CHI02FA231

The single-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight at flight level 190 (19,000 feet) and impacted the terrain while performing a forced landing to a nearby airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident with clear skies and unrestricted visibilities. The pilot reported the loss of engine power about 16 minutes prior to the accident and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Air traffic control (ATC) issued vectors to the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH). About 10 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was positioned approximately 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The pilot elected to follow ATC vectors verses circling down over BEH. ATC provided vectors for runway 27 at BEH. Witnesses to the accident reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The wreckage was located on the extended runway 27 centerline, about 1.12 nm from the runway threshold. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with a stall/spin accident. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the airplane was on a 9.5 nm final approach at 6,700 feet. Between 9.5 and 5.3 nm the airspeed fluctuated between 119 and 155 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,550 and 2,600 feet/min. Between 5.3 nm and the last radar return at 1.5 nm the airspeed dropped from 155 to 78 knots. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the accident airplane should be flown at best glide speed (92 knots) after a loss of engine power. An average engine-out descent rate of 700 feet/min is achieved when best glide speed is maintained during engine-out descents. An engine teardown inspection revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the number five crankpin journal. Visual examination of the crankshaft (p/n 13F27738, s/n V537920968) showed a fatigue-type fracture through the cheek, aft of the number five crankpin journal. The exact cause of the crankshaft failure could not be determined, due to mechanical damage at the fatigue initiation point. The fracture features for the accident crankshaft was consistent with 14 previous failures of the same part number. The engine manufacturer determined the failures were most likely due to the overheating of the steel during the forging process.

History of flight

On August 4, 2002, at 1335 eastern daylight time (edt), a Piper PA-46-350P, N316PM, owned and piloted by a private pilot, impacted the terrain on the extended centerline of runway 27, 1.12 nautical miles (nm) from the approach end, at the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH), Benton Harbor, Michigan. The pilot was performing a forced landing after experiencing a total loss of engine power during cruise flight. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The pilot and his two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The personal flight was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight departed Joe Foss Field Airport (FSD), Sioux Falls, South Dakota, at 1100 edt, and had the intended destination of Toledo Express Airport (TOL), Toledo, Ohio.

According to information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot of N316PM contacted Sioux Falls Departure Control at 1101 and was instructed to turn on course and climb to 10,000 feet. At 1102, N316PM was told to contact Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and was subsequently cleared to climb to flight level 190 (19,000 feet). At 1213, N316PM was told to contact Chicago ARTCC. At 1319, N316PM reported a loss of engine power and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Chicago ARTCC issued a descent clearance from flight level 190 to 11,000 feet. At 1321, Chicago ARTCC cleared N316PM to BEH.

At 1321:57 (hhmm:ss), Chicago ARTCC contacted South Bend Approach Control (Approach Control) and informed them of the engine failure and that N316PM was going to land at BEH. At 1322:34, Approach Control informed Chicago ARTCC that they had radar contact with N316PM. At 1324:08, N316PM established radio contact with Approach Control.

At 1324:24, the pilot of N316PM reported that he did not have BEH in sight and that he was attempting to acquire the airport on his global positioning system (GPS) receiver. At 1324:30, Approach Control replied that N316PM was "three miles northwest of [BEH]" and asked if the pilot wanted "vectors to stay there, or you want to do it on your own?" The pilot of N316PM replied "ah, why don't you just kinda ah let us, give us vectors around to [BEH] please." At 1324:40, Approach Control confirmed that he would provide radar vectors and told N316PM to turn left to a heading of 070.

At 1325:53, the pilot of N316PM told Approach Control that his rate-of-descent was 1,000 feet/min. Approach Control confirmed the transmission and told N316PM to expect runway 27 at BEH. At 1327:25, Approach Control told N316M to turn right to a heading of 140. At 1329:24, the pilot of N316PM reported descending through 8,000 feet. At 1329:31, Approach Control told N316PM to turn right to a heading 270. At 1330:33, Approach Control told N316PM to fly heading 280.

