CEN24FA340

After takeoff, the airplane climbed to flight level (FL) 210, and the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight proceeded routinely. The pilot was ultimately cleared for a visual approach to the intended destination airport by the air traffic controller. About one mile from the runway, while on final approach, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to execute a missed approach. The controller subsequently cancelled the approach clearance and instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading of 180° and climb to 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane initially continued to descend toward the runway. Seventeen seconds later, the airplane began to climb. The airplane crossed over the runway approach threshold about 800 ft above ground level (agl). The airplane’s flight track drifted slightly north-northeast of the runway centerline, and once the pilot initiated the missed approach the airplane’s rate of climb varied between about 240 ft per minute (fpm) and 1,034 fpm. During the climb, the airplane’s calibrated airspeed decreased to about 81 kts as the airplane entered a gradual right turn. At that time, the airplane was about 0.60 miles southeast of the departure end of the runway. The controller subsequently instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 230° and maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the assigned heading but not the altitude. The controller attempted to confirm the altitude assignment but received no further communications from the pilot. The airplane’s calibrated airspeed decreased to about 71 kts. About that time, the climb transitioned to a descent. About 4 seconds later, the calibrated airspeed decreased to about 47 kts and the descent rate increased to about 5,000 fpm. The calibrated airspeed then increased to about 160 kts; however, the airplane remained in a descent until the final ADS-B data point. The accident site was located about 98 ft east-northeast from that data point. A witness located about 0.25 miles from the accident site observed the airplane come up above a tree line in a climb. Shortly afterward, the airplane stopped climbing “all of a sudden,” rolled to the right, and entered a descent. The engine was loud and sounded like it was “really revving.” The witness added that it seemed to be “wide open.” A second witness located about 0.125 miles from the accident site reported that the airplane engine “revved up,” decreased, and then “revved up” again, before it cut out. He did not hear the sound of the impact. The accident site was located in a corn field about 1 mile southeast of the departure end of the runway. A small section of the 8-ft-tall corn crop exhibited 45° downward cuts immediately adjacent to the impact crater. The airframe was fragmented and portions were consumed by a postimpact fire. All major airframe structural components were located at the accident site. Each flight control surface, including both wing flaps, either remained attached to the airframe or were separated and locatedwithin the debris path. The wing flap actuator was not found and the flap position at the time of the accident could not be determined. Based on the examination of the available wreckage, no evidence of an inflight structural failure or flight control anomaly was observed. According to the airplane manufacturer’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook, the airplane’s aerodynamic stall speeds with the wings level (0° angle of bank) were as follows: 60 kts calibrated airspeed (KCAS) with the landing gear and wing flaps extended, 64 KCAS with the wing flaps at 20° and landing gear down, and 71 KCAS with the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Examination of the wreckage showed that both main landing gear struts were in the extended position (the position of the flaps could not be determined) so the aerodynamic stall speed was at least 60 KCAS. ADS-B data indicated that the airplane’s KCAS immediately before the accident was as low as 47 KCAS, well below the stall speed indicated by the manufacturer. Based on the available information, the pilot failed to maintain sufficient airspeed during the missed approach and ultimately allowed the airplane to enter an aerodynamic stall from which he was unable to recover before impacting the terrain.

