and the final resting point of the main wreckage, were small portions of airplane wreckage debris, including engine cowlings, paint chips, broken Plexiglas, and passenger personal effects.

The engine assembly was torn free from the engine firewall, and located about 25 feet upslope from the main wreckage site. The engine sustained substantial impact and fire damage to the front and underside portion. Both exhaust tubes were crushed upward against each of the cylinders. The crushed and folded edges of the exhaust tubes did not exhibit any cracking or bending.

The wings remained attached to the fuselage, but were extensively distorted, and fire damaged. The flight control surfaces remained connected to their respective attach points. Due to impact and postaccident fire damage, continuity of the flight control cables could not be established.

The instrument panel sustained extensive impact and fire damage. The airplane's directional gyro and airspeed indicator were the only two surviving panel mounted instruments that were not destroyed by impact and fire related damage.

The airspeed indicator was retained by the NTSB's IIC for laboratory examination.

The airplane's directional gy