CEN20LA118

The non-instrument rated pilot planned a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot obtained weather information and filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan through his on-line weather/flight planning account the day of the accident. Air traffic control data indicated that the flight and initial portion of the instrument approach proceeded normally. Position data revealed that the airplane proceeded inbound and descended as expected along the assigned approach course. The airplane passed the runway approach threshold at an altitude of about 300 ft above ground level (agl) and entered a gradual left turn; however, the established descent continued. The final data point depicted the airplane about 0.14 mile east of the runway, about 100 ft agl. The pilot’s memory of the instrument approach was vague due to his injuries; however, he stated that he was unable to see the runway and decided to execute a missed approach. At some point, he either made a “bad input” into the autopilot or the autopilot commanded a slight turn or descent. The accident site was located immediately southeast of the final position data point. A postimpact fire destroyed much of the airplane. A postaccident examination did not identify any preimpact abnormities that would have contributed to the accident. The instrument approach procedure allowed for descent as low as 250 ft above the runway elevation and required 1-3/8 to 1 mile flight visibility to land depending on the capabilities of the airplane. Just before the accident the automated weather reporting station recorded calm winds, one-half mile visibility in fog, and an overcast ceiling at 200 ft above ground level. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating; however, he did not have an instrument rating. The accident was consistent with the non-instrument rated pilot’s loss of control during a go-around attempt after conducting an instrument approach in weather conditions that were below minimums.

On March 11, 2020, about 0636 central daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-301T airplane, N599ST, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Jasper County Airport (RZL), Rensselaer, Indiana. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot obtained weather information and filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan through his on-line weather/flight planning account the day of the accident. Air traffic control data revealed that the airplane departed the Purdue University Airport (LAF) at 0607 on an IFR flight plan en route to RZL. At 0620, the pilot was cleared for the area navigation approach (RNAV) to runway 18. At 0626, the pilot was instructed to change to the airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and to cancel the flight plan through flight service after landing. The pilot acknowledged and no further communications were recorded. Position data depicted the airplane proceed inbound and descend along the approach course. At 0635:49, the airplane crossed the runway approach threshold about 1,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane entered a gradual left turn; however, the descent continued. The final data point was recorded at 0636:07. The airplane was about 0.14 mile east of the runway and about 800 ft msl. The airport elevation was 698 ft. Due to his injuries and hospitalization, the pilot was unable to provide a statement until several months after the accident. The pilot indicated that his memory of the accident was vague due to his injuries; however, he remembered that before the flight he obtained a weather briefing and departed without a flight plan. He added that the automated weather station at RZL reported overcast clouds at 400 ft. and one mile visibility, so he elected to conduct a RNAV/GPS approach to runway 18. He was unable to see the runway and executed a missed approach. He believed at some point on the missed approach that he either made a “bad input” into the autopilot or the autopilot commanded a slight turn or descent. The RNAV 18 approach allowed for descent as low as 250 ft above the runway elevation and required 1-3/8 to 1 mile flight visibility to land depending on the capabilities of the airplane. At 0635, the automated weather reporting station at RZL recorded calm winds, one-half mile visibility in fog, and an overcast ceiling at 200 ft above ground level. Federal Aviation Administration records indicated that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating; however, he did not have an instrument rating. The airplane wreckage was recovered to a salvage facility where engine and airframe examinations were conducted. The airframe had extensive fire and thermal damage which limited the scope of the examination. Much of the cabin and instrument panel was destroyed by the fire. Flight control continuity from the cockpit to the ailerons, rudder, and stabilator wasestablished, with the exception of a broken cable segment. Further examination of the cable segment observed failure signatures consistent with fracture after exposure to the postimpact fire while still under tension. The stabilator trim assembly corresponded to a neutral trim setting. The flap control rod position was consistent with a flaps up (retracted) setting. The nose and left main landing gear actuators were in the extended position which corresponded to a landing gear down (extended) position. The right landing gear was impact separated and its actuator was observed about mid-travel position. Examination of the engine and propeller did not identify any preimpact abnormalities.