At 1330:58, Approach Control told N316PM that the airplane was on an eight mile final for runway 27. The pilot of N316PM replied that he still did not have the airport in sight. Approach Control replied that the airport was "twelve o'clock, and ah seven miles." At 1331:43, the pilot of N316PM reported again that he had not visually acquired the airport. At 1332:39, Approach Control announced the airport was "twelve o'clock, six miles." At 1332:44, the pilot of N316PM reported having the airport in sight. At 1332:47, Approach Control inquired if the airplane had sufficient altitude to reach the airport and the pilot of N316PM replied "ah, think we'll be okay." Aircraft radar track data indicated N316PM was at approximately 3,800 feet at 1332:44.

At 1333:08, N316PM was cleared for the visual approach to runway 27 at BEH. The pilot of N316PM replied "six papa mike we're cleared for the visual Benton Harbor and we're planning on two seven, have the field in sight." At 1334:05, the pilot told Approach Control that he was changing to the local airport advisory frequency. No additional communications were received from N316PM. A transcription of the voice communications between South Bend Approach Control and N316PM is included with the docket material associated with this factual report.

Aircraft radar track data for the period before and after the reported accident time was obtained from the South Bend Approach Control and Chicago ARTCC. The obtained data indicated a single aircraft transmitting a discrete transponder beacon code (3614) maneuvering near BEH before the time of the accident. At 1325:22, the airplane was positioned about 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The aircraft then traveled northeast about 5.0 nm prior to turning to the southeast. At 1327:58, the airplane was positioned about 7.0 nm northeast of BEH at 10,400 feet. The airplane continued southeast for another 5.0 nm prior to turning onto the extended runway 27 centerline.

At 1331:15, the airplane was established in-bound for runway 27 and was about 9.5 nm from the runway threshold at 6,700 feet. The airplane continued on a westerly heading for the remainder of the radar data. At 1333:32, the airplane crossed over the locator outer marker, 4.8 nm east of the runway threshold, at 2,600 feet. At 1334:28, the airplane was positioned about 2.8 nm east of the runway at 1,900 feet.

The last radar return, recorded at 1335:29, was about 1.5 nm east of the runway at 1,300 feet. The last radar position was about 0.4 nm east of the accident site. Plots of the radar track data, along with a copy of the source data, are included with the docket material associated with this factual report.

According to a local law enforcement incident report, there were five witnesses to the accident. Two of the witness reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The three other witnesses were driving on Territorial Road when they noticed the accident airplane traveling on a westerly heading with its propeller not rotating. The witnesses reported seeing the airplane dive towards the ground before losing sight of the airplane. The incident report is included with the docket material associated with this factual report.

Personnel information

According to FAA records, the pilot, age 57, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. FAA records show the pilot's last medical examination was completed on July 9, 2001, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation "Holder shall possess glasses that correct for near vision."

The pilot's current flight logbook was reviewed and total flight times were calculated as of the accident flight. The pilot had a total flight experience of 2,407.8 hours, all of which were in single-engine airplanes. The pilot had logged 2,343.9 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC). The pilot had accumulated 116.8 hours in actual instrument conditions and 6.8 hours in simulated instrument conditions.

The pilot had flown 230.4 hours during the past year, 31.2 hours during the prior 90 days and 12.6 hours during previous 30 days. The accident flight was 2.6 hours in duration and was the only flight time accumulated during the previous 24 hours. The pilot's first flight in a Piper PA-46-350P was logged on September 30, 2001, and he had accumulated 164.7 hours in the PA-46-350P.

The pilot obtained simulator and flight instruction for the Piper PA-46-350P between November 6, 2001 and November 9, 2001. According to the pilot's logbook, he received 3.2 hours of instruction in the accident airplane and 9.5 hours of instruction in a PA-46-350P flight training device. The pilot received instruction on visual flight rules procedures and emergencies, as well as instrument approaches and procedures.

The pilot's last endorsement for a flight review was logged on May 18, 2000. According to regulation 14 CFR Part 61.56, a flight re