ATL03FA147

NTSB accident investigation · Grumman HU-16C · Fort Pierce, FL · September 25, 2003

Accident · FatalField investigationFinal report
Date
September 25, 2003, 11:26 local (15:26 UTC)
Place
Fort Pierce, FL
Injuries
2 fatal, 1 minor
Damage
Destroyed
Phase of flight
Enroute
Aircraft
N70258Grumman HU-16C
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report April 28, 2005
Report
Approved by Office Director
Parties
Orlando FSDO
FAA report
20030925031249A
Case key
58016

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

A loss of engine power due to the pilot placing the fuel selector in the off position which resulted in fuel starvation to the left engine, after the pilot intentionally shut down the right engine.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

Loss of engine powerClimb
All engines
Engine shutdown - intentionalPilot in command
In-flight planning/decisionPilot in commandCause
Fuel tank selector position - improper use ofPilot in commandCause
Fuel system - starvation
Forced landingDescent - emergency
In flight collision with objectDescent - emergency
Object - tree(s)Factor

Analysis

According to the pilot, during climb-out from runway 09 at an altitude of approximately 500 feet the right engine warning red magnetic chip detector light illuminated. The pilot decided to shut down the right engine and return to the airport. Shortly after making that decision the left engine began to lose power. The airplane was unable to maintain altitude, and the pilot prepared to make an off-airport emergency landing in a field. The airplane collided with the trees as the pilot maneuvered for the emergency landing. Examination of the airframe, and flight controls revealed no anomalies. Examination of the left and right engine revealed no mechanical anomalies. Examination of cockpit fuel selector controls revealed that the left engine fuel selector handle was in the off position and the right engine fuel selector handle was set in the left tank position. During the in-flight engine secure procedures the pilot is required to place the inoperative engine fuel selector in the off position

Factual narrative

History of flight

On September 25, 2003, at 1126 eastern standard time, a Grumman HU-16C, N70258, registered to Corsair Aviation Holdings Inc. and operated by an airline transport pilot, collided with a stand of trees during an emergency landing in the vicinity of the St. Lucie International Airport, Ft. Pierce, Florida. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Part 91 with no flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airline transport pilot received minor injuries. The airline transport rated passenger and passenger were fatally injured. The flight departed the St. Lucie International Airport, on September 25, 2003, at 1120.

According to the pilot, during climb-out from runway 09, all engine indications were normal. At an altitude of approximately 500 feet the right engine warning red magnetic chip detector light illuminated. The pilot performed the engine out procedure, informed the pilot-rated passenger that they would be returning to the departure airport, instructed the pilot-rated passenger to assist in the turn, delay the feathering procedure and continue to use the right engine at 2000 rpm. During the turn the pilot made a "PAN" call to Air Traffic Control (ATC) to report the urgency of the situation. After turning downwind the pilot instructed the pilot-rated passenger to feather the engine, which he completed after both pilots confirmed the correct engine would be feathered.

Shortly after making that decision the left engine began to lose power. The pilot informed the control tower that he would make an attempt to land on runway 14, but could not make a left turn to intercept the runway and would attempt to land on runway 09. The pilot instructed the pilot-rated passenger to re-start the right engine, but the airplane was down to 300 feet and at the minimum control speed of 85 knots.

The pilot prepared to make an off-airport emergency landing in a field. The airplane collided with the trees as the pilot maneuvered for the emergency landing.

Personnel information

Review of the pilot's records revealed the pilot held an airline transport certificate issued on February 09, 1999, with ratings for multiengine land, multiengine sea, and single engine sea. The pilot held a second-class medical issued on September 18, 2003, with the restriction "valid when wearing corrective lenses". The pilot accumulated a total 450 in the HU-16C, and completed his biennial flight review on March 30, 2003.

Review of the pilot-rated passenger records revealed the he held an airline transport certificate issued on April 22, 2002, with ratings for single-engine land, multiengine land, Single-engine Sea, multiengine sea, and rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot-rated passenger held a first class medical certificate issued August 21, 2003, with the restriction "valid when wearing corrective lenses".

Aircraft information

Review of the records for the Grumman HU-16 revealed that the last service inspection "A" was performed on September 25, 2003. The transponder, altitude, and static pressure system tests and inspections were performed on May 27, 2003.

Wreckage and impact information

Examination of the wreckage revealed the airplane came to rest on a 270-degree heading 3 miles northwest of the St. Lucie International Airport, Ft. Pierce, Florida. Approximately 10 feet of the outboard left wing was sheared off. The right fuel pod was located forward of the fuselage in a run-off stream. The fuselage was broken off aft of the landing gear, and came to rest on top of the right wing with horizontal and vertical stabilizer still attached. The right wing was attached to the fuselage and had leading edge crush damage. The right engine was attached to the wing, and the right engine propeller was located 20 feet forward of the fuselage. The cockpit and cabin section of the fuselage displayed heavy crush damage. The left engine was attached to the left wing with the propeller still attached to the engine.