The airplane maintenance records were not available to the NTSB during the course of the investigation. If they were located in the airplane, they were destroyed by the postimpact fire. According to the airplane manufacturer’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook, the airplane’s aerodynamic stall speeds with the wings level (0° angle of bank) were as follows: 60 KCAS with the landing gear and wing flaps extended, 64 KCAS with the wing flaps at 20° and landing gear down, and 71 KCAS with the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000 system; however, a flight data card was not located at the accident site, nor is it known if a data card was installed. A Stratus 2S unit was recovered at the accident site and successfully downloaded by the NTSB recorder lab. On September 6, 2024, about 0949 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P airplane, N629AG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Anderson, Indiana. The pilot, two pilot-rated passengers, and one additional passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. ADS-B and Stratus 2S data (from a device recovered from the airplane wreckage) revealed that the flight departed Fort Dodge Regional Airport (FOD), Fort Dodge, Iowa, about 0647 central daylight time. The airplane proceeded on an east-southeast course toward Anderson Municipal Airport-Darlington Field (AID), Anderson, Indiana, and climbed to FL210, which corresponded to a pressure altitude of 21,000 ft. About 0921 eastern daylight time, the pilot initiated a descent from FL210. About 0942, the airplane was about 13 miles west-northwest of AID at 7,000 ft msl when the Indianapolis approach controller instructed the pilot to descend to 3,000 ft msl and advised him to expect a visual approach to runway 12 at AID. About 4 minutes later, the pilot informed the controller that the airport was in sight, and the controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach. At that time, the flight was about 4 miles west-northwest of AID and at an altitude of about 3,600 ft msl. At 0947:19, when the flight was 0.9 miles west of the runway and about 2,059 ft msl, the pilot informed the controller he needed to execute a missed approach. The controller subsequently cancelled the approach clearance and instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading of 180° and climb to 3,000 ft msl. The airplane initially continued to descend toward the runway. Seventeen seconds later, at 0947:36, the airplane began to climb. The altitude of the airplane was about 1,665 ft msl (730 ft agl) and the calibrated airspeed was about 134 kts. Two seconds later, the airplane flew over the runway 12 threshold at 1,678 ft msl. The airplane’s flight track drifted slightly north-northeast of the runway centerline. Once the pilot initiated the missed approach, the airplane’s rate of climb varied between about 240 fpm and 1,034 fpm. At 0948:30, the calibrated airspeeddecreased to about 81 kts as the airplane entered a gradual right turn. At that time, the airplane was about 0.60 miles southeast of the departure end of runway 12 and climbing through about 2,132 ft msl. At 0948:36, the controller instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 230° and maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the assigned heading but not the altitude. The controller attempted to confirm the altitude assignment but received no further communications from the pilot. At 0948:53, the calibrated airspeed decreased to about 71 kts, and the climb had transitioned to a descent. About 4 seconds later, the calibrated airspeed had decreased to about 47 kts and the descent rate had increased to about 5,000 fpm. The calibrated airspeed subsequently increased to about 160 kts; however, the airplane remained in a descent until the final data point was recorded at 0949:02. The accident site was located about 98 ft east-northeast from that data point at an elevation of about 923 ft msl. At 0949:46, the approach controller transmitted that radar contact with the flight was lost. The AID tower controller informed the approach controller that he was not in communication with the pilot. At 0951:56, the AID tower controller informed the approach controller of black smoke southeast of the airport. A witness located about 0.25 miles from the accident site observed the airplane come up above a tree line in a climb. Shortly afterward, the airplane stopped climbing “all of a sudden,” rolled to the right, and entered a descent. The engine was loud and sounded like it was “really revving.” The witness added that it seemed to be “wide open.” A second witness located about 0.125 miles from the accident site reported that the airplane engine “revved up,” decreased, and then “revved up” again, before it cut out. He did not hear the sound of the impact. East Central Indiana Pathologists, P.C. performed an autopsy of the pilot. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries sustained in the accident. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no ethanol and no drugs of abuse. The pilot’s logbook was not available to the NTSB during the course of the investigation. The accident site was located in a corn field about 1 mile southeast of the departure end of runway 12 at an elevation of 923 ft msl. A small section of the 8-ft-tall corn crop exhibited 45° downward cuts immediately adjacent to the impact crater. The airplane came to rest upright on a northeast heading. The debris area extended about 50 ft southwest from the initial impact. The airframe was fragmented, and portions were consumed by a postimpact fire. The engine and forward fuselage were located adjacent to a 4-ft diameter impact crater. All three propeller blades were separated at the blade roots and positioned near the crater. The cockpit area was located about 12 ft from the forward fuselage. The wings and center fuselage were positioned about 15 ftfrom the cockpit debris. The aft fuselage and empennage were located in position adjacent to the wings. Both main landing gear struts were in the extended position; the nose landing gear was separated. All major airframe structural components were located at the accident site. Each flight control surface, including both wing flaps, either remained attached to the airframe or were separated and located within the debris path. The wing flap actuator was not found and the flap position at the time of the accident could not be determined.