CEN12LA053

The pilot reported that before departure, he checked two internet weather services for his flight’s weather briefing. The weather forecast indicated visual meteorological conditions for the entire flight. The internet weather service used by the pilot contained a disclaimer stating the service “is not a substitute for an official flight briefing.” The weather was reportedly good until 10 miles north of the destination, where the flight encountered rain and low ceilings. The onboard radar indicated that weather had deteriorated behind the route of flight and along the proposed route of flight. Weather conditions continued to deteriorate and the pilot elected to perform a precautionary landing with a quartering tailwind. About 30 feet above the ground, the helicopter settled rapidly. The pilot added power to slow the descent and the helicopter made a firm landing with about 10 knots of forward speed. The right skid then dug into the soft field and the helicopter rolled onto its right side. A ground fire subsequently ensued. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the helicopter during the flight. The helicopter’s Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) stated that the primary source of preflight weather briefings is an individual briefing obtained from a briefer. Other sources include the internet-accessed Direct User Access Terminal System. The AIM advises that weather services provided by entities other than Federal Aviation Administration, National Weather Service (NWS), or their contractors may not meet quality control standards; the internet sites the pilot referenced were not supported by these entities. The AIM also indicated all "flight-related, aviation weather decisions must be based on primary weather products" that meet regulatory requirements. Prior to departure the NWS was reporting instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) in the destination area and an AIRMET for IMC was current for the route of flight that extended over the accident site.

On November 3, 2011, about 1815 eastern standard time, N130AL, a Eurocopter EC 130 B4, sustained substantial damage during a hard landing near Noblesville, Indiana. A ground fire subsequently occurred. The private pilot and five passengers sustained minor injuries. The helicopter was registered to Sweetwater Helicopters LLC and was operated by the pilot. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area during the time of the accident. No flight plan was on file for the flight. The flight originated from the Adderly's Pad Heliport (1IN8), near Fort Wayne, Indiana, about 1715, and was destined for the Indianapolis Downtown Heliport (8A4), Indianapolis, Indiana. The pilot reported that before departure he checked two internet weather services for his flight’s weather briefing. He indicated that the weather forecast indicated visual meteorological conditions would be in place for the entire flight. The flight departed 1IN8 and weather was reportedly good until ten miles north of Indianapolis Metro Airport when the flight encountered rain and low ceilings. He proceeded to hover the helicopter over a field while evaluating the weather. The on-board radar indicated that weather had deteriorated both behind his route of flight and along his intended route of flight. The pilot elected to divert to Noblesville Airport. The weather conditions continued to deteriorate and the pilot elected to perform a precautionary landing on a harvested cornfield. He circled to observe the field before making a landing approach from the north. While approaching the hover about 30 feet above the ground, the helicopter settled rapidly. He added power to slow the descent and the helicopter made a firm landing with about ten knots of forward speed. The right skid dug into the soft cornfield and the helicopter rolled onto its right side. The pilot reportedly attempted to pull the emergency fuel shutoff lever but was unable to do so. The passengers and pilot exited through the left side door. After ten minutes, flames were observed and the helicopter sustained a ground fire. The pilot reported that there were no helicopter mechanical malfunctions encountered during the accident flight. Representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and a technical advisor from American Eurocopter to the accredited representative for the Bureau d'Enquetes et D'Analyses of France accessed the accident site on November 4, 2011 and examined and documented the wreckage. The instrument panel and cabin area were destroyed by the fire. The helicopter was equipped with a vehicle engine multifunction display (VEMD) and a Garmin G-500. The VEMD and the Garmin G-500 were shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for examination. The NTSB non-volatile memory (NVM) Factual Report, in part stated: Garmin G500 The Garmin G500 is amulti-function cockpit display designed to consolidate primary flight, navigation, and sensor data. ... The panel mount portion of the unit is configured with a dual side-by-side 6.5 inch displays that can be set up to display performance and control instrumentation as well as approach plates and other navigational data. The G500 is a passive display device, accepting GPS data from an external source, and does not record any information. Thales VEMD The Thales VEMD is a multi-function cockpit display designed to manage essential and non-essential vehicle and engine data. The VEMD is a dual channel system and each channel stores data and failure information on ... NVM. The following information is stored in the VEMD: Flight Reports Failure Reports Over-limit Reports (certain models). Over-limit reports