Examination of cockpit fuel selector controls revealed that the left engine fuel selector handle was in the off position and the right engine fuel selector handle was set in the left tank position. Further examination of the fuel selector handles revealed the fixed stop detents were operational.

Examination of the left wing exhibited, leading edge crush damage throughout the span of the wing. The outboard left wing section was separated outboard of the left engine. The fuel tanks on the left side were ruptured. Flight control cables were connected to the left aileron quadrant and frayed at the ends of separation. Cables located at the left wing separation were traced to the center section quadrant and forward to the control yokes. Left engine control cables were traced from the connections on the engine to the cockpit control handle connections in the overhead console. The left engine was removed for further examination.

Rudder and elevator cables were traced from the control yokes to the cabin section separation. The cables were broken at the separations in the cabin. The remainder of the elevator and rudder cables was located in the aft section of the fuselage. The cables were also frayed at the separation point.

Examination of the right wing revealed, approximately 221 gallons of fuel was drained from the main fuel tanks. The right wing was attached to the fuselage with aileron and flaps attached to the wing. The right flap exhibited crush damage and was stowed in the up position. The right wing flight control cables were traced from the right aileron quadrant to the center section quadrant and forward to the control yokes. Right engine control cables were traced to the cockpit control handles in the overhead console. The right engine was removed for further examination. The right wing fuel pod was still attached to the wing.

Examination of the left engine revealed, the main oil screens, and magnetic chip detector was free of ferrous material. Numbers 3, 4 and 5 front and rear spark plugs were oil fouled, when cleaned and tested they exhibited spark. All other spark plugs exhibited spark when tested. The left engine cylinder compression was checked. The left engine fuel pump was flow tested and produced flow capacity and pressure, and no anomalies were noted. The left engine carburetor was tested and no anomalies were noted. Both magnetos were removed for examination; the right magneto was run at 2000 rpm and produced 2.5 amps. The left magneto was run at 2000 rpm and produced 2.5 amps. The right magneto was timed at 20-degrees and the left magneto was timed at 23-degrees. Examination of the left three bladed propeller assembly exhibited all three blades were bent aft.

Examination of the right engine revealed that the nose case was broken off. The forward spline of the crankshaft was broken off. Metal filings were found in the main engine oil screen and throughout the lubricating system. The magnetic chip detector exhibited metal filings on the pick-up. The master rod bearing showed signs of scoring. The right engine propeller was broken off at the nose case, and the propeller was in the feathered positioned.

Additional information

Review of the NAVAIR 01-85AC-1, Section I, Part 2: Fuel Tank Selectors revealed. Two spring-loaded stops and a fixed stop are installed on the face of each fuel tank selector dial. The spring-loaded stops must be depressed with a finger in order to turn handle. One spring stop prevents the handle from being moved inadvertently into the OFF position from the MAIN TANK (Right or LEFT) position, thereby cutting off fuel to the engines, and also prevents it from being moved out of the OFF position to the MAIN TANK position. The other spring loaded stop prevents the handle from being moved into the AUX TANK position from the MAIN TANK position.

The fixed stop prevents th

Aircraft

Registration
N70258
Reported as
Grumman HU-16C
Category
Airplane
Serial number
141271
Airframe hours
4,276
Engines
Wright 43D50, 1,425 horsepower, reciprocatingWright, reciprocating
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Registered owner
Corsair Aviation Holdings Inc
Airworthiness certificate
Special, Restricted (Special)
Last inspection
Continuous airworthiness · September 22, 2003 · 4,276 hours before
Departed
FPR · Fort Pierce, FL
Airport
FPR · St Lucie County Intl, runway 09, 6,492 × 150 ft, asphalt

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
53
Injuries
Minor
Certificates
Airline transport, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land, Single-engine sea, Multi-engine sea
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 2, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Last flight review
March 30, 2003
Seat
Left
Flight hours
13,000 total · 450 in this make and model · 600 as pilot in command · 60 in the last 90 days · 15 in the last 30 days
Role
Co-pilot
Age
56
Injuries
Fatal
Certificate
Airline transport
Airplane ratings
Multi-engine sea, Single-engine sea, Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Seat
Right
Toxicology
Performed
Flight hours
12,800 total

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
120° at 8 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
15,000 ft broken
Temperature
81 °F, dew point 73 °F
Altimeter
29.97 inHg
Observed at
FPR, 3 nm away

Docket · 20

The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 24, 2005, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 13.7 MB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.