CEN12LA401

NTSB accident investigation · Piper PA-23 · Baltic, OH · June 28, 2012

Accident · Serious injuriesLimited investigationFinal report
Date
June 28, 2012, 09:20 local (13:20 UTC)
Place
Baltic, OH
Injuries
2 serious
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Enroute
Aircraft
N3170PPiper PA-23
Defining event
Enroute-climb to cruise: Loss of engine power (total)
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report November 26, 2012
Report
Approved by Office Director
NTSB office
Central Region
Parties
FAA Flight Standards District Office
FAA report
20120628015969A
Case key
84115

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

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Probable cause

Loss of engine power due to fuel starvation as a result of particulate contaminant on the carburetor screens.

Findings · 5

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Fluids: fuelAircraft › Fluids/misc hardware · Fluid conditionPiper PA-23: 3 casesAll aircraft: 1,695 casesProbable cause
Maintenance/inspections: scheduled maint checksAircraft › Aircraft handling/service · Inadequate inspectionPiper PA-23: 1 caseAll aircraft: 76 cases
Knowledge: knowledge of proceduresPersonnel issues › Experience/knowledge · PilotPiper PA-23: 1 caseAll aircraft: 41 cases
Maintenance: scheduled/routine maintenancePersonnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnelPiper PA-23: 1 caseAll aircraft: 320 cases

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

Shortly after takeoff, the left engine lost power so the pilot diverted to an alternate airport for landing. After the left engine was secured, the airplane was not maintaining altitude so the pilot selected an off-airport site short of the alternate airport to land. While approaching the off-airport site, the right engine lost power, and the airplane was substantially damaged during the forced landing. An examination of the fuel system revealed an extensive amount of corrosion consistent with the continued presence of water over an extended period. Both engine carburetor screens were occluded with particle contaminants, which likely resulted in the loss of power in both engines. The pilot reported that before the flight, he conducted a normal preflight inspection, had 54 gallons of fuel added to both main fuel tanks, and sumped one fuel sump cup full of fuel out of each main tank. Neither the previous owner nor the accident pilot was aware of an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring a special fuel sumping procedure before every flight. The AD also specifies that the procedure should be incorporated into the owner handbook and pilot’s operating manual. The required documentation advising pilots of this preflight procedure was not in the airplane.

Factual narrative

On June 28, 2012, approximately 0920 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-23, N3170P, was substantially damaged during a forced landing to a field near Baltic, Ohio. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured. The personal flight was being conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 without a flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The cross-country flight departed Akron-Canton Regional Airport (KCAK), Akron, Ohio, approximately 0900 and was en route to Mallory Airport (WV12), South Charleston, West Virginia. The pilot stated that about 10 minutes after departure, the left engine began to surge and subsequently lost power. He feathered the propeller, secured the engine, and elected to divert to the Richard Downing Airport (I40) near Coshocton, Ohio. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and elected to perform an off-airport landing to a field. While approaching that field, the right engine lost power. During the emergency approach and landing, the airplane impacted the tops of trees prior to impacting the ground. Both wings were bent and the fuselage was wrinkled during the accident sequence. During recovery, both main and auxiliary fuel tanks were drained. An investigator from the National Transportation Safety Board and two inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) examined the airplane, both engines, and related systems. A sample of fuel, drained from the left wing, contained small particles. Examination of the left engine fuel system revealed metal, dirt, and paint chip contamination in the fuel bowl. In addition, the fuel bowl was pitted and corroded. The fuel screen in the left engine carburetor was 100 percent occluded with contamination similar to what was found in the fuel bowl. Additional contamination was found in the left carburetor bowl. The left engine driven fuel pump was pitted and corroded, and the left engine electric fuel pump screen was occluded. The magnet in the bottom of the pump contained corroded metal fragments. Examination of the right engine fuel system revealed contamination in the fuel bowl, consistent with the contamination found in the left fuel system. The strainer bowl housing was corroded and pitted. The fuel screen in the right engine carburetor was 90 percent occluded with contamination similar to what was found in the fuel bowl. Contamination was also found in the right carburetor bowl and the right engine electric fuel pump. The fuel pump housing exhibited pitting and corrosion. No additional anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power were observed. In November 1988, Piper Aircraft issued Service Bulletin (SB) 827A, in order to address the loss of engine power due to water and sediment accumulation in the fuel system. This service bulletin required the pilot to sump both the main and auxiliary fuel tanks if the dual fuel drain kit had not been installed on the airplane. This was accomplished byselecting both main and auxiliary fuel tanks with the cockpit selector valve. In addition, the pilot was to select a cross feed setting and conduct one additional sump of the system. On August 21, 1992, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 92-13-04, requiring compliance with Piper SB 827A. This AD required that the SB with the sumping procedures be added to the Owner Handbook and Pilots Operating Manual for the airplanes affected by the AD, and that the procedures be complied with if the dual fuel drain kit had not been installed. An examination of the maintenance records revealed that the last annual inspection had been completed on October 1, 2010; under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 43 Appendix D. The logbook entry stated that AD 92-13-04 had been complied with and was to be accomplished prior to each preflight. However, SB 827A was not located in the airplane paperwork, Owner Handbook, or Pilots Operating Manual during the accident investigation. The pilot reported that prior to the flight, he conducted a normal preflight inspection, had 54 gallons of fuel added to both main fuel tanks, and sumped one fuel sump cup full of fuel out of each main tank. The pilot consulted with the previous owner who confirmed that there was only one fuel sump on each wing. The previous owner did not advise of any special procedures required for sumping the fuel. The pilot acknowledged that he was not aware of SB 827A or AD 92-13-04, which required the special fuel sumping procedure. He stated that when he sumped the fuel, he did not notice any contamination in the fuel.

Aircraft

Registration
N3170P
Reported as
Piper PA-23
Category
Airplane
Serial number
23-1105
Airframe hours
5,042
Engines
Lycoming O-320-A, 160 horsepower, reciprocatingLycoming 0-320-A, 160 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Last inspection
Annual · October 1, 2010 · 37 hours before
Departed
KCAK · Akron, OH
Destination
WV12 · SouthCharleston, WV

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
60
Injuries
Serious
Certificate
Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 3, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
January 22, 2011
Seat
Left
Flight hours
1,086 total · 27 in this make and model · 1,002 as pilot in command · 7 in the last 90 days · 1 in the last 24 hours

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
220° at 6 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
72 °F, dew point 55 °F
Altimeter
29.88 inHg
Observed at
KBJJ, 20 nm away

Docket · 4

The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 14, 2012, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 4.0 MB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.