CHI06FA043

The airplane was destroyed when it impacted terrain following an in-flight loss of control. The night cross-country flight was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR) by a non-instrument rated private pilot. Air traffic control radar track data and associated surface weather observations indicated that the flight encountered deteriorating cloud ceilings along the route. The pilot obtained a pre-flight weather briefing, during which the briefer informed him of forecast and reported instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions along the proposed route of flight. Track data indicated that the flight proceeded approximately 65 nautical miles (nm) north of the course proposed in the pre-flight briefing. During the flight, the pilot contacted Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center and requested flight following. The controller informed the pilot that radar contact could not be maintained in the area and at the altitude the airplane was operating. The controller suggested that the pilot climb to a higher altitude in order to permit radar service. The pilot replied, "I've got clouds above me" and stated that he would continue under VFR. The radar altitude returns decreased from 3,400 feet mean sea level (msl) to 2,100 feet msl during the final 65 nautical miles (nm) of the flight. The reported cloud ceiling 65 nm south of the accident site and along the flight path was 3,600 above ground level (agl) (5,000 feet msl). The reported ceiling 25 nm south of the site and along the flight path was 1,400 feet agl (3,100 msl). The reported ceiling 15 nm east of the site was 800 feet agl (2,000 feet msl). Radar track data indicated that the airplane entered a right turn from a northbound course at 2,100 feet msl. Final radar contact was approximately 60 seconds later and depicted the airplane on a westbound course at 2,800 feet msl. Elevation at the accident site was about 1,581 feet. The wreckage was contained within the immediate vicinity of the impact point and was oriented on a southerly heading. First responders noted that the snow cover was undisturbed except in the immediate vicinity of the airplane. A post accident inspection did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a pre-impact failure. The airplane's ground speed and calibrated airspeed were calculated from radar track and winds aloft data. During the climbing turn, within the final 60 seconds of available radar data, the airplane's calibrated airspeed decreased to 41 knots. The published stall speed for the airplane in level flight, with a flaps-up configuration, was 69 knots. The stall speed increased to 74 knots and 82 knots at bank angles of 30 degrees and 45 degrees, respectively.

History of flight

On December 11, 2005, at 1716 central standard time, a Cirrus SR22, N621PH, piloted by a private pilot, was destroyed during an in-flight collision with terrain near Arco, Minnesota. The flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 without a flight plan. Instrument meteorological and marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity of the accident site at the time. The pilot and 2 passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight departed Wayne Municipal Airport, Wayne (LCG), Nebraska, at 1608, with an intended destination of Flying Cloud Airport (FCM), Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar and voice communication data were provided by Sioux Falls approach control and Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). Additional flight data was downloaded from the Multi Function Display (MFD) unit on-board the accident aircraft.

An individual representing N621PH contacted Columbus Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) about 1522 and requested a pre-flight briefing for the route from LCG to FCM. The proposed flight was to be conducted under visual flight rules (VFR) and was estimated to depart within 30 minutes of the call.

The briefer informed the caller that VFR flight was not recommended due to an Aeronautical Meteorological Information (AIRMET) weather advisory for instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions over north central Iowa and southwestern Minnesota. The briefer noted current reports of IFR conditions at Estherville (EST), Iowa, Fairmont (FRM), Minnesota, and Windom (MVM), Minnesota. Detailed weather information is contained in the meteorological conditions section of this factual report.

Data indicated that the accident flight departed LCG at 1608 and proceeded northeast. The aircraft's course changed from northeast to northwest about 1625. At 1636, the pilot of the accident airplane contacted Sioux Falls approach control and requested VFR flight following en route to FCM via FSD and Montevideo (MVE), Minnesota. ATC issued a discrete transponder code and identified the flight on radar at 3,500 feet mean sea level (msl), about 30 nautical miles (nm) south-southeast of FSD.

The flight continued on the northwesterly course until 1642, when the aircraft turned to a northerly course directly toward FSD. The flight was approximately 22 nm south of FSD at that time. When the aircraft reached a point approximately 8 nm south of FSD the pilot requested to proceed direct to MVE. The request was approved and the aircraft proceeded on a northeasterly course toward MVE.