do not contain date or time stamp information. ... Four failures and three over-limitation exceedances were recorded during this flight. The recorded failures and over-limits are consistent with a sudden stoppage of the main rotor blades and a rupture of the engine to main gearbox transmission shaft. The NVM Factual Report is attached to the docket associated with this investigation. The pilot, age 54, held a private pilot certificate with a rotorcraft-helicopter rating. The pilot held a FAA second-class medical certificate issued on January 4, 2010. He reported that he had accumulated 713 hours of total flight time and 701 hours of total flight time in rotorcraft. He indicated that he had accumulated 304 hours of flight time in the same make and model airplane as the accident helicopter. The closest National Weather Service (NWS) terminal aerodrome forecast to the accident site was issued for the Indianapolis International Airport (IND), near Indianapolis, Indiana. The forecast, issued at 1518, was valid from 1500 on November 3, 2011 expected wind from 090 degrees at 8 knots; visibility 3 statute miles in light rain and mist, scattered clouds at 800 feet above ground level (AGL), ceiling overcast at 1,500 feet AGL, with temporary conditions of ceilings broken at 800 feet through 1700 EST. At 1750 EST the NWS issued an amended forecast for IND while the flight was en route. The amended forecast valid for 1800 on November 3, 2011 expected wind from 090 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 1 statute mile in light drizzle and mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet AGL. The NWS had airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) sierra update five current at the time of the accident for ceilings below 1,000 feet AGL and/or visibility below 3 miles in precipitation and mist. At 1815, the recorded weather at the Indianapolis Executive Airport, near Indianapolis, Indiana, was: Wind 040 degrees at 11 knots gusting to 16 knots; visibility 5 statute miles; present weather rain; sky condition overcast 600 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 8 degrees C; altimeter 29.92 inches of mercury. A review of the observations for TYQ indicated that IFR conditions had beenreported at the station since 1435. A representative from one of the internet weather services that the pilot used for the accident flight stated that the internet service was not a qualified internet communications provider (QICP), which does not require a login and the users are anonymous. The service did not record output data provided during the user session. However, it did record internet input requests. A review of the requests revealed weather references to 8A4 on November 3, 2011, nine views for the weather within a 10-mile radius of 8A4 and Smith Field Airport (SMD), near Fort Wayne, Indiana, one view of the airport data for 8A4, one view of the route between SMD and 8A4, and one view of the weather within a 10-mile radius between 8A4 and IND. In addition, a review of this website showed a disclaimer that it “is not a substitute for an official flight briefing.” According to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Chapter 7, Safety of Flight, the FAA maintains a nationwide network of Flight Service Stations (FSSs) to serve the weather needs of pilots. The primary source of preflight weather briefings is an individual briefing obtained from a briefer at the FSS. These briefings, tailored to a specific flight, are available 24 hours a day through the use of the toll free number. Other sources of weather information include the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS), which can be accessed by pilots via personal computer, inflight weather information, which is available from any FSS within radio range to include en route flight advisory service (EFAS), which is provided to serve the non-routine weather needs of pilots in flight. Additionally, the AIM advises pilots and operators to be aware that weather services provided by entities other than FAA, NWS or their contractors (such as the DUATS) may not meet FAA/NWS quality control standards and further cautions pilots and operators when using unfamiliar products, or products not supported by FAA/NWS technical specifications. The AIM indicated that the development of new weather products coupled with increased access to these products via the public internet, created confusion within the aviation community regarding the relationship between regulatory requirements and new weather products. To clarify the proper use of aviation weather products to meet the requirements of 14 CFR, the FAA defines weather products as a primary weather product which meets all the regulatory requirements and safety needs for use in making flight related, aviation weather decisions and supplementary weather product which may be used for enhanced situational awareness. If utilized, a supplementary weather product must only be used in conjunction with one or more primary weather products. The AIM, in part, stated: All flight-related, aviation weather decisions must be based on primary weather products. Supplementary weather products augment the primary products by providing additional weather information butmay not be used as stand-alone weather products to meet aviation weather regulatory requirements or without the relevant primary products. When discrepancies exist between primary and supplementary weather products describing the same weather phenomena, users must base flight-related decisions on the primary weather product. Furthermore, multiple primary products may be necessary to meet all aviation weather regulatory requirements.