As the flight approached the limit of FSD approach airspace to the northeast, the controller contacted Minneapolis ARTCC to inquire about a handoff. The Minneapolis ARTCC controller was unable to accept the handoff, noting that radar coverage would not be possible in that sector at the altitude the aircraft was operating. The FSD controller attempted to contact the accident flight to terminate VFR flight following five times between 1701 and 1704. There was no response from the aircraft.

At 1656, the pilot contacted the flight watch position at Princeton AFSS. The pilot informed the briefer that the flight was approximately 10 miles northeast of FSD en route to MVE. He requested weather advisories along the proposed route of flight. The briefer provided an advisory for IFR conditions for southwestern portions of Minnesota due to the possibility of light snow. The briefer noted that MVE had been reporting light snow, but that the most recent observation indicated "unrestricted visibility" and an overcast cloud ceiling at 2,000 feet above ground level (agl).

At 1707, the pilot contacted Minneapolis ARTCC. He stated that he "had switched off the radio inadvertently," and requested VFR flight following to MVE. He reported that the aircraft was 25 miles east of Brookings Very-High-Frequency Omni Range (VOR) radio navigational station at 2,500 feet msl. He noted that he was still on the discrete transponder code assigned by FSD approach.

At 1708, the Minneapolis ARTCC controller replied: "Okay at twenty five hundred . . . I see ya out there on radar but I'm going to lose ya in just a bit . . . besides I'll probably lose ya on the frequency at that altitude also ah . . . so do you want to go up for advisories or ah go back to your twelve hundred code and maintain VFR." The pilot replied: "Okay I best . . . I better go back to twelve hundred then just go VFR . . . cause I got clouds above me."

No further voice communications were received from the accident aircraft.

The radar track data indicated that the pilot switched to the 1200 transponder code about 1709. After that point, the aircraft continued on a northeast course until approximately 1710:07, when the airplane turned to an easterly course. The track data showed that the airplane returned to a northeast course about 1711:08. At that time, the transponder altitude return was 2,500 feet msl.

Between 1711:08 and 1715:09, the radar data indicated the airplane continued northeast bound, however, the altitude returns decreased from 2,500 feet msl to 2,100 feet msl. About 1714:09, the aircraft's track turned to the north until 1715:09. The altitude returns remained at 2,100 during this time period.

According to the radar track data, about 1715:09, the aircraft entered a climbing, right turn, and continued in that turn until the final radar data point at 1716:20. In addition, the turn radius decreased during the course of the turn. Altitude returns increased from 2,100 feet msl at 1715:09, to 2,800 feet msl at 1716:20.

No further radar returns attributable to the accident aircraft were recorded.

A local resident reported hearing an aircraft about 1730. She also reported that she thought she heard an "explosion" and "glass breaking."

An emergency locator transmitter signal was detected by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center via the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) network at 1858. The local Civil Air Patrol detachment was notified and subsequently located the aircraft about 0030 on December 12th.

Personnel information

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating, issued on January 17, 2001. He held a second-class medical certificate issued on October 20, 2004, with a limitation that corrective lenses be worn. According to FAA data, he did not have an instrument rating.

The pilot purchased the accident airplane in November 2005, approximately one month prior to the accident. He completed the transition-training course for new Cirrus owners conducted by the University of North Dakota on November 30, 2005. He logged 26.8 hours in the SR22, all in the accident airplane, during the course. All of this was logged as dual flight instruction. At the completion of the course, the pilot was given a current flight review endorsement. His total flight time in SR22 aircraft at the time of the accident was 41.6 hours.

The pilot's logbook was reviewed. Flight data downloaded from the airplane's MFD unit included three flights prior to the accident flight, which were not noted in the logbook. Based on the logbook entries and MFD data, the pilot had accumulated 271.9 hours total flight time. Five hours of flight time were logged in single-engine seaplanes. All of the remaining flight time was in single-engine land airplanes.

The pilot had logged 3.4 hours and 44.2 hours of actual and simulated instrument flight time, respectively. Total logged night flight time was 19.2 hours. Flight time in high performance airplanes totaled 49.6 hours, according to logbook entries and MFD data.

Aircraft information

The accident airplane was a 2005 model year Cirrus SR22 (serial number 1481). The airplane was a single-engine, low wing airplane of predominantly composite (fiberglass) construction.

The